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From “It’s standing up!” to the brink of history, what a journey. 🚀🚀 That raw, unforgettable video of Elon Musk in mission control, eyes wide, voice cracking with pure awe: “It’s standing up… Holy smokes, man!”, captures the exact moment everything changed. December 21, 2015. The first successful Falcon 9 booster landing. A feat many called impossible. Back then, reusable rockets were a dream. Failures piled up. Skeptics laughed. But that single, perfect touchdown on Landing Zone 1 didn’t just save a booster, it ignited a revolution. Launch costs plummeted. Cadence exploded. Starlink connected the world. NASA crews flew safely. And the road to Mars became real. Fast forward to today. Hundreds of landings later. Night landings on drone ships. Boosters flying dozens of times. Starship catching towers. And now, SpaceX stands on the cusp of its historic IPO, set to debut as one of the largest in history, valuing the dream at over a trillion dollars. This isn’t just about rockets or stock prices. It’s about belief. About a team that kept iterating through explosions, setbacks, and doubt. About Elon and every engineer, technician, and dreamer at SpaceX who refused to accept “that’s how it’s always been done. From that magic moment in 2015 to this milestone today, congratulations, @SpaceX. To @elonmusk, the entire team, and everyone who believed. The future isn’t coming. SpaceX is building it, booster by booster. What an inspiration!

Boris Cherny (Claude Code's creator): I deleted my IDE in November and hasn't opened it since. I writes more code than ever. his actual words on stage: I don't prompt Claude anymore. I have loops that are running. They're the ones prompting Claude. My job is to write loops. the progression he described: → a year ago: writing code by hand with autocomplete → then: running 5-10 Claudes in parallel, prompting each one → now: he doesn't prompt at all - he writes the loops that prompt Claude what it's already done inside Anthropic: • ~3x more code shipped per engineer (he says that number is already outdated and higher) • Cowork - a full product - built in ~8 days, 100% with Claude Code • designers, the finance guy, even the chief of staff now ship code his advice to founders: give everyone as many tokens as possible, and underfund every project on purpose - 2 engineers + a pile of tokens instead of 4. the roles are melting into one "builder." Watch this, than read the article below

🚨🇺🇸 The SpaceX IPO filing just set the entire space sector on fire🔥 Space and satellite stocks surged across the board today as investors piled into anything orbit-adjacent. Redwire closed up 26%, Firefly Aerospace jumped 19% after NASA picked its spacecraft for a moon mission, AST SpaceMobile rose 13%, and MDA Space climbed nearly 5%. A Bank of America basket of space-race stocks posted its biggest one-day gain in over a year and is up 57% on the year, crushing the S&P's 9.8%. Elon's filing, targeting up to $75 billion at a rumored $2 trillion valuation, is the gravity pulling all of it upward. When the biggest private company on earth opens its doors to public investors, every smaller player in its orbit suddenly looks like the next big thing. Source: Bloomberg @SpaceX

Hyperliquid is being treated like the cleanest up only narrative in crypto and I want to add some nuance here. To be clear, this is not Luna. Luna was a closed loop algorithmic peg with no real revenue. Hyperliquid has real fees from real users, a genuinely best in class product, a dominant share of onchain perps volume, and a team that has shipped relentlessly. The bull case is real. I'm not dismissing it. I just don't think the risks are getting the airtime they deserve. I called Luna a ponzi here in 2021 around $50 and got absolutely hammered on the tl for daring to suggest anything negative about it as it ran to $120 before it vaporized to $0 within days. Very similar to yesterday when I simply said HL does not have remarkable tokenomics and got piled on for it. Being early on structural risk often looks wrong for a long time. And Luna was not just a retail rug. It roped in 3AC, Galaxy, Delphi, Hashed. Sophisticated money held the bag right alongside everyone else. Here is what I see with Hyperliquid. 97% of fees buy back HYPE. That sounds incredible, and in an active perps bull market it absolutely is. But fees come from perp volume, volume comes from people chasing the token, and the token is held up by buybacks funded by that same volume. Every leg moves together. It's a functional flywheel. And in the other direction every leg turns at once. However, nobody can tell you how much of the volume is organic either. If buybacks pump the token and the chart pulls in size and size funds buybacks, you cannot cleanly separate real activity from reflexive activity onchain. It doesn't mean the volume is fake. It just means you cannot prove how much of it isn't. Then the supply side. Only 25% circulates. Team and foundation together hold roughly 30% (23% team plus the foundation allocation which is essentially team with extra steps). Buybacks absorb about 90 million of unlocks a month. Actual pressure is closer to 400 million plus. Revenue keeps growing at a real clip, which is the whole bull case, but it has to roughly 4x just to keep price flat through vesting. Then the part nobody wants to touch. 31 validators, foundation controls the supermajority of stake, closed source binary, an assistance fund holding billions that we are simply told has no private key, on a chain the team built and runs. A lot of the business is regulatory arbitrage. Offshore venue, no KYC, users that shouldn't be using it are all over it. The founder is in DC right now precisely because everyone knows this. SBF was in DC lobbying for the DCCPA right up until FTX collapsed. Do Kwon was meeting Korean regulators before Terra blew up. Doesn't mean Jeff is anything like them. And to be clear, none of this means price stops going up. This is the part that matters for traders. Reflexive setups run for a long time, sometimes years. Luna ran from $5 to $120 while plenty of smart people screamed about the structure. HYPE can absolutely do the same. The flywheel is real while it's spinning, and standing in front of it is a great way to underperform. Just know what you're actually holding. Trade the tape, respect the trend, but don't fall in love and confuse a beautiful reflexive setup with a riskless cash machine. We have seen structures like this before and it tends to end the same way for usually the same reasons.

雨の日🌧️ バッグすごい褒められる☺️嬉し。 大阪ポップアップでも展開するよ🫶🏻 Double open pile hoodie see through tops leathertouch minitub bag

I explained the Chinese real estate & debt crisis in much detail in 2024 on my Substack. Nothing has changed since. China is in what we call "the largest balance-sheet recession the world has ever seen". And it will take years to get out of it and assuming the CCP's investment-led growth model does not dig the next hole in the meantime - a likely. The FT published added some colour to it two days ago: "Housing is important to every economy. But to China, it’s extra important. According to the PBoC, 96% of urban households own a home, and 41% own at least two. The average household owns 1.5 properties. And as such, property constitutes around 70% of China’s private wealth. The comparable figure for the US is around 30%. So when Chinese property prices fall, the authors make a pretty compelling case that this has all sorts of particularly bad economic spillovers. And fall they have. The negative wealth effect is substantial, and “effects are amplified by elevated household debt, much of which consists of mortgage obligations”. This — and the weaker income expectations that the falls generate — goes some way to suppressing consumption. Moreover, declining land-sale revenues constrain local government budgets, “limiting their capacity to finance developmental projects and maintain existing public infrastructure”. And this is even before any credit impacts from rising non-performing loans and mortgages on bank balance sheets are considered. Tl;dr: bad bad bad. Of course, China isn’t the first soon-to-be-global-economic-hegemon-East-Asian-power staring down demographic oblivion to have piled its savings into a property boom. Back in 1991, the world was fretting over the rise and rise of Japan. And the Japanese were buying Japanese residential real estate at outlandish prices. Japan’s house prices peaked back in 1991 and spent the next 30 years on a downward trajectory. We’re only a few years into the Chinese property bust, and its ultimate trajectory is both unknown and unknowable. But Rogoff and Yang have pulled together some cool data they kindly shared with Alphaville, allowing us to make this chart below. So far, it looks like prices in Chinese cities are falling at around the same pace as they did over the first five-to-10 years of Japan’s bust. Japan’s property crash is associated with a lost decade (or two) of economic growth. In the 10 years leading up to 1991, Japanese real annual GDP growth averaged 4.4%. In the subsequent 10 years it averaged only 0.9% per annum. The same numbers for China, with 2021 marking its property zenith, are 7.0% per year and 4.6% per year (so far). If the IMF’s forecasts turn out right, this latter number will fall to around 4.0% per annum. While the levels are different, the before-and-after drop looks comparable. Was it housing wot dun it? Rogoff and Yang reckon that a 40% decline in house prices translates into a total consumption loss of 2-4% of GDP. Not nothing, but not a single answer explaining life, the universe and wiggles in the decadal pace of real economic growth. To get here, they construct a historical dataset comprising subnational data across 47 prefectures, and input and output data at granular industry levels. They then use this to examine the macroeconomic implications of Japan’s real estate bust. And the authors argue that: a housing bust can generate substantial adverse effects on the economy via real channels. . . . overbuilding during the boom can trigger a demand-driven recession with limited reallocation and low output. Unlike financial channels, which amplify shocks through leverage, bank balance sheets, credit constraints, or fire sales, real channels operate directly through investment, consumption, labour markets, or productivity. In Japan’s case, the housing market collapse depressed activity through three key real channels: investment, consumption, and sentiment. This is all pretty intuitive. But using city-level and household-level Chinese data plus some whizzy maths, they put meat on the bone for these three channels. They find that Chinese cities that overbuilt housing the most are less keen on new building, suppressing investment. Sounds legit. Chinese household consumption is estimated to be more responsive to house price changes than it was in either Japan or the US given its outsized role in private wealth. And it looks to the authors like people have scrambled to rebuild precautionary savings they thought they had amassed in property. Understandable. Then, on the sentiment side, Rogoff and Yang use an LLM to gauge market perceptions of the housing market. And by incorporating city-specific perceptions, they double the estimated effect of house price changes on consumption. Huh. While China is not Japan, 1991 was not 2021, and a *lot* of other things are/were going on, it’s interesting to see that the overall magnitude and pace of property price falls — as well as the aggregate drop in the pace of headline GDP growth — has (so far) been spookily similar. And as for the big question — are we there yet? "If China’s adjustment unfolds in a similar way as Japan’s, it would mean China has not gone half way through the transition. By contrast, if China’s path is eventually comparable to the United States, it appears to have already covered roughly two-thirds of the adjustment before reaching the bottom." So more to come.

パイル生地のアイテムを作りたくて実現したDouble open pile hoodie🐋 肌触り心地よく、いつまでも纏っていたくなる素材感。 ダブルジップのため、ファスナーの開け方によってさまざまな表情感をお楽しみいただけることもお気に入りポイントです☺️⛅️