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长鑫科技IPO预测市场上线了Predict @predictdotfun 发下帮主下注思路 长鑫科技（CXMT）IPO当日收盘市值排名预测。选项从排名第1到第10以后。 先说结论：用排除法，押不可能发生的事情的NO，是这类市场最稳的玩法。 先算一笔账： 长鑫募资295亿，发行比例按10-15%算，对应总市值大概2000-3000亿。科创板新股首日涨100-200%很常见，那就是4000-6000亿的区间。 再看A股当前市值排名： • Top 1 茅台 2.2万亿 • Top 2 工行 2万亿 • Top 3 中移动 1.8万亿 • Top 5 中石油 1.1万亿 长鑫首日要排进前5，市值得破万亿。按最乐观的估算（首日涨300%），也就8000-9000亿，还是够不着。 所以排名1-5的NO，确定性接近100%。 具体操作： • 排名第1的NO → 花79¢赚21¢，长鑫不可能首日超过茅台 • 排名第2的NO → 同理，不可能超过工行 • 往下到前五，都可以押注NO 正好币安钱包新手保护第三期也在，首次预测亏损兜底5U，前15000人。建议可以拿这个市场练手。 传送门🚪：

I asked Claude to apply a capital cycle analysis to $MU. Here's what it came up with: Net reading: 11 of 14 capital cycle signals are bearish or strongly bearish. The framework reads this as late-cycle, not early/mid-cycle. The two unambiguously bullish signals (equipment lead times, industry concentration) are eroding rather than strengthening. Insights Yielded by Capital Cycle Analysis: 1) "Structural change" rhetoric is itself diagnostic. The capital cycle framework treats coordinated industry-wide CEO claims of regime change as evidence of late-cycle euphoria. The same language was deployed by the same CEOs (Mehrotra at Micron specifically) in 2017–2018 and was wrong. Bayesian base rates argue against accepting the current claims at face value. The previous analysis under-weighted this base-rate evidence. 2) Look at total capital flowing into the supply curve, not just incumbent capex. The structural-change analysis focused on Big Three capex. The capital cycle lens forces aggregation of all capital flowing into memory output: a) Incumbent capex: ~$104B in 2026 across DRAM + NAND; b) CXMT IPO proceeds: ~$4.2B (with state-aligned co-financing many multiples larger); c) YMTC capacity additions (privately financed) d) Substitute technology capital (Cerebras, photonic startups, CXL controller designers) — billions of dollars of equity raised to reduce HBM intensity per dollar of AI compute deployed. When aggregated, total effective supply-side capital formation in 2026 is materially higher than the Big Three capex alone suggests. The supply response is being underestimated. 3) The customer base is doing exactly what late-cycle customers do. Hyperscalers locking in 3–5 year LTAs, pre-ordering 2027 NAND, building strategic inventory — these are not signs of confident long-cycle visibility, they are signs of late-cycle scarcity panic. Historically (DRAM 2017–2018, oil 2008, shipping 2007), customer pre-buying at peak prices is followed by sharp inventory destocking when prices roll over. The structural-change narrative frames LTA penetration as a benefit; the capital cycle frames it as a peak signal. 4) Multiple expansion + earnings expansion = asymmetric downside. The previous analysis flagged the 15x NTM P/E multiple as aggressive (referring to UBS PT raise). The capital cycle framework sharpens this: when both earnings and multiple are at peak, the compound drawdown when either reverts is severe. Memory historically goes from 60% gross margin to negative gross margin and from 10x P/E to <5x P/E. Even a modest reversion to 35% gross margin and 8x P/E from current levels implies a 60–75% equity drawdown for the memory primaries — without any disorderly cycle. 5) Supply lag is real but not unique. The bullish point about EUV/TSV/hybrid bonding lead times is correct but mis-weighted. The capital cycle history of other capital-intensive industries (oil refining, shipbuilding, semiconductor wafer fab) shows that long lead times increase the eventual amplitude of the down-cycle: capital decisions made at peak are not reversible when conditions soften, leading to capacity overhang. Long lead times delay the down-cycle; they do not abolish it. 6) China is the textbook capital-cycle disruptor. In Chancellor's historical case studies (steel, shipbuilding, solar, panels, batteries), state-backed Chinese entrants repeatedly compressed margins of consolidated Western/Korean/Japanese oligopolies once technology gaps narrowed. The U.S. equipment restrictions on China have created the illusion that this dynamic is paused, but the data shows CXMT doubled DRAM share in 18 months and is targeting domestic HBM3. The structural-change analysis appropriately flagged this; the capital cycle framework would weight it heavier as the single most important multi-year risk. 7) Substitute capital formation is its own supply curve. The capital cycle framework treats financing flows into substitutes as a parallel supply expansion. Cerebras' $5.5B IPO, Marvell's $5B Celestial acquisition, the Sandisk/SK hynix HBF JV, and the CXL ecosystem (ALAB, MRVL, MCHP) are collectively financing "HBM intensity reduction." Even if HBM unit demand is met, the value capture per dollar of AI compute is diluted. Capital is flowing in adjacent to the memory primaries to reduce the share of AI spend that ends up in their P&L. 8) The bull case relies disproportionately on demand visibility. The capital cycle warns against demand-anchored theses. The bull case requires AI capex to continue at current levels or accelerate, hyperscaler ROI economics to remain favorable, sovereign AI to scale, and inference workloads not to migrate to non-HBM architectures. Each of these is plausible; the joint probability that all hold through 2028 is materially lower than the headline narrative suggests. 9) Sell-side estimate trajectory is itself a signal. UBS's PT trajectory ($535 → $1,625, a 3x increase in one revision) is historically associated with peak euphoria. Estimate revisions of this magnitude have a poor forward record. The framework would treat the velocity of estimate revisions as a contra-signal. 10) Where the asymmetry sits. The capital cycle framework reframes the risk/reward calculation. Even if the bull thesis is right and earnings hold through 2028, the upside from current levels is modest (multiple expansion has already happened). If the bull thesis is partially wrong — say, 2028 brings 25% peak-to-trough EPS decline rather than 50% — the equity drawdown is still material because multiples will compress simultaneously. The asymmetry is not favourable at current valuations. Bottom line: The structural change thesis was directionally correct but materially overweighted by the original analysis. The capital cycle framework appropriately reweights toward supply-side caution and treats current peak conditions, peak valuations, peak management confidence, and accelerating capital inflows as a coherent set of late-cycle signals. The memory industry has undergone real and beneficial structural change in shape, but the empirical base rate against the "cycle has been abolished" claim is overwhelming. The economic characteristics of memory businesses have improved but have not been transformed into stable, compounding, low-volatility ones — and the next 18–30 months are statistically more likely to mark the end of this up-cycle than a transition to a new regime.

爆料者发布的截图显示海盗船正在采用长鑫存储 (#CXMT#) 生产的 #DDR5# 内存芯片，这应该可以降低消费级内存条价格。图片显示这款内存条品牌为海盗船，芯片为 DDR5-6000，制造商为长鑫科技，制造时间为 2026 年 3 月，不过目前这款内存条应该还未上市，网上查不到任何相关信息：

🚨 THE MEMORY CARTEL JUST GOT BREACHED. Corsair, one of the biggest US memory brands, was caught using Chinese chips inside their DDR5 kits. The maker is CXMT. China's biggest memory company. China is doubling memory production this year. Ex-Samsung chip boss says China could crush the 414% RAM spike within 12 months. Samsung, Micron, SK Hynix got greedy chasing AI margins. Now China is ready to undercut everything.

Chinese memory makers are accelerating DDR5 development and closing the performance gap with global leaders Samsung, SK Hynix, and Micron. Leading firm CXMT has demonstrated DRAM speeds of 8000 MT/s using 16Gb and 24Gb dies and recently showcased DDR5 memory modules for servers, PCs, and workstations. Another Chinese supplier, Jiahe Jinwei, has entered mass production of 64 GB DDR5 RDIMM modules at 5600 MT/s. Via @wccftech