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OAまで残り　1️⃣2️⃣　時間‼️ 岡村さん＆　#めめこじ　# タイトルコールを先行公開🧡🖤 脱出島🏝推しメンSP👍 めめこじの推しメン💕 ジャニーズの新星が参戦🐯🌟 #冒険少年　でぜひ応援を…🎉🎉# #IMPACTors# #椿泰我　##鈴木大河　##エルフ荒川　##じゅんダビ# #岡村隆史　##SnowMan　##向井康二　##目黒蓮#

🧠 El drama invisible: Cecodap alerta sobre el grave impacto de los apagones en la salud mental de los niños venezolanos 🔌 #SinLuz#

I explained the Chinese real estate & debt crisis in much detail in 2024 on my Substack. Nothing has changed since. China is in what we call "the largest balance-sheet recession the world has ever seen". And it will take years to get out of it and assuming the CCP's investment-led growth model does not dig the next hole in the meantime - a likely. The FT published added some colour to it two days ago: "Housing is important to every economy. But to China, it’s extra important. According to the PBoC, 96% of urban households own a home, and 41% own at least two. The average household owns 1.5 properties. And as such, property constitutes around 70% of China’s private wealth. The comparable figure for the US is around 30%. So when Chinese property prices fall, the authors make a pretty compelling case that this has all sorts of particularly bad economic spillovers. And fall they have. The negative wealth effect is substantial, and “effects are amplified by elevated household debt, much of which consists of mortgage obligations”. This — and the weaker income expectations that the falls generate — goes some way to suppressing consumption. Moreover, declining land-sale revenues constrain local government budgets, “limiting their capacity to finance developmental projects and maintain existing public infrastructure”. And this is even before any credit impacts from rising non-performing loans and mortgages on bank balance sheets are considered. Tl;dr: bad bad bad. Of course, China isn’t the first soon-to-be-global-economic-hegemon-East-Asian-power staring down demographic oblivion to have piled its savings into a property boom. Back in 1991, the world was fretting over the rise and rise of Japan. And the Japanese were buying Japanese residential real estate at outlandish prices. Japan’s house prices peaked back in 1991 and spent the next 30 years on a downward trajectory. We’re only a few years into the Chinese property bust, and its ultimate trajectory is both unknown and unknowable. But Rogoff and Yang have pulled together some cool data they kindly shared with Alphaville, allowing us to make this chart below. So far, it looks like prices in Chinese cities are falling at around the same pace as they did over the first five-to-10 years of Japan’s bust. Japan’s property crash is associated with a lost decade (or two) of economic growth. In the 10 years leading up to 1991, Japanese real annual GDP growth averaged 4.4%. In the subsequent 10 years it averaged only 0.9% per annum. The same numbers for China, with 2021 marking its property zenith, are 7.0% per year and 4.6% per year (so far). If the IMF’s forecasts turn out right, this latter number will fall to around 4.0% per annum. While the levels are different, the before-and-after drop looks comparable. Was it housing wot dun it? Rogoff and Yang reckon that a 40% decline in house prices translates into a total consumption loss of 2-4% of GDP. Not nothing, but not a single answer explaining life, the universe and wiggles in the decadal pace of real economic growth. To get here, they construct a historical dataset comprising subnational data across 47 prefectures, and input and output data at granular industry levels. They then use this to examine the macroeconomic implications of Japan’s real estate bust. And the authors argue that: a housing bust can generate substantial adverse effects on the economy via real channels. . . . overbuilding during the boom can trigger a demand-driven recession with limited reallocation and low output. Unlike financial channels, which amplify shocks through leverage, bank balance sheets, credit constraints, or fire sales, real channels operate directly through investment, consumption, labour markets, or productivity. In Japan’s case, the housing market collapse depressed activity through three key real channels: investment, consumption, and sentiment. This is all pretty intuitive. But using city-level and household-level Chinese data plus some whizzy maths, they put meat on the bone for these three channels. They find that Chinese cities that overbuilt housing the most are less keen on new building, suppressing investment. Sounds legit. Chinese household consumption is estimated to be more responsive to house price changes than it was in either Japan or the US given its outsized role in private wealth. And it looks to the authors like people have scrambled to rebuild precautionary savings they thought they had amassed in property. Understandable. Then, on the sentiment side, Rogoff and Yang use an LLM to gauge market perceptions of the housing market. And by incorporating city-specific perceptions, they double the estimated effect of house price changes on consumption. Huh. While China is not Japan, 1991 was not 2021, and a *lot* of other things are/were going on, it’s interesting to see that the overall magnitude and pace of property price falls — as well as the aggregate drop in the pace of headline GDP growth — has (so far) been spookily similar. And as for the big question — are we there yet? "If China’s adjustment unfolds in a similar way as Japan’s, it would mean China has not gone half way through the transition. By contrast, if China’s path is eventually comparable to the United States, it appears to have already covered roughly two-thirds of the adjustment before reaching the bottom." So more to come.

ESTATUA DE EVANGELION GENERA MILLONES EN JAPON La ciudad de Hamamatsu instalo una figura gigante del EVA cero uno que costo mas de trescientos cuarenta mil dolares. El proyecto fue un exito rotundo y genero un impacto economico de mas de siete millones de dolares.

早上读了Anthropic 在 2026 年 3 月发布的研究笔记 《Labor market impacts of AI: A new measure and early evidence》有点意思。 Anthropic是Claude的母公司，也是头部AI厂商了，手里有Claude的所有数据。这次的报告计算逻辑是通过Claude 流量里出现了足够多的、与工作相关的使用，理论上可行的任务才会被算作“covered”，所以数据应该比较准确。 这个报告重点聚焦在AI 到底有没有开始真正冲击就业这个点上，毕竟”AI焦虑“这个词已经全球范围内持续很久了，但到底落地了多少呢？ 文章提出了一个新的指标暴露度 (Observed Exposure)用来衡量AI在对真实职场的渗透情况，涵盖理论能力 + 真实使用数据 + 是否用于工作场景 + 是增强还是自动化，这对于量化AI对现实生活的冲击更有效，也在一定程度上可以让我们更好的判断AI技术革命走到哪里了。 研究发现在最容易受到 AI 影响的职业 中，从业者更可能是 年龄较大、女性、受教育程度更高、收入更高的群体。 从报告里最直观的图看，目前理论上AI能覆盖（冲击）的范围与实际上形成的范围还是有不小差距的，暴露的蓝色范围内还没有形成系统性失业率上升，只是年轻人进入这些岗位的招聘似乎有一点变慢。 当前最暴露的职业 主要集中在白领、信息处理、软件和分析类岗位。文中列出的前十包括： Computer programmers：74.5% Customer service representatives：70.1% Data entry keyers：67.1% Medical record specialists：66.7% Market research analysts and marketing specialists：64.8% Financial and investment analysts：57.2% 另外还有软件测试、信息安全、用户支持等岗位也排得很前。相反，约 30% 的工人处于“零暴露”组，典型例子包括厨师、摩托车维修工、救生员、酒保、洗碗工等。 这也正常，AI 的能力像洪水，落地像修水渠，在具身机器人举得巨大进展之前，蓝领比白领更不用焦虑。 我们这代人是幸运的，能经历互联网，移动互联网，区块链，AI，机器人等多次技术革命，不过也是不幸的，如果没有能跟上如此高速的进步，未来或许真的也就慢慢成为科幻作品中被“圈养”的那批人了。 Morning，新的努力一天开始了 原文传送门：

Muchos fans de Baki han olvidado cómo era realmente el panel original de Retsu Kaioh en el hospital. La escena pertenece al arco de Son of Ogre, justo después de que Pickle le arrancara la pierna. Aunque el momento buscaba ser trágico y reflexivo, internet lo convirtió en un meme viral al editar la imagen y eliminar el cuerpo de Retsu hasta dejar solo su cabeza sobre la almohada, borrando el impacto de la escena original.

La primera parte de la nueva temporada de One Punch Man ya concluyó y dejó a los fans divididos. La calidad de la animación generó opiniones mixtas al no lograr el mismo impacto que el arte de Yusuke Murata en el manga. La decisión de dividir la temporada en dos partes es un movimiento claro para ganar tiempo de producción. Con combates tan complejos en camino, como el clímax de Garou, esta segunda mitad será la última oportunidad para que el estudio demuestre que puede manejar la escala de la obra.

Este pequeño mono del zoológico de Ichikawa en Japón fue rechazado por su madre al nacer. Para evitar que se sintiera solo, los cuidadores le dieron un peluche de orangután de IKEA como madre sustituta. El video de Punch abrazando su peluche se volvió tan viral que el lugar se llenó de visitantes de la noche a la mañana. El impacto fue tan grande que el propio presidente de IKEA Japón fue en persona al zoológico a donar más peluches.

The income and wealth gap in the US are the highest they’ve been in almost 100 years. It’s something that need to be addressed before it creates even more extreme internal conflicts. However, I worry about the practical impacts of wealth taxes on the economic system. And that’s because there’s a difference between wealth and money. It’s all about the mechanics. Bubbles burst when there’s a need for money to generate cash flow. Wealth taxes would create a situation where people who are wealthy on paper need to sell assets to cover their liabilities. And that can quickly create a dynamic that leads to a broader issue. It’s something to watch in the coming years.