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人的三重哲学进阶 1 兽性 猴子🐒猴急猴急 —喜欢吃快餐，喜欢暴富，喜欢走后门！ 2 人性具有一定的责任 ，喜欢讲故事，塑造形象！ 3 神性 静中取乐，喜欢静中作乐，修行！ 我们最初都是猴子🐒演变而来 The three philosophical stages of human development: 1. Animality - Monkey-like impatience and eagerness - fond of fast food, sudden wealth, and backdoor deals! 2. Humanity - bears a certain responsibility, enjoys storytelling, and image-building! 3. Divinity - finds joy in tranquility, enjoys amusing oneself in silence, and practices self-cultivation! We all evolved from monkeys in the beginning @elonmusk

⚠️ Cursor has published a security incident report on the earlier supply chain attack. According to the investigation, the attacker used access keys issued by Cursor to Fireworks and subsequently exposed on Fireworks’ side to gain access to some of Cursor’s SaaS services and internal systems. The attacker ultimately tampered with the distribution cache for the Claude Code extension to collect information about users’ machines and install SSH backdoors. The compromised versions were Anthropic.claude-code 2.1.312 and 2.1.313 in Cursor’s VS Code extension marketplace distribution cache, affecting macOS and Windows. The exposure window ran from October 29 at 17:27 to October 30 at 04:35 (UTC+8), with up to approximately 5,000 users affected. Security recommendation: If you installed or updated to either affected version through Cursor’s marketplace during this window, read the official notice as soon as possible and run the remediation script for your platform to check for and remediate any compromise: Fireworks’ initial announcement and subsequent update:

This is the biggest irony of the whole Alice Huang / Nvidia saga: the Chinese government actually doesn't want Nvidia chips and is actively keeping them out of the country. Last year it even ordered Alibaba and ByteDance to cancel their Nvidia orders ( and sent customs teams to the ports to check every advanced chip coming in ( And right now 600,000 Nvidia H200s are stuck in Hong Kong because Beijing won’t let them into the country ( Nvidia also explicitly frames this as a threat to its business in its latest annual report to the SEC: "The Chinese government has encouraged customers to purchase from our China-based competitors and discouraged customers from purchasing, importing, or using our data center products" ( Why does China do that? Because every Nvidia chip a Chinese company buys is one that Huawei or Cambricon doesn’t sell, and domestic chips can only catch up if people actually buy them (which means money for R&D, etc.). Which means that the notion that Chinese intelligence was running honeytraps to get more Nvidia chips into China gets the whole thing exactly backwards. In fact, it looks like Megaspeed - Alice Huang's company - was a counter-reaction to official Chinese policy: a private sector workaround to these efforts by the Chinese government to curtail Nvidia. As was widely reported - including by Western media - Megaspeed built data centers in Southeast Asia and rented their computing power to Alibaba, which the New York Times called "a backdoor way of getting access" to Nvidia chips ( That is a backdoor not only - allegedly - around Washington’s export controls, but also around China's own efforts to wean its companies off Nvidia. I can’t believe the Chinese government was too thrilled about it: it'd make just about zero sense for it to run countless domestic measures to prevent Alibaba from using Nvidia chips, yet at the same time have its top spy agency help the same Alibaba get Nvidia chips through the back door in Southeast Asia 🤷 At the end of the day, as with all such stories, you always need to look at "cui bono?": who benefits? Who benefitted is pretty clear: - Nvidia itself: it's in the business of selling chips so a customer willing to spend billions of dollars on chips in Southeast Asia is a godsend. Again, as they themselves state in their SEC filings, not being able to tap into Chinese demand would have "a material and adverse impact on our business" ( - Chinese companies like Alibaba: facts are, 1) Chinese chips haven't yet caught up, 2) Chinese chip companies' production capabilities are still limited and 3) Chinese tech firms' historical tech stack runs on Nvidia’s CUDA ecosystem, and rewriting years of code for Huawei chips is painful. Renting Nvidia chips in Southeast Asia is the easy way to stay competitive and serve customer demand in the meantime. - The US, according to core members of the Trump administration: back in July last year, US Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick explained that the point of letting Nvidia sell more chips to China was to get Chinese developers "addicted to the American technology stack" ( Who does NOT benefit, according to official Chinese policy, is the Chinese state, which has made tech self-reliance one of its foremost priorities. Which means that, to believe the spy story, you have to believe that a person - Alice Huang - was effectively a spy paid by her own government while simultaneously sabotaging its tech self-reliance drive, which it has spent years and trillions of dollars on - pretty senseless. Stranger things have happened, I guess, but it doesn't pass the smell test. And there is another absolutely major contradiction in the media story. According to a Financial Times article published yesterday ( "a person who knows [Alice Huang] said they had been asked by MSS for information about her earlier this year after news emerged that Singapore was investigating the company in relation to chip-smuggling allegations. The agency wanted to find out more information about Huang, including the nature of her business and connections, the person said." Which raises a damn obvious question: if she were indeed an MSS asset, why on earth would the MSS need to ask the people around her who she was and the nature of her business? It's a complete contradiction with the spy story - but very much not a contradiction with what I described above: a private businesswoman running a workaround to Beijing’s own policy, which the Chinese security apparatus would naturally want to look into. Especially since, around about the same time, Shanghai police detained her business partner, reportedly her husband, in a stock manipulation case ( also coherent with Chinese authorities looking into her network, and much harder to square with her being a prized MSS asset. And, to top it all, there is - to this day - not a shred of evidence that's been published that she is, in fact, a Chinese spy: just anonymous intelligence officials, repeated by journalists who never verified it, as I detailed here ( and here ( with one of the key FT journalists on this story actually admitting that he has no idea what evidence US intelligence actually has. So the claim went to print without anyone seeing the evidence, without anyone being able to check it, and without anyone knowing whether it even exists. And given everything above, from Beijing blocking the very chips she was supposedly recruited to help get into China, to the MSS asking around about her, to her partner being detained in Shanghai, my bet is that the evidence doesn’t exist at all. If anything, everything we can check points the other way.

My investigation on the GTA 6 Leaker is done and I have emailed all the evidence to TAKE2 and Rockstar Games legal team As much as I wanted and loved to actually reveal who we are dealing with here, full identity and all, I believe that would be doxxing. Since the way I got to this guy was through a mix of OSINT and some people familiar with the matter via TG, I don’t want anyone to get into trouble, so for now I’ll leave out personal details and how I obtained the information One of the stronger findings links to what appears to be this guy’s personal bank account, the bank is located in Europe. It’s obviously not out of the question that the bank account in question might be stolen, but given the circumstances and some other correlations I saw, I believe we have him Going forward, I’ll refer to him as Leeker With the data I have provided to T2, I believe it will make their job easier when cooperating with law enforcement and help pin down the people involved (it’s not just one). Given the nature of the data I found, revealing it publicly could give the guys time to cover their tracks or alter evidence But I don’t want to leave people hanging so I’ll share some stuff below and answer as much as I can in the comments without it being damaging Stuff I have learned that can be shared: -> The leeker is actually a threat actor who has previous malicious activity under a different alias It also seems that there is genuine hatred toward this guy from the people around him. Much of my current information comes from his peers snitching after my first post -> This leak was apparently due to a breach or an insider. Nature of how is still unknown to me, But I’ve received two different stories about this so I'll share them anyway: 1. One story I got is that leeker bought a backdoor access or some sort from someone 2. Another person told me this is somewhat related to some incident inside Rockstar a while ago Keep in mind it’s pretty common for these crypto bros to boast and lie about their “gains” to each other, so I honestly don’t know which to believe here -> Not related at all to the ‘Mafia 808’ group -> I haven’t heard anything about Rockstar India being hacked unlike some other people are claiming -> This build we are seeing here is apparently from a year ago (as confirmed in ResetEra forums), but the theft I believe happened in April 2026 and the leeker has been preparing since then -> From what I can tell, and as I explained in one of the earlier posts, I don’t think they possess a live build. Most likely pre-recorded footage, but this is just my assumption The voting thing they did initially was to make people want to get the coin so the market cap can grow I highly recommend staying away from the coin. This is a literal pump and dump, don't buy into their "Fighting for gamers" bullshit. I won’t be surprised if they at some point start threatening to leak the story unless people donate to them in the poll. Even if that happens, don’t do it That’s all I can responsibly share right now. Questions that don’t risk the investigation or the people involved are welcome in the replies

🚨 Threat Intelligence | On-Chain Backdoor in a Malicious TRAE Extension Following @Will42W’s warning about TRAE IDE extension supply chain risks, SlowMist investigated the malicious extension juannegro.solidity. Although removed from Open VSX, the extension was still available through the TRAE marketplace as of July 18, 2026. It impersonated a legitimate Solidity plugin and acted as a cross-platform malware dropper. Our analysis found that it: 🔹 Impersonates a legitimate Solidity extension and uses the marketplace as the initial malware delivery channel 🔹 Automatically executes after IDE startup and establishes persistence across platforms 🔹 Uses an Ethereum smart contract to store and retrieve dynamic C2 configurations 🔹 Allows attackers to update C2 endpoints and payload delivery without republishing the extension This incident highlights how extension marketplaces can become initial infection vectors, while blockchain infrastructure can be abused for dynamic C2 management. Users who installed juannegro.solidity should remove the extension and check their systems for potential compromise. Full analysis👇

Some observations on Kimi: 1. It's a very good model! I don't think its performance can be explained away by distillation or anything like that. In agentic coding sessions, it seems pretty much on par with the best public models of Q1 2026. In my fairly limited use, it also seemed very token hungry. It's not obvious to me that this model is actually that cheap to run. 2. I am personally surprised the Chinese state continues to allow the open sourcing of models this good, given potential risks. To be clear, I *myself* might be fine with models presenting this level of marginal risk being open weight, but I am surprised that China is fine with it. I suspect the reason they are is 75% explained by strategic blindness/lack of AGI-pilledness (the CCP is very Yann Lecun-y in its views of AI). The other 25% or so is their lack of compute for customer inference (making China's open-weight strategy an unintended byproduct of US export controls) and the normal Chinese strategy of aggressive exports. For the companies, as opposed to the government, the decision to open source is partially ideological and partially because they are behind, and they know that very few people would pay for sub-frontier models from China. 3. Open-weight models are inherently decelerationist, and I'm continually surprised to see the so-called "accelerationists" so excited about open-weight models. I suspect the reason they are is that they know open-weight models are effectively ungovernable, and they simply like the overall cloak of ungovernability open-weight models create over the whole of AI. It's not a bad strategy; it reminds me of James Scott's recounting of the hill people in "the art of not being governed." Still, in the end, open-weight models deter further AI capex. 4. One probable outcome of an open-weight-model-dominant world is full AI communism, which is precisely what China proposes: rather than a market product, AI is a "public good" which will ultimately be provided by the state as a kind of "digital public infrastructure." This future strikes me as a dystopian hellscape, but I've never met an open-weight models advocate who doesn't ultimately concede this is where things end. You'd be surprised how many 'accelerationists' lobbied me, while I was in government, to support an eleven or twelve-figure federally funded data center so that startups could train models at a subsidy and then give them away for free. There was no other way for AI to progress, they said. Perhaps this is the logical end state of things. Nonetheless, I find myself surprised to see supposed accelerationists excited about such an outcome. I think many of them just don't know what they're doing. Many accelerationists do not view the creation and serving of frontier models as a legitimate business. 5. I would guess that the Trump Administration will at some point realize that their best strategy here would be to create large amounts of regulatory risk around the use of open-weight Chinese models. You don't need to "ban open source" (one of the dumber motifs of AI policy discussion). You just need to direct every agency to issue soft law that creates FUD. "A Federal Reserve Advisory Bulletin found that there may be backdoors in Chinese AI models." It needn't be that well justified. You just create enough regulatory risk that every regulated enterprise backs off. You probably don't want to create so much regulatory risk that you scare off the hyperscalers from serving Chinese models; this will just drive startups to sketchier providers. There's a happy middle ground here. I'd assume they will do some version of this. 6. It's probably true that open-weight models of this capability make the world a bit more dangerous, but not so much more that you'll really notice. At some point the models will be capable enough that you will notice. "A nonliving, invisible, dangerous, and infinitely self-replicating agent escaped from a Chinese lab," you say? Color me shocked.

I took a quick look at an undetected Linux #backdoor# targeting #iKuai# routers. 🐞ELF: 4e6276cc400b3b9e9616d04474b64a8fa0c35375b9673ab41a92a6d5bce72d8d 📡C2: h/t @malwrhunterteam