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I explained the Chinese real estate & debt crisis in much detail in 2024 on my Substack. Nothing has changed since. China is in what we call "the largest balance-sheet recession the world has ever seen". And it will take years to get out of it and assuming the CCP's investment-led growth model does not dig the next hole in the meantime - a likely. The FT published added some colour to it two days ago: "Housing is important to every economy. But to China, it’s extra important. According to the PBoC, 96% of urban households own a home, and 41% own at least two. The average household owns 1.5 properties. And as such, property constitutes around 70% of China’s private wealth. The comparable figure for the US is around 30%. So when Chinese property prices fall, the authors make a pretty compelling case that this has all sorts of particularly bad economic spillovers. And fall they have. The negative wealth effect is substantial, and “effects are amplified by elevated household debt, much of which consists of mortgage obligations”. This — and the weaker income expectations that the falls generate — goes some way to suppressing consumption. Moreover, declining land-sale revenues constrain local government budgets, “limiting their capacity to finance developmental projects and maintain existing public infrastructure”. And this is even before any credit impacts from rising non-performing loans and mortgages on bank balance sheets are considered. Tl;dr: bad bad bad. Of course, China isn’t the first soon-to-be-global-economic-hegemon-East-Asian-power staring down demographic oblivion to have piled its savings into a property boom. Back in 1991, the world was fretting over the rise and rise of Japan. And the Japanese were buying Japanese residential real estate at outlandish prices. Japan’s house prices peaked back in 1991 and spent the next 30 years on a downward trajectory. We’re only a few years into the Chinese property bust, and its ultimate trajectory is both unknown and unknowable. But Rogoff and Yang have pulled together some cool data they kindly shared with Alphaville, allowing us to make this chart below. So far, it looks like prices in Chinese cities are falling at around the same pace as they did over the first five-to-10 years of Japan’s bust. Japan’s property crash is associated with a lost decade (or two) of economic growth. In the 10 years leading up to 1991, Japanese real annual GDP growth averaged 4.4%. In the subsequent 10 years it averaged only 0.9% per annum. The same numbers for China, with 2021 marking its property zenith, are 7.0% per year and 4.6% per year (so far). If the IMF’s forecasts turn out right, this latter number will fall to around 4.0% per annum. While the levels are different, the before-and-after drop looks comparable. Was it housing wot dun it? Rogoff and Yang reckon that a 40% decline in house prices translates into a total consumption loss of 2-4% of GDP. Not nothing, but not a single answer explaining life, the universe and wiggles in the decadal pace of real economic growth. To get here, they construct a historical dataset comprising subnational data across 47 prefectures, and input and output data at granular industry levels. They then use this to examine the macroeconomic implications of Japan’s real estate bust. And the authors argue that: a housing bust can generate substantial adverse effects on the economy via real channels. . . . overbuilding during the boom can trigger a demand-driven recession with limited reallocation and low output. Unlike financial channels, which amplify shocks through leverage, bank balance sheets, credit constraints, or fire sales, real channels operate directly through investment, consumption, labour markets, or productivity. In Japan’s case, the housing market collapse depressed activity through three key real channels: investment, consumption, and sentiment. This is all pretty intuitive. But using city-level and household-level Chinese data plus some whizzy maths, they put meat on the bone for these three channels. They find that Chinese cities that overbuilt housing the most are less keen on new building, suppressing investment. Sounds legit. Chinese household consumption is estimated to be more responsive to house price changes than it was in either Japan or the US given its outsized role in private wealth. And it looks to the authors like people have scrambled to rebuild precautionary savings they thought they had amassed in property. Understandable. Then, on the sentiment side, Rogoff and Yang use an LLM to gauge market perceptions of the housing market. And by incorporating city-specific perceptions, they double the estimated effect of house price changes on consumption. Huh. While China is not Japan, 1991 was not 2021, and a *lot* of other things are/were going on, it’s interesting to see that the overall magnitude and pace of property price falls — as well as the aggregate drop in the pace of headline GDP growth — has (so far) been spookily similar. And as for the big question — are we there yet? "If China’s adjustment unfolds in a similar way as Japan’s, it would mean China has not gone half way through the transition. By contrast, if China’s path is eventually comparable to the United States, it appears to have already covered roughly two-thirds of the adjustment before reaching the bottom." So more to come.

普通人也能吃到量子算力红利？我开始关注 Quip Network 节点了 @quipnetwork ，最打动我的不是“量子”这个词有多科幻，而是它终于把一个很远的东西，变成了普通 Web3 用户能动手参与的事情。 过去我们聊 DePIN，想到的是带宽、存储、GPU、无线网络；聊量子计算，想到的却是实验室、巨头公司和高门槛设备。Quip Network 有意思的地方就在这里：它想把量子计算和去中心化算力网络接起来，让 CPU、GPU、QPU 这些不同硬件都能进入同一个开放市场。换句话说，家里闲置的机器，不只是吃灰，而是有机会成为全球量子计算网络的一部分。 我尤其喜欢它的 Compute Layer 逻辑。传统挖矿很多时候是在拼电费和哈希，而 Quip 更强调有用计算：节点参与优化任务、验证结果、支撑网络运行。官方测试网已经开放，公开信息里提到有 13,000+ 用户提前报名，代码开源，并且首个量子子网与 D-Wave 有合作背景。对节点党来说，这种早期阶段往往最值得盯，因为门槛还没被卷到离谱，贡献也更容易被记录。 更关键的是，Quip 不只是一条“跑节点拿奖励”的线。它还有 Asset Layer，通过 WOTS+ 这类后量子签名方案，为 EVM、Solana、Bitcoin 等资产安全提供量子防护思路。也就是说，我一边可以用闲置算力参与网络，一边还能体验资产保护和任务积分，这种“双收益”比单纯做社交任务更有吸引力。 我对 Quip 的判断很简单：AI 缺算力，Web3 缺真实基础设施，未来资产又需要更强安全层。Quip 刚好站在这三个交叉点上。它不只是讲一个量子叙事，而是在把“普通人参与量子网络”这件事产品化。 如果你错过了 Render、Helium 早期，那 Quip Network 这种量子 DePIN 测试网，至少值得花时间跑一跑、研究一下。真正的机会，往往不是等大家都喊起来才出现，而是在你发现家里那台闲置电脑也能贡献价值的时候，悄悄开始。 @QuipNetwork

这轮我真正关注 @quipnetwork，不是因为它又讲了一个“量子+Crypto”的宏大故事，而是因为它把一个很遥远、却可能突然逼近的问题，做成了普通用户现在就能参与的入口。 以前聊量子威胁，大家总觉得像科幻：等到 Q-Day 来临，量子计算机可能破解传统签名，BTC、ETH 这些依赖现有密码学的资产都会面临新的安全边界。但问题是，链上世界从来不是等风险发生才修补，真正有价值的基础设施，往往是在大多数人还没反应过来之前就开始铺路。 Quip Network吸引我的点就在这里：它不是简单喊“重新造一条后量子链”，也不是要求用户把资产搬去一个陌生生态，而是尝试用更模块化的方式，给现有链上的资产加一层后量子保护。根据公开信息，Quip 已经在 Bitcoin 方向推出不需要分叉、不需要冻结资产的后量子钱包方案，并使用 WOTS+ 这类后量子签名思路；测试网也吸引了超过 13,000 人参与，并且是在 D-Wave 咨询下推进量子-经典混合网络测试。 @quipnetwork 对我这种 Web3 用户来说，这个叙事最性感的地方不是“恐惧”，而是“提前占位”。一边是给未来资产安全做准备，一边是通过任务、积分、内容贡献，甚至运行节点参与网络早期建设。CPU/GPU 也能加入测试，未来如果 Quip 真能把 CPU、GPU、QPU 等算力连接成一个开放市场，那节点就不只是撸空投工具，而是在参与量子算力网络的早期冷启动。 我更愿意把 Quip 看成一个“量子时代的入口层”：前面是后量子资产防护，后面是去中心化量子计算市场。现在参与，不一定是为了立刻暴富，而是用最低成本站到一个新叙事的前排。等所有人都开始讨论 Q-Day 时，真正的早期位置可能早就被完成账户、跑过节点、贡献过内容的人拿走了。 @QuipNetwork

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