与「CCP」相关的搜索结果

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巴西交易所 B3 完成首笔与 Hashdex 加密 ETF HASH11 挂钩的场外期权交易，由 Inter 与 XP 达成。该交易由 B3 清算所作为中央对手方（CCP）提供担保，意味着加密 ETF 已被纳入保证金、清算与结算等传统金融基础设施体系。（CryptoSlate）

【BIT科普系列】很多用户问，在 BIT买美股，资金与证券最终由谁保管？ 为此，我们做一次完整披露：关于美股清算架构的科普，以及 BIT美股合规底层的起底。内容分为三部分：美股清算体系基础、Broker接入清算的四种主流方式、及BIT采用的具体路径。 全程公开可查，通过FINRA BrokerCheck、SEC 注册数据库、不丹 GMC 官方均可核验。 一、美股清算体系基础 美股交易看似在纽交所、纳斯达克完成，但真正决定资金与证券所有权变更的，是 SEC 监管下的清算与结算体系。整套体系由 DTCC 旗下三家公司加一家独立机构构成： · DTC（Depository Trust Company），存证公司，账面保管的证券资产超过 $87 trillion，已超过美国当年 GDP。 · NSCC（National Securities Clearing Corporation），日均清算美股交易额接近 $1.7 trillion。 · OCC（Options Clearing Corporation），独立运营，所有股票期权与波动率期货由其清算。 · FICC（Fixed Income Clearing Corporation），DTCC 子公司，负责美债清算。 SEC 将这四家列为 systemically important——倒一家，全市场停摆。 整套体系最核心的机制是 CCP novation——中央对手方合约更替。任何买卖成交后，原始合约立即拆分为"客户对手为 NSCC，NSCC 对手为所有人"。一家 broker 破产，损失由 NSCC 通过保证金、违约基金、风险瀑布层层吸收。在 2008 年金融危机期间，相关中央清算机制在维持市场运作方面发挥了重要作用。 二、Broker接入清算体系的四种主流方式 行业内主要存在四种结构，对应不同的成本、资本门槛与隐私权衡。 Self-Clearing（自清算）：券商自持 NSCC 与 DTC 会员资格，下单、清算、托管全程自营。代表如 Schwab、Fidelity、盈透。控制力最强、成本最低，但监管资本与运营要求极高。 Fully Disclosed IB（全披露介绍经纪商）：清算责任外包给 clearing broker，但每位客户身份完全披露给清算端，由 clearing broker 替 IB 持有独立客户账户。客户隐私自 IB 层透传至清算层。 Omnibus IB（综合账户介绍经纪商）：所有客户资产在 clearing broker 端合并为单一大账户，清算端仅看到 IB 整体头寸。IB 自行完成 KYC、合规、申报。这是国际跨境证券服务中较为常见的接入模式之一，行业内亦多采用。 DVP/RVP（Delivery Versus Payment）：属于结算方式而非 broker 架构，意为资金与证券同步交付。机构客户基本要求 DVP 结算。CCP novation 与 DVP 的组合，构成清算体系切断信用风险的底层保障。 三、BIT 美股的合规架构 以下是BIT采用的合规路径，全程公开可查。 【牌照层】 BIT 美股（原 Matrixport）运营主体为 Matrix Gelephu Pte. Ltd.，在不丹格勒普正念之城（Gelephu Mindfulness City，GMC）经济特区持有数字金融服务牌照。GMC 为不丹国家级战略，监管框架由全球顶级金融监管专家共同参与设计。硬性规范包括：客户资产与公司资产严格隔离、托管由独立持牌机构提供、维持资本与流动性缓冲、持续审计与申报、对客户资金与证券的使用设严格限制。 之所以选择 GMC 而非传统券商牌照，原因在于 BIT 业务定位是面向全球非美国本土投资者的美股服务，同步推进代币化与链上结算等数字金融业务。传统券商（broker-dealer）牌照对业务范围有强约束，对数字资产业务支持有限。GMC 是少数将证券、代币化与国际市场业务纳入统一监管框架的方案。 【清算路径】 BIT采用 Omnibus IB 结构。BIT 不直接对接 NSCC，而是将订单引入美国本土持牌清算broker，由后者承接 NSCC 清算与 DTC 存证托管。两家清算与托管合作方均可通过 FINRA BrokerCheck 公开查证： · RQD CLEARING, LLC，SEC 监管，CRD 134284 · ATOMIC VAULTS SECURITIES, LLC（AVS），SEC 监管，CRD 317194 【三层叠加】 GMC 牌照保障经营合规，Omnibus IB 路径将客户资产置于美国清算与托管基础设施之内，SIPC 提供最坏情形下的法定底线。客户美股资产与其他大型美国券商共享同一套底层基础设施——不在任何公链上，不在 BIT 自定义托管账户内，亦不依赖 BIT 自身的资产负债表。 查证入口 · RQD CLEARING, LLC： · ATOMIC VAULTS SECURITIES, LLC（AVS）： 我们坚持公开披露所有合规细节，欢迎用户自行核查与监督。

火花ちゃん可愛いすぎて幸せすぎた𓂃◌𓈒𓐍🎀 仕草も表情もほんとに火花ちゃんすぎて、 思い出す度にドキドキ止まらない…(⸝⸝> <⸝⸝) 最高の時間をありがとうございましたෆ˚* 素敵な火花ちゃん🎇🤍 凸守たかね様꒰@_taka_nene21꒱ #スターレイル楽園# #スターレイル3rdアニバ# #たかねっと#

I explained the Chinese real estate & debt crisis in much detail in 2024 on my Substack. Nothing has changed since. China is in what we call "the largest balance-sheet recession the world has ever seen". And it will take years to get out of it and assuming the CCP's investment-led growth model does not dig the next hole in the meantime - a likely. The FT published added some colour to it two days ago: "Housing is important to every economy. But to China, it’s extra important. According to the PBoC, 96% of urban households own a home, and 41% own at least two. The average household owns 1.5 properties. And as such, property constitutes around 70% of China’s private wealth. The comparable figure for the US is around 30%. So when Chinese property prices fall, the authors make a pretty compelling case that this has all sorts of particularly bad economic spillovers. And fall they have. The negative wealth effect is substantial, and “effects are amplified by elevated household debt, much of which consists of mortgage obligations”. This — and the weaker income expectations that the falls generate — goes some way to suppressing consumption. Moreover, declining land-sale revenues constrain local government budgets, “limiting their capacity to finance developmental projects and maintain existing public infrastructure”. And this is even before any credit impacts from rising non-performing loans and mortgages on bank balance sheets are considered. Tl;dr: bad bad bad. Of course, China isn’t the first soon-to-be-global-economic-hegemon-East-Asian-power staring down demographic oblivion to have piled its savings into a property boom. Back in 1991, the world was fretting over the rise and rise of Japan. And the Japanese were buying Japanese residential real estate at outlandish prices. Japan’s house prices peaked back in 1991 and spent the next 30 years on a downward trajectory. We’re only a few years into the Chinese property bust, and its ultimate trajectory is both unknown and unknowable. But Rogoff and Yang have pulled together some cool data they kindly shared with Alphaville, allowing us to make this chart below. So far, it looks like prices in Chinese cities are falling at around the same pace as they did over the first five-to-10 years of Japan’s bust. Japan’s property crash is associated with a lost decade (or two) of economic growth. In the 10 years leading up to 1991, Japanese real annual GDP growth averaged 4.4%. In the subsequent 10 years it averaged only 0.9% per annum. The same numbers for China, with 2021 marking its property zenith, are 7.0% per year and 4.6% per year (so far). If the IMF’s forecasts turn out right, this latter number will fall to around 4.0% per annum. While the levels are different, the before-and-after drop looks comparable. Was it housing wot dun it? Rogoff and Yang reckon that a 40% decline in house prices translates into a total consumption loss of 2-4% of GDP. Not nothing, but not a single answer explaining life, the universe and wiggles in the decadal pace of real economic growth. To get here, they construct a historical dataset comprising subnational data across 47 prefectures, and input and output data at granular industry levels. They then use this to examine the macroeconomic implications of Japan’s real estate bust. And the authors argue that: a housing bust can generate substantial adverse effects on the economy via real channels. . . . overbuilding during the boom can trigger a demand-driven recession with limited reallocation and low output. Unlike financial channels, which amplify shocks through leverage, bank balance sheets, credit constraints, or fire sales, real channels operate directly through investment, consumption, labour markets, or productivity. In Japan’s case, the housing market collapse depressed activity through three key real channels: investment, consumption, and sentiment. This is all pretty intuitive. But using city-level and household-level Chinese data plus some whizzy maths, they put meat on the bone for these three channels. They find that Chinese cities that overbuilt housing the most are less keen on new building, suppressing investment. Sounds legit. Chinese household consumption is estimated to be more responsive to house price changes than it was in either Japan or the US given its outsized role in private wealth. And it looks to the authors like people have scrambled to rebuild precautionary savings they thought they had amassed in property. Understandable. Then, on the sentiment side, Rogoff and Yang use an LLM to gauge market perceptions of the housing market. And by incorporating city-specific perceptions, they double the estimated effect of house price changes on consumption. Huh. While China is not Japan, 1991 was not 2021, and a *lot* of other things are/were going on, it’s interesting to see that the overall magnitude and pace of property price falls — as well as the aggregate drop in the pace of headline GDP growth — has (so far) been spookily similar. And as for the big question — are we there yet? "If China’s adjustment unfolds in a similar way as Japan’s, it would mean China has not gone half way through the transition. By contrast, if China’s path is eventually comparable to the United States, it appears to have already covered roughly two-thirds of the adjustment before reaching the bottom." So more to come.

长鑫存储扩产的设备供应链全景 长鑫现在合肥两座、北京一座，三座12英寸厂。合肥一厂11万片月产能，二厂8万片，北京厂7万片，加起来接近30万片，全部满产。两年涨了三倍，2024年初差不多10万片，2025年底冲到28到30万，2026年目标稳在30万。按晶圆片数算全球DRAM占比已经接近15%，但按销售额算只有3.97%，片数堆上来了，单价还在追赶。 工艺端，G4在16纳米已经量产，DDR5良率从2024年底的80%升到现在的90%区间。G5对应15纳米，2026年底量产。HBM2去年下半年就上了，比外界预期提前两年，主要供华为昇腾910。HBM3的前段晶圆产能主要在合肥和北京现有基地内部腾出来，目标月产6万片，约占30万片总产能的20%。后段的堆叠和封装由上海新建的HBM封测厂承接，2026年底投产。 产能还在继续扩。上海新厂分两期，Phase 1产能10万片，2027年初量产，Phase 2同样10万片，2028年初量产。加上现有的30万片，远期产能目标是奔着50万片以上去的。华为也在建一条10万片规模的产线，专门配合长鑫做昇腾系列所需的HBM3和LPDDR5X，2026年下半年开始全面量产。 IPO募资295亿，DRAM技术升级拿了130亿，量产线升级75亿，前瞻技术研发90亿。多家券商纪要提到其中约200亿会直接变成设备采购订单，叠加2024年712亿的存量Capex节奏，是国产设备厂未来两年最确定的基本盘。 长鑫正在进行的大规模扩产，设备采购需求非常可观。每个品类的国产化进展差异很大。 光刻是最大的对外依赖，国产化率连5%都不到。主力机器是ASML的NXT:1980Di，每小时出275片，覆盖到16纳米节点，目前还能正常采购。被荷兰管制的是NXT:2050i及以上，每小时295片，2023年9月起要许可证，2024年1月起对华许可基本停发。修正一个流传很广的说法，275到295片是1980Di到2050i的代际跳变，不是1980系列内部的迭代。长鑫往15纳米以下走，这道墙绕不开。上海微电子的28/14纳米DUV还在攻关，光刻这一环短期无解。 刻蚀占设备投资25到30%，是国产化最深的核心工艺。北方华创的ICP在长鑫产线上市占超过50%，中微的CCP介质刻蚀机做到50比1以上深宽比，专门用于HBM的TSV深硅通孔。但存储节点100比1深宽比的极端工艺，孔洞必须互相平行规整，任何偏差直接砸良率，Lam和东京电子在这个区间仍然是主力。 薄膜沉积占约25%，品类分得细。PECVD做绝缘层，PVD做金属互连，ALD做电容器的高k介电层。拓荆科技的PECVD已经批量进入长鑫DDR5和LPDDR5产线，北方华创的PVD覆盖铝铜溅射和氮化钛溅射。但DRAM电容器核心的高k ALD设备，应用材料和ASM的位置很难动，拓荆的ALD在验证爬坡中还没有大规模上量。整体看PECVD和PVD的国产化率高一些，ALD最低。 CMP只占设备投资5到7%。华海清科占国产CMP装备销售90%以上份额，12英寸Universal-300已经导入长鑫。新变量是中微4月29日刚过会的收购杭州众硅，6抛光盘架构是国际首创，效率比主流4盘方案高一截。国产CMP从单点供应正式进入双供。 清洗国产化率30到40%，盛美上海的SAPS/TEBO兆声波清洗覆盖FinFET和DRAM的16到19纳米制程。热处理40到50%，北方华创立式氧化炉打头，激光退火端莱普科技两年内国内市占从3%涨到16%，跟长鑫和长存共同开发匹配DRAM工艺的设备。这几个环节已经跑通了。 最薄弱的三个环节是量测检测、涂胶显影和离子注入。量检测国产化率个位数，KLA全球占51到54%，精测电子进了长鑫12英寸产线，中科飞测也在部分环节往里切，但高端光学检测和电子束检测差距仍然明显。涂胶显影国产化率仅4%，东京电子在大陆市占超过90%，芯源微是唯一量产替代，目前只在封装端站住了，前道关键层还进不去。离子注入同样个位数，万业凯世通累计交付40多台。弹性最大的三个环节，也是短期内最动不了的三个环节。 长存三期产线2026年一季度国产设备占比首次过50%，目标100%。长鑫设备国产化率已突破45%，但仍低于长存三期产线的水平。根源在工艺。DRAM的电容刻蚀和光刻精度对先进DUV的依赖远高于3D NAND。NAND可以靠堆层数绕过光刻瓶颈，DRAM要正面硬刚，结构性差异，跟意愿无关。 外部约束在收紧。4月22日美国众议院外交事务委员会投票通过了MATCH法案，路透社称之为"国会史上最大规模的半导体出口管制立法审议"。法案把长鑫、中芯国际、长江存储、华为、华虹一起列入covered facility，禁止ASML的DUV浸没式光刻机对长鑫出口，禁止盟国为既有设备提供维保，要求荷兰和日本在150天内对齐美方规则。主要推手是美光。一旦通过，NXT:1980Di这条最后的灰色通道就堵死了。长鑫本身还没进BIS实体清单，但设备进口其实早就在2022年10月那波18纳米以下DRAM工艺限制的笼子里。 45%的国产化率意味着长鑫在两条腿走路，海外设备保良率，国产设备保供应链安全。MATCH法案的压力反而在加速这个进程。长鑫每往国产设备多切一个百分点，对应的就是北方华创、中微、拓荆、华海清科、盛美这些公司实打实的订单增量。上海新厂分两期共20万片的增量产能，加上现有产线的持续技术升级，未来两到三年国产设备厂面对的是一个确定性极高的需求窗口。 从更长的时间尺度看，长鑫的扩产不只是一家公司的资本开支计划。它每走通一个工艺节点，整条12英寸国产设备平台就多一次被验证、被复用的机会。刻蚀和CMP已经证明了这条路径，薄膜沉积和清洗正在跟进，量测和涂胶显影是下一个要啃的硬骨头。这个验证循环一旦转起来，国产设备的竞争力会以远超线性的速度积累。

【予約受付中】 CCPJAPAN×STUDIO24の夢のタッグで送るハイクオリティフィギュア 《CMC キン肉マン 戦闘服 ファイティングポーズ Ver. 》 CCPJAPAN直販にて予約受付中！ 初回限定特典 ＜フェイスガード頭部パーツ＞ ＜限定描き下ろしメタルカード＞ が付属する豪華仕様！ 【予約締切：5/29】

Hostage diplomacy and exit bans have become key tools of CCP coercion. As President Trump meets with Xi Jinping today in Beijing, securing the release of unjustly detained Americans and U.S.-linked individuals should be a top priority. My latest in @FoxNewsOpinion:

The Chinese Communist Party is waging a war against faith. Order my book, China's War on Faith, today to learn more about the CCP’s assault on religious freedom and the global consequences of digital authoritarianism.

A Taiwanese TV anchor with hundreds of thousands of followers was secretly submitting his scripts to China for approval before broadcasting them. He was paid in cryptocurrency for every video. And he was using the same bank accounts to bribe military personnel into handing over Taiwan's missile deployment data. Lin Chen-you, known by his screen name "Ma De," worked as a political reporter and anchor at CTiTV, one of Taiwan's major cable news networks, and ran a YouTube channel with a substantial following. On May 6, 2026, Taiwanese prosecutors indicted him on three counts after a four-month investigation. They are seeking 12 years in prison. The charges are specific and documented. First: Lin produced anti-recall propaganda videos during Taiwan's Legislative Yuan recall campaigns while following instructions from an unidentified Chinese contact, submitting his scripts for pre-approval before broadcasting them on television and YouTube. He then sent back viewership statistics and traffic screenshots as proof of impact. He received 4,325 USDT in Tether cryptocurrency for this work, approximately NT$130,000. Second: Lin provided at least five of his personal bank accounts as a money channel, wiring funds to six active and retired military personnel from Taiwan's Army, Navy, Air Force, and missile units. The bribed soldiers were instructed to film pro-CCP "surrender videos" while holding PRC flags and to photograph and transmit classified military documents through messaging apps. The secrets allegedly handed over included drone and missile data, Han Kuang military exercise details, rocket system specifications, missile deployment locations, new missile parameters, and internal operation manuals. From 2023 to 2025, Lin received nearly 50,000 USDT from Chinese sources, totalling over NT$1 million in illegal gains, laundered through Binance and OKX. Third: prosecutors charged him with money laundering for layering the cryptocurrency payments through multiple exchanges to conceal their origin. The lead prosecutor described Lin as a tool for information warfare who handed content control of a mainstream Taiwanese news platform directly to foreign hostile forces, calling his crimes "heinous and unforgivable." The case will not receive a public trial because the evidence involves classified national security material. Lin told investigators he did not know the money came from Chinese forces. Prosecutors noted that he submitted scripts for Chinese approval before every broadcast and sent back viewership data after each one. The evidence includes bank records, crypto transaction logs, chat histories, and confessions from several of his military co-defendants. The CCP did not need to hack Taiwan's military. It found a news anchor who needed money and gave him a script. #Taiwan# #CCP# #China# #Espionage# #MediaEspionage# #NationalSecurity# #Disinformation# #CTiTV# #Geopolitics# #ChinaSpying#