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An investigation into the NEET paper leak: Done ✅ Action against the accused: Done ✅ Re-exam conducted: Done ✅ Results declared on time: Done ✅ No student lost a year. 💪🏻 Sincerely, 𝐀𝐧 𝐡𝐨𝐧𝐞𝐬𝐭, 𝐡𝐚𝐫𝐝𝐰𝐨𝐫𝐤𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐈𝐧𝐝𝐢𝐚𝐧 𝐬𝐭𝐮𝐝𝐞𝐧𝐭.

Nonce-Generation Vulnerability in the Zilliqa Ledger App: A critical vulnerability has been identified in the Zilliqa Ledger application affecting the generation of Schnorr signatures for native (non-EVM) Zilliqa transactions. The vulnerability causes signatures to be generated with a predictably weakened ephemeral nonces, from which an attacker can recover the signer’s private key using only publicly available on-chain data. Protective measures are already in place to prevent further loss, and a coordinated remediation plan is being finalised. Users who have signed native Zilliqa transactions with a Ledger device should await official guidance before taking any action. Impact: The vulnerability affects private keys used to sign native Zilliqa transactions with a Ledger device. Any account that has broadcast approximately five or more native transactions signed through the Zilliqa Ledger app should be considered compromised. Its private key can be reconstructed from signatures already recorded on-chain, regardless of any subsequent software update. The issue is confined to the Ledger app’s native signing path. EVM transactions are unaffected. Zilliqa software development kits, including zilliqa-js, gozilliqa-sdk and pyzil, generate nonces correctly and are not affected. Root cause: Zilliqa native transactions are authenticated using EC-Schnorr signatures over secp256k1. Each signature requires a fresh, uniformly random 256-bit ephemeral nonce, (k). The secrecy and full-width randomness of (k) are essential, as any systematic bias can allow the private key to be recovered. The signing routine generated 40 bytes of randomness and reduced them modulo the curve order, correctly producing a uniform 256-bit value. However, when copying this value into the nonce buffer, the code copied the wrong 32 bytes of the 40-byte output. This retained the eight zero-padding bytes introduced by the reduction and discarded eight bytes of entropy. As a result, the most significant 64 bits of every generated nonce were fixed at zero, meaning (k < 2^{192}). A nonce with 64 known bits leaks information about the private key with each signature. With five or more affected signatures, the private key can be recovered in seconds using commodity hardware by solving the resulting Hidden Number Problem through lattice reduction - a well-documented technique for attacking biased-nonce signatures. Because the affected transactions are permanently recorded on-chain, this exposure cannot be reversed by updating the signing application. The affected keys must be retired. Timeline 2019-2026: The defect was present in every released version of the Zilliqa Ledger app across all supported devices. 19 July 2026: On-chain activity consistent with active exploitation was observed. 21 July 2026: The root cause was isolated to the app’s nonce-handling code and confirmed by reproducing the issue against on-chain signatures. Ongoing: A corrected version of the app is being prepared in coordination with Ledger. Release details will be announced separately. Remediation: As soon as the issue was identified, native (non-EVM) transactions were suspended as a protective measure. This has halted further draining of affected accounts while a solution is prepared. Affected accounts cannot be secured through an ordinary transfer. Because their private keys can be derived from data already recorded on-chain, an attacker with access to the same key could attempt to front-run a legitimate transfer as soon as transactions resume. Advising users simply to move their funds would therefore be ineffective and potentially unsafe. A corrected build of the Ledger app has been prepared, restoring full-width nonce generation and preventing further weakened signatures from being produced. However, this does not protect keys that have already been used to sign affected transactions. Those keys must ultimately be retired. A coordinated remediation plan to secure affected balances is being finalised and will be published separately. Until then, users who have signed native Zilliqa transactions with a Ledger device should take no independent action and should rely solely on official Zilliqa channels for instructions. Users who hold or transact with ZIL exclusively through EVM-compatible tooling are not affected. Acknowledgments: @kucoincom played a key role in pinpointing the root cause in the Zilliqa Ledger app nonce generation, recovered affected private keys from publicly available on-chain signatures, and confirmed ongoing exploitation. KuCoin’s timely reporting and responsible collaboration enabled rapid protective measures, helping safeguard users, ecosystem participants, and the broader Zilliqa ecosystem while the remediation plan was being developed. We sincerely appreciate the KuCoin team’s professionalism, technical expertise, and cooperation throughout this process.

3 years ago we started as a tiny experiment with the goal of helping you learn faster. Since then, we grew to bring audio, video, and interactivity to your sources, transitioning from a passive workspace to your true research companion. And now, notebooks have even become an entire ecosystem: you can already access them in the @GeminiApp and soon in Google Search So, with these advancements, it’s time for us to evolve once again: NotebookLM is now Gemini Notebook ✨📓 The same app you know and love isn’t going anywhere, we just have an updated name that reflects our role in Google's AI portfolio. And our mission stays exactly the same: helping you learn, faster. Thank you for believing in us— this wouldn't have been possible without your passion (and feature requests...) Big things to come (yes, even folders📂!) so stay tuned. Sincerely, The Project Tailwind team

𝗧𝗵𝗮𝗻𝗸 𝘆𝗼𝘂, 𝗟𝗮𝗸𝗶𝗮. As of today, our contract with 'Lakia' Jongmin Kim from the Gen.G VALORANT team has come to an end. We sincerely thank Lakia for his unwavering dedication and for all the time he has spent with us over his journey with the team. We wish him all the best and will always be cheering him on as he embarks on his next chapter.

I’ve reached 150,000 followers. It’s honestly hard to put into words how much this means to me. At the same time, it can feel a bit overwhelming. In Chinese communities, some people refer to me as a KOL, and I often see my tweets being screenshotted and shared across WeChat groups in real time. “Jukan said this.” Sometimes even the shitposts I throw out as jokes end up being analyzed far more seriously than I ever intended.... That said, there’s no denying that I’ve received far more attention and support than I ever expected. I wouldn’t have made it this far without all of you. Thank you, sincerely.

NTA STATEMENT REGARDING THE ACTION ON TELEGRAM PLATFORM IN INDIA 1. The National Testing Agency (NTA) welcomes the directions issued today in respect of the Telegram platform in India. The directions, issued on recommendations of NTA are calibrated and bounded in time: (a) a direction under Section 69 A of the Information Technology Act, 2000, restricting access to the Telegram platform in India for a defined and limited period ending 22 June 2026, covering the day of the NEET (UG) 2026 re-examination and its immediate aftermath; and (b) a direction requiring the platform to disable, in India, the message-editing feature in respect of messages already posted, for a defined period ending 30 June 2026, addressing the specific structural feature through which the platform has been used to fabricate after-the-event “paper leak” evidence in respect of national examinations. Both measures have been taken in the interest of public order, in response to the organised use of the platform by cheating rackets to defraud candidates appearing for the NEET (UG) 2026 re-examination scheduled on 21 June 2026. NTA expresses its gratitude to the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology for this timely action, in the interest of students, which will go a long way in helping NTA to be able to conduct safe and secure examinations on 21st June 2026. 2. Throughout the period leading up to the present action, the Indian Cyber Crime Coordination Centre (I4C), under the Ministry of Home Affairs, has served as the principal nodal agency coordinating the operational response to the Telegram-based fraud and misinformation targeting NEET (UG) 2026 candidates. Acting on inputs received continuously from NTA, from State law-enforcement agencies including the police forces of Bihar, Gujarat and Rajasthan, and from its own continuous monitoring of public channels and platforms, I4C has secured the prompt take-down of a substantial number of Telegram channels, groups and bots whose names and content openly advertised their fraudulent and misleading purpose. This was done with active support of Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology. NTA places on record that the intelligence-sharing and coordinated take-down action led by the Ministry of Home Affairs, through I4C, and MeitY has been continuous, prompt and substantive, and remains the operational backbone of the response. This sustained inter-agency effort, well in advance of the present platform-level action, is the reason the harm caused by these rackets has been contained to the extent it has. 3. The directions issued today by MeitY have been made following references by NTA and the Department of Higher Education, Ministry of Education, drawing attention to the structural limits of channel-by-channel action and seeking graduated platform-level compliance. The directions are a measure of last resort, taken only after intermediate remedies, including the take-down action coordinated by I4C, had been pursued and had not produced, at the platform level, the response required to protect candidates in the run-up to the examination. The calibration of the directions - a narrow platform-access restriction confined to the examination window, together with a feature-specific compliance direction for the post-examination period - reflects an effort to address the public-order concern with the minimum restriction necessary. 4. Over the preceding weeks, channels operating openly on the platform under names that themselves advertised their purpose - “PAPER LEAKED NEET”, “Re-NEET 2026”, “Private Mafia”, “REE NEET MAFIAA” and similar formulations - demanded sums ranging from a few thousand to several lakhs of rupees from candidates and their families, in exchange for purported access to the re-examination paper. NTA has placed on the record, and reiterates, that there is no such paper available outside the secured examination chain. The promise of any such material is, in every instance, a fraud. 5. The direction requiring Telegram to disable its message-editing feature in India through 30 June 2026 addresses a separate but related concern. The feature, in its present form, permits a channel administrator to edit the content of a previously posted message - including the substitution of attached files such as PDFs - while the original send-time stamp is retained. This capability has been used, in respect of multiple recent examinations, to fabricate after-the-event “paper leak” artefacts: a channel administrator edits an older, innocuous message to insert the actual question paper after the examination has been conducted, and the resulting chat is then circulated as purported “evidence” that the paper was in circulation before the examination. The MeitY direction closes this avenue of fabrication for the post-examination window in which such artefacts have historically been deployed. 6. Independent action by State law-enforcement agencies has, over the same period, reinforced the scale and seriousness of the concern. The Bihar Police Economic Offences Unit issued a formal public advisory on 9 June 2026, warning candidates against fraudulent claims of pre-examination access to the paper circulated through Telegram and other platforms. The Ahmedabad City Cyber Crime Branch arrested members of an inter-State cyber-fraud gang found to be operating eight Telegram channels in furtherance of the same modus operandi, with documented transactions of approximately ₹1.5 crore routed through fraudulent bank accounts and approximately one thousand mobile numbers contacted in a single month. Investigations are in progress in multiple other States. 7. NTA acknowledges that the access restriction issued by MeitY affects lakhs of citizens who use the Telegram platform for legitimate personal, educational, professional and informational purposes, and sincerely regrets the inconvenience caused to them. The access restriction is, by its express terms, confined to the period ending 22 June 2026 - i.e. the day after the examination. The feature-specific direction in respect of the message-editing function, which remains in force through 30 June 2026, does not affect ordinary use of the platform for sending or receiving new messages. 8. The NEET (UG) 2026 re-examination will be conducted as scheduled on 21 June 2026. The security of the examination is unaffected by the action taken; it is, in fact, the very purpose of the action. Every candidate and parent is reassured of NTA’s commitment to conducting a fair, secure and credible examination. Candidates are urged to focus on their preparation, to disregard unverified content circulating on any platform, and to rely exclusively on the NTA website ( and verified NTA handles for all examination-related updates. 9. Any encounter with fraudulent solicitations - in person, by telephone, or through any online platform - should be reported immediately to the National Cyber-Crime Helpline at 1930, or through the National Cyber-Crime Reporting Portal at NTA’s own helplines remain available at 011-40759000 / 011-69227700 and at neetug@nta.ac.in. 10. NTA places on record its sincere appreciation of the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology for the timely and calibrated directions issued, of the Ministry of Home Affairs and the Indian Cyber Crime Coordination Centre for the sustained operational coordination that has made today’s action possible, of the Central Bureau of Investigation for its parallel inquiry into the underlying offences, and of the police forces of Bihar, Gujarat, Rajasthan and other States for their independent enforcement action - each of which has contributed, in its own measure, to protecting the integrity of one of the country’s most consequential examinations and the interests of its candidates.

Excellency. Congratulations on having served as Prime Minister for over 4,000 days. I hope you every success in your future endeavours. I look forward to meeting you in the near future. Yours sincerely, KISHIDA fumio Chairman, The Japan-India Association @narendramodi

I've only been learning the Sanxian for three months, and I'm still very much a beginner. There are plenty of wrong notes and awkward moments along the way😅 Yet whenever I put on Hanfu and play in public, people respond with kindness and encouragement. It has made me realize that perfection isn't what matters most. What matters is the willingness to learn, appreciate a culture, and engage with it sincerely. In return, I've been met with warmth, patience, and generosity from strangers. It's a simple experience, but one that has truly warmed my heart😊

Yesterday, our industry witnessed something unprecedented. In the past, when a CEX faced negative news, users could still freely move their assets to another platform. But this time, many users discovered something alarming: They were not unable to leave HTX — they suddenly had nowhere to go. Following the UK sanctions-related concerns around HTX, some third-party risk-control systems broadly labeled wallets interacting with HTX as “high risk.” As a result, many normal users experienced: restricted transfers, blocked transactions, and in some extreme cases, frozen accounts on other platforms simply for depositing funds from HTX. This level of large-scale, indiscriminate risk control against ordinary users is unprecedented in crypto history. What makes this even more troubling is: HTX itself is operating normally. Trading, deposits, withdrawals, and OTC services are all functioning as usual. But somehow, the users became the problem. And that is something the entire industry should reflect on. Because the people being affected are not “HTX users” alone. They also trade on Binance, OKX, Bybit, Coinbase, and many others. They belong to the crypto industry as a whole. If concerns exist around a platform, then measures should target the platform itself — not ordinary users through broad collateral damage. At the moment, HTX withdrawals remain fully operational. Users can still move assets on-chain. But if users eventually feel safer keeping funds only on-chain, or exiting entirely through OTC markets, then this is no longer an HTX issue. It becomes a crisis of trust for all centralized exchanges. And in a market already struggling with weak confidence, this could cause lasting damage to the entire industry. To put it simply: Crypto can survive without HTX. But crypto cannot survive without user trust. We want to clearly state: HTX fully supports compliance efforts and is actively cooperating with all relevant parties to resolve misunderstandings as quickly as possible. We respect the need for exchanges to follow compliance requirements. But we also believe ordinary users should not become victims of flawed or overly broad risk-control systems. Therefore, we sincerely call on all exchanges and industry partners to: 1️⃣ Work together with third-party security and compliance providers to address the current situation affecting users, and improve industry-wide risk-control standards. 2️⃣ Implement more precise review mechanisms for normal users interacting with HTX, so legitimate funds and users are not unfairly impacted. HTX is fully willing to cooperate throughout this process. Finally, to everyone who still trusts HTX and continues to keep assets on our platform: Thank you. HTX will not run away. We will stay here, face the situation directly, and continue working until these issues are fully resolved.

In March, we released benchmark numbers alongside SpacetimeDB 2.0. After a thorough investigation, we discovered a serious error in SpacetimeDB which caused our results to be misleading. We would like to sincerely apologize to our community. Read the full article: