Japan's Prime Minister briefed her country with wet hair last night. Beijing would have detained the citizen who filmed it.
At 10:29 p.m. on Friday, a magnitude 5.6 earthquake struck Japan's Yamanashi Prefecture, registering a maximum seismic intensity of lower 6 in the town of Fujikawaguchiko at the foot of Mount Fuji. By 11:15 p.m. — forty-six minutes later — Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi was standing at the Prime Minister's Office briefing the nation. Crisis management center activated. Director-general-level emergency gathering team convened. Human life first. Information to the public, promptly and accurately.
She was also visibly straight out of the bath.
Hair still wet. No makeup. Takaichi posted on her own X account a short time later, in plain language: she had come directly from the bath without time to dry her hair or apply makeup, and apologized for her appearance. She did not have to volunteer that detail. She chose to.
That choice is the story.
Because somewhere about 1,700 miles to the west, operating under the same physics but a very different political philosophy, the first hour after a magnitude 5.6 earthquake would have looked nothing like this. It would not have been spent activating a crisis center, dispatching emergency teams, and putting the head of government in front of cameras to admit she had rushed straight out of the shower. It would have been spent deciding what to tell the public, what to delete, and which citizen with a camera to detain.
We know because we have watched it happen.
In Wuhan in early 2020, the doctors who tried to warn the world about a novel coronavirus were summoned by police and forced to sign confessions for "spreading rumors." The citizen journalists who filmed the morgues and the sealed apartment doors — Chen Qiushi, Fang Bin, Li Zehua — were disappeared by the state. Fang Bin would later be sentenced to three years in prison; he was held for the duration.
In Zhengzhou in July 2021, passengers drowned trapped in a flooded subway tunnel while state propaganda ran headlines about heroic rescue. When BBC correspondent Robin Brant asked the local government how a metro system less than a decade old could leave passengers to die on a platform, the Henan branch of the Communist Youth League posted his whereabouts to its 1.6 million followers and called for people to track him down. Death threats followed within hours.
In Hebei in August 2023, when the floodwaters from Typhoon Doksuri had to go somewhere, authorities diverted them away from Beijing and into Zhuozhou — and the Hebei provincial Party Secretary, Ni Yuefeng, publicly declared the province would "serve as a moat for the capital." Videos of the submerged villages disappeared from Chinese social media within hours.
And in Sichuan in 2008, after a magnitude 8.0 earthquake killed at least 5,335 schoolchildren in school buildings that collapsed while government offices nearby remained standing — what citizens named "tofu-dreg schoolhouses" — the writer Tan Zuoren tried to compile a list of the dead. He was sentenced to five years in prison. Huang Qi, the activist who tried to help the parents, got three years; in 2019, the Party gave him twelve more on state-secrets charges. He is still inside.
The pattern is not a series of accidents. It is a system. In the People's Republic of China, the function of the state in a disaster is not to serve the public. It is to protect the Party from the public.
Compare and contrast.
In Tokyo on Friday night, the head of government decided that telling the country what she knew, forty-six minutes after the ground stopped shaking, mattered more than how her hair looked. In Beijing under any equivalent scenario, the head of government would not be at a podium for hours, or days. The citizens with cameras would already be on a list.
Wet hair is not the real headline. Wet hair is the headline because of what it accidentally exposes: a democracy is a system that runs toward its citizens in the dark. A dictatorship is a system that hides from them.
Sanae Takaichi did not need to apologize for her hair. The Chinese Communist Party owes apologies it will never make, to families whose dead it never named.
ACI — Aric Chen | Insights
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Today a crazy quantum story just got wilder.
On March 31, the Google Quantum AI team published a landmark result on Shor's algorithm for elliptic curve cryptography. Technically, the paper was a bombshell: a dramatic 10x improvement over the state-of-the-art. As a stunt and wakeup call to the blockchain space, those optimisations were illustrated on secp256k1, the elliptic curve underlying Bitcoin and Ethereum signatures.
But perhaps the most striking part of the paper was sociological, not technical. Instead of following standard academic process, the optimisations were kept secret, hidden behind a zero-knowledge (ZK) proof. Google's accompanying blog post mentions they "engaged with the U.S. government". The ZK proof demonstrates the existence of algorithmic improvements without leaking details. Academic censorship with ZK, a historic first!
As a co-author of the Google paper I witnessed some of the context surrounding this censorship. To be honest, multiple aspects of that context don't sit well with me. As much as I believe the general public ought to know more, I am limited in my ability to whistleblow. Though let me be clear about one thing: the Google team's professionalism has been absolutely exemplary, and they deserve nothing but praise.
Censorship has a way of backfiring. The Streisand effect, where an attempt to bury something only draws more attention to it, is exactly what's unfolding today. First, Google's key optimisation has been rediscovered by the French. And in a thrilling turn of events, a collaborative Shor-at-home challenge just launched. The initiative, available at ecdsa[.]fail, breached a new Shor world record in a matter of hours.
Let's start with the rediscovery. Just two months after Google's paper, French quantum expert André Schrottenloher cracks the main secret optimisation. His paper, titled "Optimized Point Addition Circuits for Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithms", landed on the arXiv today. Big congrats to André, who beat several other nerdsnipped experts to it. In a blog post also published today, Craig Gidney, the world expert on Shor optimisations, revealed that he'd been sitting on this very optimisation for a whole year under censorship pressure.
Interestingly, André missed a handful of minor optimisations, both from Google's original publication and from improvements found since. It's plausible there's still plenty of juice left to squeeze out of Shor, and this is exactly what the ecdsa[.]fail challenge is about. The verifier program developed for the ZK proof does double duty, automatically filtering for valid submissions. Dozens of compounding small and micro improvements are rolling in. As of the time of writing there's an 8.4% improvement to Google's circuit, as measured by the product of logical qubit count and Toffoli gate count. Nice!
The nerdsnipping ran deeper than anyone expected. Over the last few weeks it became clear it extended well beyond André and other quantum experts. Behind the scenes, a small army of amateurs quietly got to work. Inspired by Karpathy-style autoresearch, they turned AI on Shor. Ironically, the verifier program for the ZK proof makes an ideal reward function for AIs. The barrier to entry for this modern style of research is refreshingly low, with several non-experts, even a teenager, finding nice optimisations. Get in touch if you'd like to join a Telegram group with fellow autoresearchers :)
Part 2: neutral atoms and qday
The story doesn't end with Google. On the same day Google went public, a stealthy startup called Oratomic published its own Shor paper in a coordinated release. It made a splash, ultimately becoming the most upvoted paper on scirate[.]com, a website ranking arXiv papers.
Oratomic's claim was wild. By building on Google's logical optimisations and applying custom physical optimisations for neutral atoms, they claimed just 10K physical qubits were sufficient to run Shor's algorithm on secp256k1. That number is mind-bogglingly low.
Knowing essentially nothing about neutral atoms when Oratomic's paper landed, I was intrigued and decided to learn more about the tech. I fell straight down the rabbit hole and spent a couple hundred hours on the topic. I got a little obsessed and watched every YouTube video I could find and spoke to a bunch of experts.
My conclusion? The tech is real, very real. Even Google recently decided to start a neutral atom lab, a notable pivot from their sole focus on superconducting qubits. If you care about qday, i.e. the day a quantum computer will break the first piece of cryptography in production, neutral atoms demand your attention. I shared some of my learnings on Shor and neutral atoms in a 30min talk at the ZKProof cryptography conference. You can find it on YouTube by searching "zkproof neutral atom".
Here's an interesting observation about this duo of breakthrough papers: neither Google nor Oratomic say a word about what their results mean for qday. No timelines. Zero. Nada. That is especially baffling given that the whole point of whitehat quantum cryptanalysis is to inform qday estimations and help the general public make good decisions.
So let me attempt to partially fill the silence, similarly to what Scott Aaronson did in his April 29 post. Given everything I know, including scary non-public information, I now put the odds of qday by 2032 at 50%. 10% by 2030.
Anecdotally, the US government has its own date: 2035. Originating at the NSA and later adopted by NIST, it's when branches of the US government will be disallowed from using quantum-vulnerable cryptography. In plain language: with hindsight, that date is a joke and should be discounted entirely. I don't see how NIST avoids being forced to pull it forward by years.
Part 3: post-quantum cryptography
There are good reasons to sound the alarm today, but please do not panic. Rushing carelessly towards immature post-quantum cryptography is a recipe for disaster. IMO a good target date for migration is 2029, roughly 3.5 years out. 2029 happens to be the date selected by Google, Cloudflare, and the Ethereum Foundation.
These days most of my time goes to safely migrating Ethereum towards post-quantum cryptography as part of the broader lean Ethereum effort. There's a lot to do. We need to rip out and replace BLS signatures at the consensus layer, KZG commitments at the data layer, and ECDSA signatures at the execution layer.
The plan to get there is compelling, and is based on hash-based cryptography. Within the Ethereum Foundation we've developed a Swiss army knife called leanVM (github[.]com/leanEthereum/leanVM) powered by the magic of hash-based SNARKs. Thanks to truly exceptional work by Emile, Thomas, and others, its performance is derisked. Regarding security, leanVM is a jewel, a minimal zkVM crafted for end-to-end formal verification and maximum security.
Want to help? There are two $1M initiatives. First, the Proximity Prize (proximityprize[.]org). Solve a long-standing mathematical conjecture in coding theory, improve hash-based SNARKs, and go home a millionaire. Second, the Poseidon Initiative (poseidon-initiative[.]info), offers $1M for breaking Poseidon, the SNARK-friendly hash function.
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