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800 million people were lifted out of extreme poverty in China thanks to a little bit of capitalism. Central planning doesn’t work. At least Deng Xiaoping saw Mao’s catastrophic blunders and understood that. Which is why when he took power, he ripped out the collectivized economy by the roots. >let farmers work their own plots and sell what they grew instead of farming for the state (food production soared almost overnight) >carved out Special Economic Zones like Shenzhen where foreign capital could operate under different rules than the rest of communist China > poverty crashed from nearly 90% in 1981 to under 4% by 2016 On his Southern Tour in 1992, Deng told CCP officials “to get rich is glorious.” He was right btw. And it is best done through private property and free markets.

CCP把信托补报时间放在2023年一月一号，这显然不太妥当。 因为反贼富人都是2022年上海封城后立刻搞的信托，就逃过了铁拳。 爱国富人才会拖到2023年以后，CCP这等于是在利惠反贼。

The CCP fears what it cannot control. Perhaps most of all, faith in God. For 266 days, the CCP imprisoned Pastor Ezra Jin for his religious beliefs. Today, thank God, he is free. To every Christian still persecuted in China: You are not forgotten. We will continue speaking out for you.

10 crypto concepts to know A beginner-friendly guide to core terms like blockchain, smart contracts, PoW vs PoS, gas fees, tokenomics, stablecoins, and wallet security. Read more 👇

Some observations on Kimi: 1. It's a very good model! I don't think its performance can be explained away by distillation or anything like that. In agentic coding sessions, it seems pretty much on par with the best public models of Q1 2026. In my fairly limited use, it also seemed very token hungry. It's not obvious to me that this model is actually that cheap to run. 2. I am personally surprised the Chinese state continues to allow the open sourcing of models this good, given potential risks. To be clear, I *myself* might be fine with models presenting this level of marginal risk being open weight, but I am surprised that China is fine with it. I suspect the reason they are is 75% explained by strategic blindness/lack of AGI-pilledness (the CCP is very Yann Lecun-y in its views of AI). The other 25% or so is their lack of compute for customer inference (making China's open-weight strategy an unintended byproduct of US export controls) and the normal Chinese strategy of aggressive exports. For the companies, as opposed to the government, the decision to open source is partially ideological and partially because they are behind, and they know that very few people would pay for sub-frontier models from China. 3. Open-weight models are inherently decelerationist, and I'm continually surprised to see the so-called "accelerationists" so excited about open-weight models. I suspect the reason they are is that they know open-weight models are effectively ungovernable, and they simply like the overall cloak of ungovernability open-weight models create over the whole of AI. It's not a bad strategy; it reminds me of James Scott's recounting of the hill people in "the art of not being governed." Still, in the end, open-weight models deter further AI capex. 4. One probable outcome of an open-weight-model-dominant world is full AI communism, which is precisely what China proposes: rather than a market product, AI is a "public good" which will ultimately be provided by the state as a kind of "digital public infrastructure." This future strikes me as a dystopian hellscape, but I've never met an open-weight models advocate who doesn't ultimately concede this is where things end. You'd be surprised how many 'accelerationists' lobbied me, while I was in government, to support an eleven or twelve-figure federally funded data center so that startups could train models at a subsidy and then give them away for free. There was no other way for AI to progress, they said. Perhaps this is the logical end state of things. Nonetheless, I find myself surprised to see supposed accelerationists excited about such an outcome. I think many of them just don't know what they're doing. Many accelerationists do not view the creation and serving of frontier models as a legitimate business. 5. I would guess that the Trump Administration will at some point realize that their best strategy here would be to create large amounts of regulatory risk around the use of open-weight Chinese models. You don't need to "ban open source" (one of the dumber motifs of AI policy discussion). You just need to direct every agency to issue soft law that creates FUD. "A Federal Reserve Advisory Bulletin found that there may be backdoors in Chinese AI models." It needn't be that well justified. You just create enough regulatory risk that every regulated enterprise backs off. You probably don't want to create so much regulatory risk that you scare off the hyperscalers from serving Chinese models; this will just drive startups to sketchier providers. There's a happy middle ground here. I'd assume they will do some version of this. 6. It's probably true that open-weight models of this capability make the world a bit more dangerous, but not so much more that you'll really notice. At some point the models will be capable enough that you will notice. "A nonliving, invisible, dangerous, and infinitely self-replicating agent escaped from a Chinese lab," you say? Color me shocked.

40%拒签率、8700元存款把印媒急得集体破防。 这个，中国做得好。何况印度并未对中国公民实施免签政策，反而在签证申请上设置诸多限制，流程繁琐且门槛较高。

2012年为《叫魂》重出版采访孔飞力，《叫魂》真是陈兼教授翻译成中文的。但是。。。可以去看我当年的访谈。 2024年《周恩来》英文版出版后，也想着去做。对陈兼老师极为尊重。但是我正准备资料的时候，发现最后一段出现三个硬伤：1 邓颖超接替邓小平，正式当选为第六届全国政协主席的时间是 1983年6月（第六届全国政协第一次会议），而不是1982年。1982年时，政协主席依然是邓小平。2 邓颖超进入中央政治局是在 1978年12月 召开的具有历史转折意义的 中共十一届三中全会 上（被增选为中央政治局委员）。1977年召开的是中共十一大，当时她只被选为中央委员，并未进入政治局。3 邓颖超生于1904年2月4日，逝世于1992年7月11日。无论是按中国传统的虚岁，还是国际通用的周岁计算：1992−1904=88。她逝世时足岁应当是 88岁（eighty-eight），书中此处写成了87岁。 再次申明，对于陈兼老师和他的学术极为尊重，仅为探讨。下面是原文最后一段： Deng Yingchao, now Zhou’s ­ widow, would live for another sixteen years.When Zhou was alive, she was never granted any critical party or government leadership position, although she was elected to the CCP Central Committee at three party congresses. ­ After her husband’s passing, she entered the Politburo in 1977 and became chairperson of the National ­ Political Consultative Committee, a position Zhou had held for twenty-­ seven years, in 1982. In order to preserve her late husband’s reputation and, prob­ ably, cover up some of the darkest episodes of his ­ service ­ under Mao, she demanded that all rec­ ords of the 1973 “criticize Zhou” Politburo meetings be destroyed,which the party leadership accepted. She passed away in 1992, at the age of eighty-­ seven.

91号文件在海外某几个地方秘密存放 91号文件是爆料革命潘多拉盒子的一部分，但不是潘多拉总盒 91号文件一旦打开，共产党在西方几十年布局的所有情报系统，企业渗透，蓝金黄，贪官被侦听、调查都会曝光 91号文件是炸掉CCP堡垒的核力量