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I’ve seen some confusion about USDM supply, which is dropping on many dashboards. TLDR; this is healthy for a new ecosystem right now. But the explanation is long (although not complex): We always talk about “money” as if that’s a simple definition but economists have multiple definitions, each measuring a different set of assets considered part of the money supply. You may have heard terms like M1 money supply or M3 money supply if you read financial news a lot or took economics in school. At the bottom of the stack, the narrowest definition is M0 (which stablecoin issuer @m0 takes its name from). This is physical currency + your banks’ balance at the central bank. ⬆️ This is what most dashboards will show you for a stablecoin’s supply, because it’s relatively easy to count. Just add up the tokens, and of course central banks aren’t generally holding untokenized balances at Circle or Tether or Paxos. While this is a useful number, it excludes most of what we would in everyday usage call “money”. M1 is the next layer in the money stack, and includes M0 + demand deposits. When you say you have $500 in your checking account, you’re including M1 in your definition of money. ⬆️ This is where a deposit into @aave, @Morpho, or other short-term markets sits in the money stack. Quickly going through the other layers for your own curiosity: M2 = M1 + savings accounts + money market funds M3 = M2 + time deposits + repo agreements + short-term debt (usually up to 2 years) As of today, the M1 supply of USDM > M0 supply. Generally this is always the case with any currency, since it is what happens when fractional reserve lending, like on Aave, Morpho, Euler, Compound, or a traditional bank occurs. In the case of USDM, the M0 supply has shrunk while M1 has continued to grow. And remember that M1 cannot unwind without M0 (but can persist without it as long as the debt is healthy). This is due to a cross-chain carry trade. USDM has become a more attractive funding currency than USDC, and debt is being refinanced. This should be good news to those worried about USDM demand being purely for looping on the MegaETH Aave - it’s a second use case. Because Aave rates rise as utilization increases, at some point USDM will cease to be a good funding currency, and we’ll be at an equilibrium. This is growing pain of a healthy path for a new stablecoin (what’s the alternative, that no one wants to even borrow it?) - and is mostly a function of concentration on the Aave market. As USDM is accepted into other apps and another lender or three steps in for a piece of the market, I would anticipate less volatility in M0 supply of USDM, while M1 continues to grow at a more sustainable pace.
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[ #Piece_Of_Today# #💚# ] 이번 주 주간아이돌은 GOT7🐥 This week's Weekly Idol is GOT7🐥 #GOT7# #갓세븐# @GOT7Official #IGOT7# #아가새# #GOT7_BreathofLove_LastPiece# #GOT7_Breath# #GOT7_LASTPIECE#
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In 1990, the World Wide Web was invented on Steve Jobs' computer. Steve ignored it. This is the story I tell in my new book Steve Jobs in Exile. Here is what it should tell the rest of us about the moment we are in now. Steve was running NeXT, an unsuccessful computer company. He had been pushed out of Apple five years earlier and was burning his fortune trying to build a successor to the Macintosh. The machine NeXT sold was a matte-black magnesium cube -- expensive and beautiful and not selling. In October of that year, on the other side of the Atlantic, a British physicist named Tim Berners-Lee took delivery of a NeXT Cube at CERN, the physics laboratory on the Swiss-French border. He used it to invent the World Wide Web. The web ran on the Cube for its first year of existence. The revolution was happening on Steve's hardware, and yet Steve ignored it. Here is the question I keep thinking about from my book. If Steve Jobs, the most visionary tech mind of his generation, missed the Web, the most civilization-shaping tech of his lifetime, how are the rest of us supposed to see anything coming? Berners-Lee had been asking his boss at CERN for a NeXT Cube for months. His boss finally signed off, hoping to test the exotic Cube. "He suggested that I should buy one of these NeXT machines I'd been talking about so enthusiastically," Berners-Lee later told Fresh Air. "And if we needed a sort of test project to run on the NeXT machine ... 'Why not just do this hypertext thing you're talking about?'" The "test project" evolved into the World Wide Web. The problem Berners-Lee was trying to solve was not a glamorous one. CERN employed thousands of scientists from over a hundred countries, most cycling through on short assignments and taking their knowledge with them when they left. Berners-Lee was trying to keep institutional knowledge from walking out the door. He wanted a system that worked the way human memory does, where any piece of information could connect to any other without permission or central control. Through late 1990, he coded in his gray-floored office. The Cube's object-oriented system let him build in months what would have taken a year on anything else. By December, the first website went online. The World Wide Web now existed, running on a single black NeXT Cube in CERN's Building 31. Berners-Lee scrawled a warning on it in red ink: "This machine is a server. DO NOT POWER IT DOWN!!" Underneath the elegant interface he was building HTTP, HTML, and the server software that would deliver web pages. These three inventions would form much of the invisible plumbing of our modern connectivity. When a colleague of Berners-Lee's brought a demo of the Web to NeXT's headquarters in California, he could not get anyone there to pay attention. Nobody even dared show it to Steve, afraid he would dismiss it. NeXT was busy with its own internet plans, which Steve eventually killed. So back to the question. If Steve Jobs missed the web, how are the rest of us supposed to see whatever comes next? The honest answer is that we cannot. Nobody can. The rest of us are not going to outpattern-match Steve Jobs. But here is what I learned writing Steve Jobs in Exile. Transformations almost always begin in obscurity, on the margins, solving boring problems with boring tools. The web did not look revolutionary in 1990. It looked like a tool for sharing physics papers. We are in another such moment now. AI is the obvious changemaker. But the biggest transformations are rarely the obvious ones. The next one is happening somewhere right now, and it is trickier to spot than any sweeping proclamation about AI. We will recognize it, if we recognize it at all, from the unglamorous work few people are focused on. I will not speculate on what Steve would have made of AI today. But if he could miss the Web, the rest of us are going to have to look harder. Photo of the original CERN NeXT Cube courtesy of Robert Scoble.
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[ #Piece_Of_GOT7# #💚# ] Did you have a great Friday Night with GOT7?🔥 OUT today because of Perfect GOT7👏 #GOT7# #갓세븐# @GOT7Official #IGOT7# #아가새# #GOT7_BreathofLove_LastPiece# #GOT7_Breath# #GOT7_LASTPIECE# #2020KBSSongFestival#
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[ #Piece_Of_GOT7# #💚# ] GOT7 got prize in Golden Disc Awards thanks to I GOT7✨ GOT7's performance is the best today😘 🏆Best Album #GOT7# #갓세븐# @GOT7Official #IGOT7# #아가새# #GOT7_BreathofLove_LastPiece# #GOT7_Breath# #GOT7_LASTPIECE# #Goldendiscawards#
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[ #Piece_Of_GOT7# #🌴# #👑# #🌙# ] Today is also Happy Christmas with GOT7💚 Hope you have a good weekend I GOT7🐥 #GOT7# #갓세븐# @GOT7Official #IGOT7# #아가새# #GOT7_BreathofLove_LastPiece# #GOT7_Breath# #GOT7_LASTPIECE#
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Do you remember when I cosplayed Trafalgar Law? 😛 Looking forward to today’s episode of One Piece 👀 #onepiece#
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T-1 before $DROPEE TGE, and I think the market is finally starting to understand why @dropee_app keeps getting attention across CT. The thesis is no longer just: “AI + Telegram.” It’s the convergence of: 📲 Telegram distribution 🤖 AI-native production 🎮 portfolio-scale app iteration 💰 built-in monetization 🔄 structural buybacks And from a builder perspective, the most important piece is Dropee Create. Most people still think Dropee Create is just: “AI generating Telegram apps.” But after digging deeper, I think the actual value proposition is much bigger. Dropee Create is trying to automate the ENTIRE operating stack behind Telegram Mini Apps. Not just coding. A creator can describe an idea in plain English, and the platform can automatically: 🧠 generate gameplay loops, progression systems & retention mechanics 🎮 design missions, rewards, upgrade systems & engagement flows 🎨 create character assets, UI layouts, branding & animations ⚙️ produce production-ready Telegram Mini App code 🌐 integrate TON wallets, token utilities & on-chain actions 💰 plug directly into Telegram Stars, ad monetization & $DROPEE incentives 📈 build referral systems, onboarding funnels & viral growth mechanics 📊 analyze engagement behavior to optimize retention and monetization That last layer is probably the strongest moat. Because in consumer apps, the hard problem is usually NOT: “Can you build something?” The hard problem is: ❌ Can you retain users? ❌ Can you monetize efficiently? ❌ Can you lower acquisition costs? ❌ Can you iterate faster than competitors? ❌ Can you scale distribution profitably? Most AI builders today only solve the first step. Dropee Create is trying to solve the full lifecycle: idea → product → monetization → growth → ecosystem retention. That’s why the Voodoo background matters so much. The team already understands: 📊 retention curves 💰 monetization optimization ⚡ rapid experimentation 📈 scaling consumer apps at massive volume Now they’re combining that operator experience with: 🤖 AI-native production 📲 Telegram-native distribution 🌐 TON-native payments & onboarding Which changes the economics of app creation dramatically. Traditional studios are constrained by: • developer bandwidth • production cost • long testing cycles • slow feedback loops Dropee Create reportedly compresses this into: ⚡ ~14-day concept-to-monetization cycles 💸 ~90% lower production costs Meaning the ecosystem can continuously: • test new app concepts • launch faster • scale winning products • kill weak performers quickly And unlike single-app ecosystems, Dropee compounds value across a portfolio. Every app connects into: ⭐ Telegram Stars 📢 shared ad infrastructure 🎁 cross-app $DROPEE rewards 🌐 unified TON onboarding So successful apps strengthen the broader ecosystem instead of existing independently. That portfolio structure is probably the strongest defense against the “post-airdrop collapse” problem Telegram ecosystems keep facing. And importantly: the traction already exists pre-TGE: ✅ 13M+ users ✅ ~$2.5M revenue ✅ 8 live applications ✅ #1# on TON in December Which makes the token mechanics much more compelling. Up to 50% of ecosystem revenue is allocated toward $DROPEE buybacks. Meaning: more creators → more apps → more monetization → more revenue → more structural buy pressure. Telegram distribution. AI-native production. Portfolio economics. Proven operators. Live revenue before TGE. That’s why the market keeps circling back to Dropee. ChainGPT Pad pre-sale closes today. TGE tomorrow 🚀 #Dropee# #DROPEE# #TON# #ChainGPTPad#
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Nami today just to say that this week's One Piece episode is amazing 😍😍 Are you watching? I'm really excited to see more of Wano ⛩ RT if you like it ❤️
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Berkshire Hathaway underperformed the S&P 500 by more than 30-percentage points over the last year! Berkshire's only annual performance that was worse was in 1999 -- during the Internet mania. Today, though, Berkshire owns Apple and Google, unlike in 1999 when it didn't own any tech stocks. So, what else could explain the company's declining performance? More than a decade ago, researchers at AQR ran a series of regression studies across 30 years of Berkshire's public stock investments to discover which factors drove Buffett's outstanding investment results. They discovered -- to no one's surprise -- that Buffett buys ultra-high quality, large-cap, low-volatility stocks that are extremely cheap. But that's not all they discovered. They also disaggregated Buffett’s portfolio into two distinct sleeves and then ran the same the regression studies on each separately. The public sleeve is the portfolio of publicly traded stocks held inside Berkshire’s insurance subsidiaries — disclosed quarterly in SEC Form 13F filings. This is what most financial press coverage focuses on. The Coca-Cola, the American Express, the Apple, the Bank of America. Over the full sample it averaged about 35% of Berkshire’s total capital. The private sleeve is the portfolio of wholly-owned operating businesses — See’s Candies, Nebraska Furniture Mart, GEICO after the 1995 full acquisition, BNSF after 2010, Berkshire Hathaway Energy, Dairy Queen, NetJets, Precision Castparts, the whole roster of consolidated subsidiaries. Over the full sample the private portion grew from under 20% of Berkshire to more than 78% today. Berkshire was once an insurance company with an equity portfolio. Today it’s an insurance company owned by a conglomerate. And here's why that matters. The public sleeve — the portfolio of stocks Buffett bought fractionally and held — earned an average excess return of 12.0% per year at 16.2% volatility. Sharpe ratio: 0.74. The private sleeve — the portfolio of whole companies Buffett bought outright — earned an average excess return of 9.3% per year at 20.6% volatility. Sharpe ratio: 0.45. The publicly traded pieces of companies Buffett owned delivered materially better returns, especially when compared against the risk taken. The private sleeve’s Sharpe ratio of 0.45 is, remarkably, lower (worse) than the broad market’s 0.49 over the same period. In other words, when Buffett bought pieces of great public companies, he outperformed. When Buffett bought whole private companies, he did not. The private sleeve’s drag on Berkshire’s overall performance is meaningful. That drag was smaller in the early years, when the private portfolio was only 20% of the business. As the private sleeve has grown to 78% of Berkshire’s capital, the drag has grown proportionally. The declining Sharpe ratio of Berkshire over time — which every long-term shareholder has felt, even if they could not name it — comes primarily from the growing share of capital trapped inside whole-company acquisitions that underperform the public-market alternatives Buffett could have bought instead. Learn more about Warren's Mistakes and how to learn these lessons to improve your own investing in my new book.
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