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每日大盘解读——BTC 从周K角度来看，价格正处于回踩W底颈线的关口，该位置作用在小级别的支撑还在，可以正常放低点位看长做短。但由于整体压制下行的缘故，向上预期很小，不能贪杯。 从日线走势去观察，价格两度反抽本级别MA30后，处于线下震荡箱体，该箱体扮演的角色，是下跌中继结构，再结合周线的形态支撑，本级别的波动半径被压缩在2%的范围内，故而不能追涨，需要耐心等会价格回踩箱体下轨，或微微刺破时的支撑。 从4H到12H的走势来看，中线处于多空收缩结构下部的状态还在持续中，价格运行重心和均线空头发散进一步向下延伸，原有控盘线（75180）一带的支撑还在，但仅限于会盯盘的用户实时参考，新的挂单需要等待价格抵达23号低点附近后再考虑。 从1H及以下级别的走势来看，K线未形成有效买点，均线系统也是清一色空头发散，昨天在低点接到的筹码拉伸中自行主动止盈，新筹码等待波动放大后再进。 总结：周K颈线支撑和日线均线系统压制汇聚，让价格的波动空间被压缩在2%的半径内，结合周K颈线的看长做短的低多，以及结合日K压制看长做短的高抛是必要的准备。 激进支撑75440-75180（缓跌快进快出，有效期6H） 短线支撑74411-73535（1:2快进快出） 短线压制76433-77190（盯盘参考，不操作） 68500是大级别长效支撑，该区域闲钱长期可挂（有支撑和能到是两回事，是68500有支撑，不是糖哥看跌BTC到68500）！#BTC#

Here's the #1# thing most people don't know about Warren Buffett: There is nothing special about Buffett’s stock picking. That doesn’t mean that Buffett wasn’t a great investor. He was! Buffett was, by far, the greatest investor in history, by a huge margin. Over 486 months between October 1976 and March 2017 –— 41 years –— Berkshire Hathaway’s Class A stock earned an average excess return of 18.6% per year above U.S. Tbills. Annualized volatility was 23.5%. Sharpe ratio: 0.79. Berkshire’s Sharpe ratio of (0.79) is roughly 1.6x times the broad U.S. stock market’s Sharpe ratio of 0.49 over the same period. Among all large-cap U.S. stocks and mutual funds with 30-plus-year continuous track records, those are unmatched numbers. A dollar invested in Berkshire on October 31, 1976, was worth more than $3,685 by March 31, 2017. A dollar invested in the S&P 500 with dividends reinvested over the same period was worth approximately $76. Buffett beat a passive index by a multiple of 48. But he didn’t do it with stock picking! Three researchers at AQR Capital Management –— Andrea Frazzini, David Kabiller, and Lasse Heje Pedersen –— dissected Berkshire’s 50 years of investments through 2013. They expanded and republished their findings in 2018 in the Financial Analysts Journal, which is the most highly respected industry financial journal. Their work won the Graham and Dodd Award for the best published paper of the year. The paper is called Buffett’s Alpha. They found, after accounting for cheap leverage (from the insurance float) and exposure to a handful of publicly documented factor premiums, Buffett’s investment skill –— the portion of his returns that cannot be explained by any mechanical strategy –— is 0.3% per year. That's statistically indistinguishable from zero. In other words, the alpha that Berkshire enjoyed for 50 years (as it compounded capital at 24% a year!) wasn’t due to Buffett’s stock picking. So, how did he do it? He did it by gaining access to a huge amount of investment capital that he did not own, for free. Buffett’s track record was built on leverage. That’s a dirty word for most investors, but it's the secret behind Berkshire. The AQR researchers had access to something most Buffett commentators do not: 40 years of Berkshire’s audited financial statements and the full quarterly history of the public 13F stock portfolio. The researchers asked a specific question: If I take Berkshire’s monthly stock returns from October 1976 through March 2017, and I run a linear regression against a set of well-documented risk factors –— market beta, size, value, momentum, and two newer factors called Betting-Against-Beta and Quality-Minus-Junk (detailed below) –— how much of Buffett’s performance can the factors explain? And after the factors have been stripped out, how much excess return remains? The data show clearly there are a few qualities that drove Berkshire’s results. First, Buffett has always preferred large-cap stocks, contrary to the popular image of him as a small-cap value investor. He buys elephants. Second, no surprise, Buffett buys cheap. Berkshire is almost six standard deviations away from neutral on the value axis. So far the picture is ordinary. Every large- cap value manager in America loads positively on size and on value. Buffett’s genius lies in the last two factors. These last two factors are a little complicated, but please stick with me. There’s a new factor, that, like value and size, characterizes Buffett’s strategy. It’s called Betting-Against-Beta (“BAB”). What it means is intentionally investing in stocks with very low volatility. The BAB factor captures the excess return that accrues to investors who own low-beta stocks. Low-beta stocks have historically earned higher risk-adjusted returns than high-beta stocks. Financial theory teaches that higher beta (higher risk) should mean higher return. But it doesn’t. The opposite occurs, in fact. And Buffett was one of the very first people to figure this out. Why does this factor persist? In an efficient market, once that factor is known to investors, then they should bid the price up on low- beta stocks until it no longer provides an edge. The explanation, per the theory of AQR’s Frazzini and Pedersen’s theory, is that because ordinary investors do not use leverage and seek high returns, they create persistent excess demand for more volatile stocks. (Having worked with retail investors for 30 years, I can assure you that is true.) But, an investor with access to cheap leverage –— Warren Buffett, for instance –— can exploit the mispricing by owning the low-beta names and levering them up to produce market-beating returns. And the last factor that matters to Buffett is quality. Buffett buys companies with high returns on invested capital. Quality-Minus-Junk (“QMJ”) is a factor described by Cliff Asness, also at AQR with Frazzini, and Pedersen, in a 2019 paper in Review of Accounting Studies. The QMJ factor captures the return to owning stocks of high-quality companies –— profitable, growing, safe, with high payout ratios –— against stocks lacking those characteristics. QMJ has been positive and statistically significant in every major developed equity market for which it has been measured. Berkshire’s loading is 0.37, with a t-statistic of 4.6. –– meaning it is highly significant to Berkshire’s results. In plain English: Buffett only buys large, high- quality, low-volatility stocks of the highest quality. But, Berkshire’s results were not, in any way, unusual. Any investor buying these same kinds of stocks would have earned those same returns –– about 16% a year over time. So how did Berkshire compound at 23% a year? To figure that out, AQR’s researchers built a Berkshire replica. They constructed a simple, rules-based, publicly investable portfolio that mechanically tilts toward large-cap, cheap, low-beta, high-quality stocks, and levers it 1.6- to- 1 to match Berkshire’s insurance float leverage. The correlation between their replica’s returns and Berkshire’s were virtually identical. The authors’ conclusion is unambiguous. “In summary, we find that Buffett has developed a unique access to leverage that he has invested in safe, high-quality, cheap stocks and that these key characteristics can largely explain his impressive performance.” Berkshire’s cost of insurance float has averaged almost three percentage points below the Treasury bill rate across 50fifty years of data. In roughly two-thirds of all years, Berkshire has been paid to hold other people’s money. That is not an investment strategy. That is a financing miracle. It is also the living, breathing heart of Berkshire Hathaway. It’s what Buffett built, starting in 1967 when he paid $8.6 million for National Indemnity’s $19.4 million of float. And it is the factor every retail investor admiring Berkshire’s returns has never paid any attention to. The 1.6-to-1 leverage that AQR measured over the full period, financed at this negative cost, explains the dollar magnitude of Berkshire’s returns. How do we know? An unleveraged version of the same stock portfolio –— which you can approximate by looking at the 13F holdings alone –— has earned an average excess return of 12% percent per year. It’s Berkshire’s leverage that magnifies this excess return to 18.6 %percent. How does this square with Berkshire’s reported gains? Berkshire’s 18.6% excess return, plus the T-bill rate that averaged roughly 4.7% over 1976–2017, gives you a total nominal return of roughly 23% per year, which is the figure you usually see quoted for Berkshire’s historical performance. The 23% tells you what Berkshire returned. The 18.6% tells you how much of that return was compensation for taking investment risk, as opposed to the baseline yield every lender to the U.S. government was earning anyway. With both of Berkshire’s “edges” –— systematic factor exposures to cheap, high-quality, low-volatility stocks and roughly 1.6-to-1 leverage delivered with insurance float –— you get Berkshire Hathaway’s 23% annual gains over 60 years. It’s the structure that’s genius, not the stock picking. And that's very important because it means the original Berkshire formula can work for any investor. I show you exactly how, in my new book.

暴雷了 阿团 昨晚互动里提到了2015年徐翔出事，很多新股民好奇，我简单补充一下。 徐翔的泽熙私募大概在5月份就大幅度减仓了，减仓后踏空了一段行情还被人嘲讽质疑，结果6月底a股开始崩盘，泽熙躲过一劫，并且在国家队介入救市后精准抄底抓反弹大赚一笔。 阳光私募的净值每周更新一次，所以徐翔的操作很快就引起了媒体的关注，一边是大盘泥沙俱下，国家队狼狈救场，一边是徐翔逃顶抄底，逆势赚大钱，这在当时有很强烈的反差感。事后回想这种时候应该低调回避的，可能是人在顺境中忘乎所以，忽视了其它风险。 那一轮股灾和救市最后搞的鸡飞狗跳，上层应该是很不满意，事后开始清算，前后抓了上百人，徐翔也是其中之一。2015年11月1日，徐翔在宁波杭州湾跨海大桥上被公安机关逮捕，当场拍摄了那张全网流传的白色阿玛尼照片。 他的罪名是操纵证券市场罪和内幕交易罪，主要都是他和上市公司高管勾兑，这些属于实锤没什么好说的。那几年很流行市值管理，所谓“管理”和“操纵”的边界是很模糊的，不出事是管理得当，出事就是操纵罪。当时也有人来找我一起去和某上市公司谈市值管理，我不愿掺合。 事后有人说徐翔全靠犯罪才能挣那么多钱，这就属于纯纯的没脑子，在a股和上市公司勾兑的人太多了，为什么只有徐翔赚了几百亿。他的能力毋庸置疑，绝对股神级别的。但他出身草莽，在合规安全上不够重视，又在股灾中高调暴赚，于是触发了“其它风险”。 前人踩雷，后人避险。有感于徐翔事迹，我从很早就开始注意避嫌，我甚至都做好准备随时某一天监管部门突然找到我，要求我交出手机和电脑，然后核查我有没有利用文章流量给交易谋利。保证安全，绝对合规，我现在个股都几乎不买了，重仓期指，干干净净，清清白白。 …… 说到期指，我今天盘中卖了一手，我都忘了上一次主动减仓是什么时候了，起码最近三年都是只加不减。我前面说了中证超过7000点，每涨1%就卖1手。今天中证最高点7074，正好符合，结果我刚卖完没多久它就尿了，一路跌到收盘6854，跌了200多点。 我复盘看了一下，今天成交3.17万亿，这个量能仅次于去年10月8日，排历史第二。中位数有点惨，跌了2.8%，是自4月份行情启动以来单日最大跌幅，很多近期岁月静好的股民今天跌的脑瓜子嗡嗡的。 其实也没什么特殊利空，确实就是这一波涨太多了，尤其是最近加速上涨，技术指标有点问题，还留了个缺口，趁着今天回调修复一下。熊市多长阳，牛市多暴跌，这个现象很正常，那些只要一个下跌就嚷嚷着要逃命的都是吃不了细粮的久财。 其实今天市场过热有一个显著信号，就是寒武纪在盘中股价曾经短暂超过了茅台，篡位a股第一高价股宝座。我估计你们很多人也听说过茅台魔咒，说的就是历史上有一些股票股价曾经短暂超越茅台，但随后下场一个比一个惨。 最早是中国船舶，超越茅台后股价回撤85%+。之后那么多年又陆陆续续多了一批反贼，石头科技、安硕信息、海普瑞、吉比特、禾迈股份、全通教育，这里面吉比特回撤腰斩已经是表现最好的，剩下几个跌幅都在80%、90%以上。 最惨的是暴风科技，跌没了，退市了，创始人抓进去坐牢三年，好像前年已经出狱了。 总之就是流水的妖股，铁打的茅台，在长时间尺度下只有真价值的股王能承受得起照妖镜的检视，其它股票都被照回原形。现如今寒伟达趁着ai概念的东风也来挑战一下魔咒，咱也不能把话说死，因为这本来就是玄学领域，寒伟达的股东们可以说这次不一样，这没毛病，之前那些个被活埋的也都是不信邪的。我只是陈述一下有这么个事，吉凶你们自己把握。 …… 这几天有不少人留言问怎么不被洗啊，还有人问怎么逃顶啊？ 这两个问题都可以用ma20的策略去解决，即指数收盘在20日线上持有，指数收盘在20日线下就卖出。这是一个典型的趋势右侧交易策略，你们没有条件回测不要紧，自己翻出2007年和2015年的k线，肉眼观察或者拿纸笔简单算一下就知道大致效果。 它的问题是中间震荡反复的时候，可能会连续错几次小的，每次亏个2-4%，不多，但是很伤积极性，比如3%连亏3次，你就会开始怀疑这个策略是不是坑人的，等到后面它发挥作用帮你逃过-30%的暴跌时你可能反而不信了。 我以前曾经用类似的策略指导读者在大趋势波动时回避风险，策略本身没问题，但是队伍一直乱哄哄，骂骂咧咧，后来我就不干了。这次我只简单说下思路，你们感兴趣的自己去琢磨。 ps：慢熊市、个股操作不适合用这个策略。 …… 今天晚上美团爆了个大雷，直冲热股榜榜首。 核心本地商业（外卖、到店）收入 653 亿元，增长 7.7%，增速较去年同期的 18.2% 显著下滑。调整后净利润仅 14.9 亿元，同比减少 132 亿元，利润率从去年的 16.5% 骤降至 1.6%，几乎都快不挣钱了。 除了财务疲软外，美团的市占率也在被淘宝快速侵蚀，8月份淘宝订单峰值突破 1.5 亿单，首次超越美团。美团为了迎战只能被迫增加给骑手们的补贴，单均配送成本增加 0.34 元，进一步雪上加霜。 这还不是最糟的，接下来国家强制所有企业给员工上社保，美团的经营成本会继续增加，美团核心本地商业CEO王莆中之前接受采访，话说的可硬了，当时还以为美团胸有成竹，谈笑风声击退友商，结果今晚财报直接光着屁股就上来了 这还不给淘宝那边打鸡血了，再补贴几百亿加码干啊。阿里这几年商战一次都没赢过，终于在美团这里开胡了。 今晚美股开盘的美团adr盘前交易跌9%。 最后提醒一下前几天推的重疾险，还有4天就要涨价了，因为保险行业的预定利率8月31日之后就会上调，有需要的这几天认真考虑一下。 推荐2款高性价比重疾险： 达尔文11号：中青年人首选，预计8月31日下掉。价格是我接触到算最低的，保1次重疾、3次中症和4次轻症，还有一般产品没有的厉害保障：一是因意外导致重疾能多赔30%；二是一直没得大病，60岁后哪怕因小病或意外住院也能领津贴。三是现金价值还不错，老后不想保了差不多能拿回已交保费，不用担心钱打了水漂。 妈咪保贝爱常在：孩子首选，最晚8月31日下掉。保1次重疾+累计6次的中症和轻症，儿童高发的白血病、严重哮喘等20种特定病种额外赔100%保额，买50万赔100万，如果是特定罕见病直接赔150万。还自带重度孤独症、严重少儿心理疾病等别家没有的保障。价格也相当便宜。 有需要的话最好早点，产品随时可能有变动，了解也要时间，点这里可以预约咨询，注意接听0755座机来电。 就这些，发射。

I'm finally scratching the surface of how much simpler application code becomes with Svelte. I never expected such a stark difference, yet here we are. React hook to track an element's height, vs the Svelte equivalent—it's amazing how much simpler things get with a compile step.

[ #아이돌라디오# ] 'IDOL RADIO' ep #685#. 아이돌 플레이리스트 YouTube Melon VIBE #GOT7# #갓세븐# @GOT7Official #IGOT7# #아가새# #Youngjae# #영재# #GOT7_DYE# #GOT7_NOTBYTHEMOON#