与「Cerebras」相关的搜索结果

白嫖党看过来，一个 OpenAI 兼容的接口，背后把 16 家大厂的免费额度全薅到一块儿，Google、Groq、Cerebras、Mistral、NVIDIA 这些都在里面，加起来差不多每月 17 亿 Token，全免费。 最骚的是它自带路由：哪家被限流了自动跳下一家，还帮你盯着每个 key 的用量，不让你超免费额度的线。 别小看这堆零头，单看一家是玩具，叠起来真能省下不少钱。Claude Code、Codex 这些也能直接接。 周末找时间折腾一下，香。 🔗

晚点LateTask这篇访谈的信息量非常大，关于百度美研、Scaling Law、OpenAI、Anthropic、Cerebras的往事。 > "Dario 能进百度，其实是他职业生涯里很重要的一步。他是 Greg Diamos 招进来的。而且加入百度前，Dario 并不是计算机或 AI 科班出身，而是数学、物理和生物背景，Greg Diamos 发现他很有 AI 直觉和训练模型的能力。" > 十年前（早于transformer），百度已经在训练接近 3 亿参数的语言模型——也就是发现Scaling Law雏形的时候。用 GPU 训练一次要三个多月，这个模型基于一个自研的框架——Paddle（飞桨）。 > Sam Altman 本人是 Cerebras 的投资人。百度是 2017 年投的，Sam Altman 2016 年就投了。 > 百度早期投资 Cerebras，投资决策只用了2天，由李彦宏、陆奇、CFO做出——这个投资决策也证明了百度当时的投资眼光有多超前。 > 百度曾有机会成为 OpenAI、Anthropic 的早期天使。当时OpenAI、Databricks、Scale AI 这些公司都在百度的待投名单上。可惜的是中美关系恶化导致没投成。 > 陆奇早年曾是 Sam Altman 的 mentor。2018 年 5 月陆奇从百度离职后，同年 8 月便接受 Sam Altman 的邀请，出任 YC 中国的创始人兼首席执行官。 > 2020 年夏天，一些在 OpenAI 的百度前员工说 GPT-3 快训练出来了，当年在百度想做的事情，快在 OpenAI 做成了——维基百科水平的语言模型。那时 GPT-3 还在后训练阶段，距离 ChatGPT 出来还有两年多。 > 百度美研顶峰时期至少 250 多人，人才密度很高，甚至在 Google DeepMind 都没有过。很多人是冲着吴恩达来的。 > 后来这里的很多人加入了核心 AI 创业公司，或自己创业，除了前面提到的 OpenAI、Anthropic，也有人参与创办 Adept、xAI，还有一些人成了 Meta FAIR 等实验室的重要成员。

十年前百度美研一群人就预判：不能把 AI 算力全押在英伟达身上。结果他们真的投了一家「晶圆级」芯片公司 —Cerebras。 2016 年，周楠从投行跳去百度美国人工智能研究院。那时候吴恩达带队，预算充足，GPU 随便买。Dario（Anthropic 创始人）和 Greg Diamond 都在那里。团队已经隐约摸到 scaling law 的雏形：模型越大、数据越多、算力越强，效果就越好。DeepSpeech2 那篇论文就是最早的信号之一。 周楠做的第一个项目就是 Cerebras。当时他满世界找「不是英伟达」的训练芯片，看了 Graphcore、Wave Computing，最后选了 Cerebras。因为这家公司最激进——要做 wafer-scale engine，把一整片晶圆做成一个巨大的 AI 计算引擎，让计算单元和内存靠得极近，大幅降低通信成本。 投的时候 Cerebras 连流片都没有，只有 signature。百度美研的研究员直接上手验证，在当时全球最大的语言模型上跑，信号还不错。投决会几乎零阻力，Robin、陆奇、李彦宏快速通过。估值当时已经 7 亿多刀，在 2017 年算贵，但周楠赌的是「非共识」。 真正难的不是 idea，而是把 wafer-scale 做出来。良率、散热、电源、编译器，每一个都是硬骨头。2017-2019 年几乎是至暗时刻，流片一延再延。但 Benchmark、Foundation、Eclipse 等早期投资人一直陪，给了足够耐心。芯片真的要十年才能看到结果。 现在 Cerebras 的机会在推理，而不是训练。OpenAI 签下至少 200 亿刀大单，就是看中它低延迟、高吞吐。英伟达的 CUDA 生态太强，训练阶段迁移成本极高，但推理场景下，Cerebras 的架构优势开始显现。Sam Altman 其实 2016 年就个人投了 Cerebras，比百度还早。 周楠感慨，百度美研其实是硅谷的「黄埔军校」。后来出去创业的人太多：Inflection、Adept、Anthropic、Cohere……可惜因为地缘政治，百度后来想单独募一个专注 AI 的基金没成，OpenAI、Databricks 当时都在 list 上，最终都没投成。 十年前大家就担心不能只依赖英伟达，结果英伟达还是成了事实垄断。但现在推理需求爆发，反而给了异构芯片新窗口。Cerebras 只是开始，后面可能还会有更多新架构的推理芯片出现。 周楠现在看 AI 投资：共识来得太快，早期窗口越来越短。他反而更关注还没形成共识的方向，比如 Physical AI（机器人）和新的推理芯片架构。这期节目最打动人的，是把十年前 scaling law 刚冒头、百度美研那批人「神仙打架」的氛围还原了出来。很多事情早早被看到，但真正落地要等十年。Cerebras 的故事，只是其中一个缩影。

Day one wrapped and the energy was undeniable! Full rooms. Packed stages. Conversations spilling into the corridors. Balaji, Benedict Evans, Max Tegmark, Planet Labs, Cerebras, Google Cloud, Exa, Stripe and more. You showed up. Day 2 will be even bigger. See you tomorrow.

🚀 1,000+ TOKENS/S ON A 1T MODEL! 🚀 We are thrilled to release Xiaomi MiMo-V2.5-Pro-UltraSpeed in collaboration with @TileRT_AI , breaking the 1,000 tokens/s output speed on a 1 Trillion parameter model for the FIRST TIME! Not wafer-scale integration like Cerebras. Not pure on-chip SRAM chips like Groq. We achieve 1,000 tps on a 1T MoE model using just a SINGLE, STANDARD 8-GPGPU NODE. Read the full technical deep dive： Want to experience the future of real-time AI? 👉 Apply for UltraSpeed now: ⏳ Limited-Time Access: Application-based · Jun 8 – Jun 23 (PDT) 💬 Chat Experience: Completely FREE for a limited time — try the blazing-fast web chat now. ⚡ UltraSpeed API: Just 3x the price for a ~10x boost in output experience. 🤝 Enterprise & Large-Scale Needs: business-mimo@xiaomi.com

Pre-IPO 不是今天才被发现的机会 早在今年3 月 2 日 MSX 就已经上线了Pre-IPO 板块 首批开放了SpaceX、ByteDance、Cerebras 等全球头部未上市资产代币的申购 并把参与门槛降到 10 USDT。 4 月之后，Gate、Binance Wallet、Bitget 等平台才陆续进入这个赛道。 这说明一个事实： MSX 不是在追热点 而是更早看到了独角兽企业能给用户带来真 实的收益。 我们希望更多的平台加入这个赛道 因为后来者越多越说明这个方向在被验证 但时间线也会说明一件事： 行业不缺喊自己是“首家”的人 有人是在追逐热度 有人是在提前建设市场。 市场不缺后来者的声量 缺的是先行者的判断和交付 方向对不对，时间线会说明问题 产品有没有真正落地，用户会给答案。

SoFi Invest could be your source for IPOs. We’ve recently supported the launch of Cerebras, Blackstone, Pershing Square, BitGo, and more.
See how you could access IPOs before they reach public markets with SoFi Invest.*

🇺🇸 美国 AI/科技公司融资 大模型 & AI基础设施 1. Factory — $150M C轮（AI开发平台） - 旧金山，专注AI-native软件工程 - 🔗 2. Cerebras — $20B+ 框架协议（AI芯片） - 与OpenAI签署协议，提供750MW超低延迟推理能力 - 2026年3月与AWS合作集成CS-3到Amazon Bedrock - 🔗 3. Shield AI — $1.5B G轮 + $500M优先股（国防AI） - 估值$12.7B，同比↑140% - 美国空军选定其Hivemind软件用于协作作战飞机项目 - 预计2026年收入$540M+（↑80%） - 🔗 4. xAI — $10B（Elon Musk的AI公司） - $5B战略股权 + $5B定期贷款和担保票据 - 🔗 --- AI应用公司（企业服务/SaaS） 5. Lyzr — 估值$250M（AI Agent基础设施） - 帮助企业构建与企业数据和应用交互的AI Agent - 提供安全部署和管理AI Agent的工具 - 🔗 6. Humand — $66M（无办公桌工人操作系统） - 面向零售、制造、物流等行业的前线员工 - 移动优先的AI工作流、内部通讯和HR系统 - 🔗 7. Savvy Wealth — $72M B轮（财富管理AI） - 为财务顾问提供AI工具 - 累计融资$106M - 🔗 8. Sona — $45M（薪资和劳动力管理） - 面向零售、酒店、医疗等前线行业 - AI驱动的排班、预测和工资准确性工具 - 🔗 9. Stedi — $50M（医疗保健交易处理） - 连接医疗服务提供商、付款方和清算所 - 标准化碎片化数据流，减少人工对账 - 🔗 10. Yuzu Health — $35M A轮（健康保险运营） - 理赔裁决、计划配置和入职软件 - 使用AI简化通常依赖多个中介和人工检查的流程 - 🔗 11. Levelpath — $55M B轮（采购AI） - AI Agent自主处理企业采购任务 - 由Battery Ventures领投 - 🔗 12. Patlytics — $40M B轮（法律AI） - 专利分析和知识产权AI平台 - 🔗 13. Luminai — $38M B轮（企业AI） - 🔗 14. AfterQuery — $30M A轮（数据AI） - 🔗 15. Parasail — $32M A轮（AI云基础设施） - 🔗 16. Phonely — $16M A轮（AI语音通信） - 🔗 17. Variance — $21.5M A轮（合规自动化） - AI Agent摄取监管文件、映射要求、监控合规差距 - 🔗 18. NeuBird AI — $19.3M（IT预测监控） - 分析日志、指标和信号，在问题升级前发现 - 自动触发修复（重启服务、重新分配资源） - 🔗 --- 🇸🇬 新加坡/东南亚 AI公司 19. SleekFlow — 累计$23.5M（全渠道AI对话平台） - 覆盖新加坡、香港、马来西亚、印尼、巴西、阿联酋 - AI Revenue Agent处理线索资格审查、产品推荐、收款、预约 - 🔗 20. ViSenze — 视觉AI平台（零售/电商） - 为零售和电商客户提供视觉搜索AI - 提高参与度、平均订单价值和产品发现速度 - 🔗 --- 🇪🇺 欧洲 AI公司 21. Unique — $30M A轮（金融AI） - 苏黎世，为资产管理、财富管理、零售和私人银行提供专业AI平台 - 支持Pictet、UBP、SIX、LGT、Partners Group等客户 - 为30,000名金融专业人士提升研究、合规和KYC效率 - 由CommerzVentures和DN Capital领投 - 🔗 22. 欧洲AI融资趋势 - 2024年：€4.1B / 233笔交易 - 2025年：€10.6B / 662笔交易（↑158%） - 西班牙成为潜在黑马，瑞典成为最热门AI中心 - 机器人技术成为欧洲认为可以胜出的领域 - 🔗 --- 🌍 全球隐身/新兴公司 23. AAI（Amnon Shashua的隐身AI创业公司） - 估值超$1B，融资数亿美元 - Shashua是Mobileye创始人，TIME 100 AI影响力人物 - 2026年Mobileye估值$11.5B，将为Uber和Lyft的机器人出租车提供动力 - 同时创立Mentee（机器人）和AI21 Labs（正在谈判$300M新融资） - 🔗

I asked Claude to apply a capital cycle analysis to $MU. Here's what it came up with: Net reading: 11 of 14 capital cycle signals are bearish or strongly bearish. The framework reads this as late-cycle, not early/mid-cycle. The two unambiguously bullish signals (equipment lead times, industry concentration) are eroding rather than strengthening. Insights Yielded by Capital Cycle Analysis: 1) "Structural change" rhetoric is itself diagnostic. The capital cycle framework treats coordinated industry-wide CEO claims of regime change as evidence of late-cycle euphoria. The same language was deployed by the same CEOs (Mehrotra at Micron specifically) in 2017–2018 and was wrong. Bayesian base rates argue against accepting the current claims at face value. The previous analysis under-weighted this base-rate evidence. 2) Look at total capital flowing into the supply curve, not just incumbent capex. The structural-change analysis focused on Big Three capex. The capital cycle lens forces aggregation of all capital flowing into memory output: a) Incumbent capex: ~$104B in 2026 across DRAM + NAND; b) CXMT IPO proceeds: ~$4.2B (with state-aligned co-financing many multiples larger); c) YMTC capacity additions (privately financed) d) Substitute technology capital (Cerebras, photonic startups, CXL controller designers) — billions of dollars of equity raised to reduce HBM intensity per dollar of AI compute deployed. When aggregated, total effective supply-side capital formation in 2026 is materially higher than the Big Three capex alone suggests. The supply response is being underestimated. 3) The customer base is doing exactly what late-cycle customers do. Hyperscalers locking in 3–5 year LTAs, pre-ordering 2027 NAND, building strategic inventory — these are not signs of confident long-cycle visibility, they are signs of late-cycle scarcity panic. Historically (DRAM 2017–2018, oil 2008, shipping 2007), customer pre-buying at peak prices is followed by sharp inventory destocking when prices roll over. The structural-change narrative frames LTA penetration as a benefit; the capital cycle frames it as a peak signal. 4) Multiple expansion + earnings expansion = asymmetric downside. The previous analysis flagged the 15x NTM P/E multiple as aggressive (referring to UBS PT raise). The capital cycle framework sharpens this: when both earnings and multiple are at peak, the compound drawdown when either reverts is severe. Memory historically goes from 60% gross margin to negative gross margin and from 10x P/E to <5x P/E. Even a modest reversion to 35% gross margin and 8x P/E from current levels implies a 60–75% equity drawdown for the memory primaries — without any disorderly cycle. 5) Supply lag is real but not unique. The bullish point about EUV/TSV/hybrid bonding lead times is correct but mis-weighted. The capital cycle history of other capital-intensive industries (oil refining, shipbuilding, semiconductor wafer fab) shows that long lead times increase the eventual amplitude of the down-cycle: capital decisions made at peak are not reversible when conditions soften, leading to capacity overhang. Long lead times delay the down-cycle; they do not abolish it. 6) China is the textbook capital-cycle disruptor. In Chancellor's historical case studies (steel, shipbuilding, solar, panels, batteries), state-backed Chinese entrants repeatedly compressed margins of consolidated Western/Korean/Japanese oligopolies once technology gaps narrowed. The U.S. equipment restrictions on China have created the illusion that this dynamic is paused, but the data shows CXMT doubled DRAM share in 18 months and is targeting domestic HBM3. The structural-change analysis appropriately flagged this; the capital cycle framework would weight it heavier as the single most important multi-year risk. 7) Substitute capital formation is its own supply curve. The capital cycle framework treats financing flows into substitutes as a parallel supply expansion. Cerebras' $5.5B IPO, Marvell's $5B Celestial acquisition, the Sandisk/SK hynix HBF JV, and the CXL ecosystem (ALAB, MRVL, MCHP) are collectively financing "HBM intensity reduction." Even if HBM unit demand is met, the value capture per dollar of AI compute is diluted. Capital is flowing in adjacent to the memory primaries to reduce the share of AI spend that ends up in their P&L. 8) The bull case relies disproportionately on demand visibility. The capital cycle warns against demand-anchored theses. The bull case requires AI capex to continue at current levels or accelerate, hyperscaler ROI economics to remain favorable, sovereign AI to scale, and inference workloads not to migrate to non-HBM architectures. Each of these is plausible; the joint probability that all hold through 2028 is materially lower than the headline narrative suggests. 9) Sell-side estimate trajectory is itself a signal. UBS's PT trajectory ($535 → $1,625, a 3x increase in one revision) is historically associated with peak euphoria. Estimate revisions of this magnitude have a poor forward record. The framework would treat the velocity of estimate revisions as a contra-signal. 10) Where the asymmetry sits. The capital cycle framework reframes the risk/reward calculation. Even if the bull thesis is right and earnings hold through 2028, the upside from current levels is modest (multiple expansion has already happened). If the bull thesis is partially wrong — say, 2028 brings 25% peak-to-trough EPS decline rather than 50% — the equity drawdown is still material because multiples will compress simultaneously. The asymmetry is not favourable at current valuations. Bottom line: The structural change thesis was directionally correct but materially overweighted by the original analysis. The capital cycle framework appropriately reweights toward supply-side caution and treats current peak conditions, peak valuations, peak management confidence, and accelerating capital inflows as a coherent set of late-cycle signals. The memory industry has undergone real and beneficial structural change in shape, but the empirical base rate against the "cycle has been abolished" claim is overwhelming. The economic characteristics of memory businesses have improved but have not been transformed into stable, compounding, low-volatility ones — and the next 18–30 months are statistically more likely to mark the end of this up-cycle than a transition to a new regime.