注册并分享邀请链接,可获得视频播放与邀请奖励。

SlowMist 的个人资料封面
SlowMist 的头像

SlowMist (@SlowMist_Team)

@SlowMist_Team
SlowMist is a Blockchain security firm established in 2018, providing services such as security audits, security consultants, red teaming, and more.
406 正在关注    88.7K 粉丝
🚨SlowMist TI Alert🚨 AIDC token on BSC has been exploited. 💸 Loss: 220.12 WBNB (~$120929.35) 🔍 Root Cause: AIDCToken's `_sellTransfer()` accumulates a 30% burn amount without deducting it from the seller. Subsequently, any non-Pair transfer triggers `_executeAccumulatedBurn()`, which incorrectly burns tokens from the `uniswapPair` balance instead of the seller. After burning, `sync()` is called, artificially deflating the AIDC reserve in the AMM, allowing the attacker to drain WBNB. 📌 Attacker: 0x89eb2c99e970d831525c7a52badc290afa116b63 📌 Victim: 0x2725033282b3bd4be8873b7f0f622c18e3b7cbd8 (Pancake V2 AIDC/WBNB Pair) 📌 Vulnerable Contract: 0x5021d71859f81b4c905b573591db8f9cc4a0c6fe (AIDCToken) The attacker exploited a flawed burn mechanism where sell-induced burn debt is wrongly imposed on the liquidity pool, enabling repeated reserve manipulation and a final swap that drained nearly all WBNB from the Pair. Powered by #SlowMist#.AI
显示更多
🚨 SlowMist TI Alert 🚨 A new Shai-Hulud / Miasma / Hades npm malware variant linked to the compromised npm developer account czirker, affecting the npm ecosystem. The campaign uses a preconfigured binding.gyp file to execute during npm install; reported scope includes 23 affected packages, with leo-logger noted at 3,140 weekly npm downloads. As of the tweet publication time, 408 infected GitHub repositories containing stolen credentials had already been observed. Potential attacker actions include GitHub token theft, npm token theft, AWS / GCP / Azure credential theft, local environment data exfiltration, malicious GitHub workflow abuse, and further npm supply-chain propagation. Security teams should immediately check lockfiles and package histories for affected versions, downgrade or remove impacted packages, rotate npm, GitHub, cloud, CI/CD, and application secrets, enforce 2FA. Thanks to @OX__Security for the excellent analysis. As always, stay vigilant! The following URL can be used to track the latest situation:
显示更多
🔥Glad to support @HTX_DAO’s HTX Genesis Hackathon as a security partner! Hosted by HTX DAO & this global hackathon focuses on AI × Web3 innovations in smart finance, AI Agents, and on-chain infrastructure. $20,000 prize pool + $100k compute power and strong ecosystem support. Top projects can enter HTX DAO accelerator.✨ Register by July 5! Wishing all hackers a great experience and groundbreaking innovations! 🚀
显示更多
Welcome @SlowMist_Team as the security support partner of HTX Genesis Hackathon 🛡️ As a global leading blockchain security company, SlowMist will provide AI-driven, full-chain security solutions for this hackathon, supporting builders with integrated protection from threat detection to defense. Innovation needs courage. Security needs to keep up. Registration is still open — scan the QR code on the poster and join now👇 #HTXDAO# #HTXGenesisHackathon# #SlowMist#
显示更多
🚨SlowMist TI Alert🚨 @aztecnetwork has been exploited again. 💸 Loss: 1,158 ETH+150,000 DAI+0.4696 renBTC (~$2,209,704.23 USD) 🔍 Root Cause: The `RollupProcessor.escapeHatch()` function (`0x737901bea3eeb88459df9ef1be8ff3ae1b42a2ba`) lacks access control: no `onlyOwner`, no `rollupProviders` authorization, and no provider signature verification. When `rollupSize == 0`, the TurboVerifier accepts an escape hatch proof, and `processDepositsAndWithdrawals()` directly trusts the `proofData` public inputs (`publicOutput`, `outputOwner`, `assetId`) without independent validation of fund ownership or withdrawal balance, executing `withdraw(1158 ETH, attacker, 0)`. 📌 Attacker EOA: `0x6952d9246e9afe8b887b2877225163436f78e97f` 📌 Victim Contract: `RollupProcessor` at `0x737901bea3eeb88459df9ef1be8ff3ae1b42a2ba` 📌 Verifier Contract: `TurboVerifier` at `0x48cb7ba00d087541dc8e2b3738f80fdd1fee8ce8` Impact: Attacker drained 1,158 ETH from the `RollupProcessor` by submitting a valid escape hatch proof with spoofed public inputs, exploiting validation in the escape hatch withdrawal path. Powered by #SlowMist#.AI
显示更多
🚨SlowMist TI Alert🚨 💸 @LittleBoyPlus has been exploited. Loss: ~377,642 USDT (~610.555 BNB) 🔍 Root Cause: The `LBPHashrate._update()` function (in `0x5e3c...85fe`) is triggered by zero-value `transferFrom` calls, which bypasses OpenZeppelin's allowance check. This allows an attacker to call `LBPHashrate.transferFrom(pair, DEAD, 0)` without pair authorization, triggering `_harvest(pair)` which mints LBP tokens directly to the PancakePair address via `LBP.mintReward(pair, reward)`. The minted LBP increases the pair's balance but not its reserve, enabling the attacker to drain USDT via `PancakePair.swap()`. 📌 Attacker: `0x5449ded887576f43fc339851e942ebc1e6f8118b` 📌 Victim Pair: `0x00e3ea08fd8cbad955ec5d2292ad637670c31524` 📌 Vulnerable Contract (LBPHashrate): `0x5e3cbc82d020be91a989eb747934104e9ab585fe` Impact: Zero-value `transferFrom` on LBPHashrate allows unapproved harvest & mint to PancakePair, leading to reserve imbalance and immediate USDT drain. Powered by #SlowMist#.AI
显示更多
🚨SlowMist TI Alert🚨 💸 @ThetanutsFi was exploited for approximately $2.1M. However, around $2M worth of positions appear to have been rescued by a whitehat. 🔍 Root Cause: Integer division truncation in `mint(uint256)` — after `claim(uint256)` drained the vault to near-zero totalSupply, the formula `depositAmount = vault.balance * amount / totalSupply` evaluated to 0 for `amount`, enabling unlimited free minting. Exploit TX: White Hat Rescue TX: White Hat Message:
显示更多
🚨 SlowMist TI Alert 🚨 MistEye has detected an active npm supply-chain attack compromising @redhat-cloud-services packages. Reported impact includes 31+ affected packages, about 116,282 weekly downloads, and 300+ GitHub repositories containing stolen credentials. The attack techniques show strong similarities to the previous Shai-Hulud npm campaign, including credential harvesting, malicious repository creation, and automated secret exfiltration. Public GitHub searches for the “Miasma: The Spreading Blight” marker, sorted by recent updates, still show newly appearing suspicious repositories, indicating that users are still being compromised. Potential attacker actions include GitHub/npm token theft, AWS/GCP/Azure credential theft, SSH key and Kubernetes secret collection, local environment and wallet data exfiltration, malicious GitHub repository creation, persistence, and destructive behavior if stolen tokens are revoked. Immediately remove or downgrade affected @redhat-cloud-services package versions, audit CI/CD workflows and dependency installs, rotate GitHub, npm, cloud, SSH, and wallet-related secrets, preserve logs, and rebuild exposed developer machines or runners from clean images. As always, stay vigilant! Live hunt:
显示更多
🚨SlowMist TI Alert🚨 💸 Loss: 85,519.47 USDT 🔍 Root Cause: The `cliamRewred` function in `LegendaryMoneyMonNft` allows arbitrary reward claiming. The only authorization depends on `verify()` which checks `recoverSigner(...) == admin`. `recoverSigner` does not validate `ecrecover` returning `address(0)`, and `changeadmin()` allows setting admin to zero address. The attacker used an invalid signature (r=0, s=0, v=27) which returns `address(0)` from `ecrecover`, passing the check because `admin` was zero address at that moment. 📌 Attacker: 0xe1582248c593df4b367e131922438fec9d76e787 📌 Victim Contract: 0x92d60629ff5d53a0098b51e9b1d59546d1d8e5b6 📌 Vulnerable Contract: 0x92d60629ff5d53a0098b51e9b1d59546d1d8e5b6 The attacker exploited the zero-address signature bypass to drain all tokens from the contract and swapped them for USDT via PancakeSwap. Powered by #SlowMist#.AI
显示更多
0
1
64
19
转发到社区
✍️We have released an in-depth technical analysis report on the #TrapDoor# cross-ecosystem supply chain credential theft campaign. TrapDoor was first disclosed by the @SocketSecurity on May 24. Subsequently, we conducted continuous threat hunting through our MistEye threat intelligence system and issued an early warning. The campaign spans npm, PyPI, and involving 34+ malicious packages and 384+ versions targeting developers in crypto, #DeFi#, #Solana#, #Sui#/Move, and #AI#. 🔍In this report, we selected three representative samples for detailed analysis: 🔹PyPI: git-config-sync (disguised as a Git configuration synchronization tool) 🔹npm: token-usage-tracker (disguised as a token usage tracking tool) 🔹 sui-framework-helpers (disguised as a Sui Move development helper library) For each sample, we fully reconstructed the attack chain — from the entry-point trigger mechanisms (postinstall / / sensitive data collection scope, encryption and encoding methods, to the exfiltration channels and remote control infrastructure ( GitHub Gists, Special thanks to @SocketSecurity for their outstanding initial research and disclosure of the TrapDoor campaign. Salute! 👏 📖 Full technical analysis :
显示更多
🚨 SlowMist TI Alert 🚨 MistEye has detected a cross-registry supply chain attack targeting developers through malicious packages published to npm, PyPI, and The campaign includes 34+ malicious packages and 384+ related versions. Targeted communities include crypto, DeFi, Solana, Sui/Move, and AI developers. Potential attacker actions include theft of crypto wallets, SSH keys, cloud credentials, GitHub/AWS tokens, browser data, environment variables, and developer secrets. Some payloads also attempt persistence through .cursorrules, CLAUDE.md, Git hooks, shell hooks, cron, systemd, and SSH. Remove affected packages immediately. Isolate impacted systems, preserve logs, rotate exposed credentials, rebuild CI runners and developer machines from clean images, and review GitHub, cloud, SSH, and wallet activity. As always, stay vigilant!
显示更多
🚨SlowMist TI Alert🚨 💸 Loss: 62.5 BNB & 1,195,918.92 JOE 🔍 Root Cause: Single-function reentrancy in `_removeLiquidityViaContract` – BNB sent via low-level `call` before updating `lpInfo[user].lpAmount`, allowing recursive calls. 📌 Attacker EOA: 0xaa761779945dcc5f26064fc6dcb36ffab6ac7610 📌 Attacker Contract: 0x31f81fcd91025728f24bd6f0e4efb156e345a4cf 📌 Vulnerable Proxy: 0xef0f12d08d66e76e1866e60f30a0daa578e00c04 📌 Vulnerable Implementation: 0xb12ce0a21f67a9fc3c8ad1c7dbc4b017b7e67319 Attackers exploited the delayed state write to repeatedly withdraw liquidity, netting 62.5 BNB and ~1.196M JOE via 25 reentrancy loops. Powered by #SlowMist#.AI
显示更多
🚨SlowMist TI Alert🚨 💸 Loss: 8,080.16 USDT + 11,702.08 USDC 🔍 Root Cause: `WUSD._deglove()` uses `GLOVE.creditlessOf(msg.sender)` as the unlock base without verifying the source or epoch of creditless GLOVE. In addition, WUSD’s epoch/vesting logic was driven by cumulative wrap volume, which could be flash-loan amplified and advanced 100+ epochs inside one tx. This converted creditless GLOVE into transferable GLOVE atomically. 📌 Attacker: 0x88329a09428778f62bc0c8baac0997864e5a57f8 📌 Victim: Uniswap V3 liquidity pools (GLO/USDT: 0xa2bd1a142ff49131b8cc70a332bda0125018c324, GLO/USDC: 0xb89f65d6c7d33a35da7c01934e310a6f40e18a1f) 📌 Vulnerable Contract: WUSD (0x068e3563b1c19590f822c0e13445c4fa1b9eefa5) Attacker exploited a credit accounting flaw in WUSD/GLOVE to mint and unlock transferable GLOVE, then drained USDT/USDC from Uniswap V3 pools. Powered by #SlowMist#.AI
显示更多
🚨 SlowMist TI Alert 🚨 MistEye has detected a cross-registry supply chain attack targeting developers through malicious packages published to npm, PyPI, and The campaign includes 34+ malicious packages and 384+ related versions. Targeted communities include crypto, DeFi, Solana, Sui/Move, and AI developers. Potential attacker actions include theft of crypto wallets, SSH keys, cloud credentials, GitHub/AWS tokens, browser data, environment variables, and developer secrets. Some payloads also attempt persistence through .cursorrules, CLAUDE.md, Git hooks, shell hooks, cron, systemd, and SSH. Remove affected packages immediately. Isolate impacted systems, preserve logs, rotate exposed credentials, rebuild CI runners and developer machines from clean images, and review GitHub, cloud, SSH, and wallet activity. As always, stay vigilant!
显示更多
0
8
38
13
转发到社区
🥳We are thrilled to announce our ecosystem partnership with @www_back_im! SlowMist Zone brings together top industry security expertise. By partnering with @www_back_im, we aim to deliver more comprehensive crypto asset security solutions and build a safer blockchain ecosystem together. 💪
显示更多
🎉 正式宣布!imBack 已成为 @SlowMist_Team 慢雾区生态合作伙伴! 慢雾( imBack( 感谢慢雾安全团队的认可与支持! #SlowMist# #区块链安全# #CryptoRecovery# #imBack#
显示更多
We’ve released a detailed technical analysis of the supply chain poisoning activities related to Mini Shai-Hulud. Within just 22 minutes, the attacker-controlled npm account “atool” published 637 malicious versions across 317 npm packages, including popular dependencies in the AntV ecosystem and echarts-for-react. At the same time, the attackers also poisoned Python packages such as durabletask while impersonating official Microsoft releases. The malware primarily targets sensitive credentials from cloud environments including AWS, GCP, Azure, Kubernetes, and Vault, as well as npm and GitHub tokens. It also features supply chain self-propagation and persistence mechanisms targeting AI coding assistants such as Claude Code and Codex. Full technical analysis👇
显示更多
🚨 MistEye TI Alert 🚨 Based on recent intelligence, multiple high-frequency npm packages, including AntV and Echarts-for-react, as well as the durabletask Python SDK, have been compromised by Mini Shai-Hulud supply chain attacks. Notably: 1. May 19, 2026: The npm account atool (i@hust.cc) was compromised, allowing attackers to automatically publish 637 malicious versions across 317 packages within 22 minutes. 2. May 20, 2026 (Beijing Time): Within 35 minutes, attackers consecutively uploaded durabletask versions 1.4.1, 1.4.2, and 1.4.3 at 00:19, 00:49, and 00:54, bypassing normal release controls and impersonating official Microsoft releases. Additionally, these two events—the large-scale GitHub token leaks (potentially exposing official repositories) and the Grafana Labs targeted ransom attack—are likely related to the Mini Shai-Hulud supply chain compromise: • GitHub token leaks: Evidence suggests some leaked tokens may have been used to access and potentially sell official GitHub repositories. The leaks were caused by a compromised employee device, which involved a polluted VS Code extension. • Grafana Labs attack (May 16, 2026): A cybercrime group gained unauthorized access to their GitHub repositories, downloaded the codebase, and issued a ransom demand under threat of data disclosure. Affected Components / Targets: • npm packages: AntV, Echarts-for-react, and other high-frequency components in the npm ecosystem. • Python packages: durabletask 1.4.1, 1.4.2, 1.4.3. • Developer credentials and secrets: GitHub PATs, npm Tokens, AWS Keys, Kubernetes Secrets, Vault Tokens, SSH keys, and over 90 types of local sensitive files. • GitHub repositories: internal codebases potentially accessible via leaked tokens. • Grafana Labs’ repositories (downloaded by attackers; ransom demanded). Potential Attacker Actions: • Immediate exfiltration of cloud and local credentials upon package installation or import. • Unauthorized access to internal repositories and sensitive cloud infrastructure. • Lateral movement across developer machines, CI/CD pipelines, and cloud workloads. • Sale and exploitation of leaked GitHub tokens. • Supply chain compromise affecting dependent projects and production systems. • Ransom demands and potential data disclosure threats against organizations, including open source platforms. Detection Methods: • Audit npm and PyPI dependencies for affected packages: • npm: npm ls --all • Python: pip list --outdated or pip show durabletask to confirm versions. • Inspect lockfiles (package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, pipfile.lock) for malicious versions. • Review CI/CD pipelines and deployment logs for installation of compromised packages. • Monitor GitHub and cloud activity for unusual authentication events, including signs of leaked token usage. Mitigation Measures: • Immediately rotate all exposed GitHub, npm, PyPI, and cloud credentials. • Replace affected npm/PyPI packages with verified safe versions or freeze dependency versions. • Isolate potentially compromised systems and audit for credential theft or lateral movement. • Apply security patches and review post-compromise artifacts in CI/CD pipelines. Additional Recommendations: • Enable real-time monitoring and alerting for suspicious token or key usage. • Implement stricter dependency review policies and supply chain risk checks. • Educate teams to verify package authenticity before installation. • Monitor dark web or underground marketplaces for leaked credentials related to your organization. SlowMist will continue to track and monitor developments related to this incident, including potential new malicious releases or related exploits. MistEye has already pushed relevant threat intelligence to clients to help them proactively assess and mitigate risks.
显示更多
🚨 MistEye TI Alert 🚨 Based on recent intelligence, multiple high-frequency npm packages, including AntV and Echarts-for-react, as well as the durabletask Python SDK, have been compromised by Mini Shai-Hulud supply chain attacks. Notably: 1. May 19, 2026: The npm account atool (i@hust.cc) was compromised, allowing attackers to automatically publish 637 malicious versions across 317 packages within 22 minutes. 2. May 20, 2026 (Beijing Time): Within 35 minutes, attackers consecutively uploaded durabletask versions 1.4.1, 1.4.2, and 1.4.3 at 00:19, 00:49, and 00:54, bypassing normal release controls and impersonating official Microsoft releases. Additionally, these two events—the large-scale GitHub token leaks (potentially exposing official repositories) and the Grafana Labs targeted ransom attack—are likely related to the Mini Shai-Hulud supply chain compromise: • GitHub token leaks: Evidence suggests some leaked tokens may have been used to access and potentially sell official GitHub repositories. The leaks were caused by a compromised employee device, which involved a polluted VS Code extension. • Grafana Labs attack (May 16, 2026): A cybercrime group gained unauthorized access to their GitHub repositories, downloaded the codebase, and issued a ransom demand under threat of data disclosure. Affected Components / Targets: • npm packages: AntV, Echarts-for-react, and other high-frequency components in the npm ecosystem. • Python packages: durabletask 1.4.1, 1.4.2, 1.4.3. • Developer credentials and secrets: GitHub PATs, npm Tokens, AWS Keys, Kubernetes Secrets, Vault Tokens, SSH keys, and over 90 types of local sensitive files. • GitHub repositories: internal codebases potentially accessible via leaked tokens. • Grafana Labs’ repositories (downloaded by attackers; ransom demanded). Potential Attacker Actions: • Immediate exfiltration of cloud and local credentials upon package installation or import. • Unauthorized access to internal repositories and sensitive cloud infrastructure. • Lateral movement across developer machines, CI/CD pipelines, and cloud workloads. • Sale and exploitation of leaked GitHub tokens. • Supply chain compromise affecting dependent projects and production systems. • Ransom demands and potential data disclosure threats against organizations, including open source platforms. Detection Methods: • Audit npm and PyPI dependencies for affected packages: • npm: npm ls --all • Python: pip list --outdated or pip show durabletask to confirm versions. • Inspect lockfiles (package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, pipfile.lock) for malicious versions. • Review CI/CD pipelines and deployment logs for installation of compromised packages. • Monitor GitHub and cloud activity for unusual authentication events, including signs of leaked token usage. Mitigation Measures: • Immediately rotate all exposed GitHub, npm, PyPI, and cloud credentials. • Replace affected npm/PyPI packages with verified safe versions or freeze dependency versions. • Isolate potentially compromised systems and audit for credential theft or lateral movement. • Apply security patches and review post-compromise artifacts in CI/CD pipelines. Additional Recommendations: • Enable real-time monitoring and alerting for suspicious token or key usage. • Implement stricter dependency review policies and supply chain risk checks. • Educate teams to verify package authenticity before installation. • Monitor dark web or underground marketplaces for leaked credentials related to your organization. SlowMist will continue to track and monitor developments related to this incident, including potential new malicious releases or related exploits. MistEye has already pushed relevant threat intelligence to clients to help them proactively assess and mitigate risks.
显示更多
0
4
51
16
转发到社区
🚨 SlowMist TI Alert 🚨 The Shai-Hulud malware has resurfaced via the npm account atool(i@hust.cc), with over 600 malicious versions published. Notably, high-download packages such as size-sensor@1.1.4 (4.2M dl/mo), echarts-for-react@3.1.7 (3.8M dl/mo), and @antv/scale@0.6.2 (2.2M dl/mo) are at elevated risk. The attack carries risks: 1. AI agent hijacking: Claude Code, Codex, and VS Code tasks can trigger a Bun bootstrapper that re-executes the malicious payload. 2. Credential harvesting: The malware collects credentials from cloud services, GitHub, npm, local environments, and CI/CD pipelines. Using ^ to specify version ranges may cause npm to automatically install versions that have been compromised or contain security risks. Detection & Mitigation Measures: • Audit dependencies for any package published by atool (i@hust.cc) and check for suspicious preinstall scripts • Remove compromised packages and rotate all exposed credentials • Inspect CI/CD pipelines and local Node.js projects for malicious hooks or workflows • Revert to safe package versions or known-good dependencies ⚠️ Critical Action: Treat any system with affected packages as potentially compromised. Apply mitigation steps immediately.
显示更多
We recently issued an alert regarding the active supply chain attack targeting the foundational Node.js library node-ipc (malicious versions: 9.1.6, 9.2.3, 12.0.1). ✍️We have now published a detailed technical analysis covering the attack background, payload deobfuscation, credential stealing & DNS tunneling exfiltration, trigger mechanisms, and remediation recommendations. 📖 Full Analysis:
显示更多
🚨 SlowMist TI Alert 🚨 MistEye has received critical threat intelligence regarding an active supply chain attack compromising node-ipc, a foundational Node.js library. The malicious releases have been identified as versions 9.1.6, 9.2.3, and 12.0.1. Threat actors injected an obfuscated credential-stealing payload into the CommonJS bundle. Once loaded, it silently harvests over 90 categories of developer data—including AWS, Azure, GCP, SSH, K8s tokens, and Terraform states—and exfiltrates it to attacker-controlled infrastructure. We have synchronized this IOC with our clients immediately. Detection & Remediation: Please urgently audit your environments for exposure: • Dependencies: Run npm ls node-ipc --all to identify direct or transitive inclusions. • Lockfiles: Search package-lock.json, yarn.lock, or pnpm-lock.yaml for the affected version ranges. • CI/CD: Review pipeline jobs executed after May 14, 2026, that may have pulled loose semver updates (~9.1.x, ^12, etc.). ⚠️ Critical Action: If a compromised version was installed, assume certain compromise. Do not wait for exfiltration confirmation. Downgrade to a known safe version immediately and aggressively rotate all credentials, tokens, and environment secrets present on the affected machine or CI runner. As always, stay vigilant!
显示更多
🚨 Exploit Analysis | ShapeShift FOX Colony Authorization Trust Chain Flaw SlowMist analyzed the recent ShapeShift FOX Colony exploit on Arbitrum, where attackers abused a semantic conflict between meta-transactions and DSAuth self-call authorization to hijack the resolver and drain all ERC20 assets via malicious delegatecall. 🔍 Key Takeaways: • Arbitrary self-call in executeMetaTransaction() • DSAuth auto-trust for address(this) • Resolver hijacking through meta-tx • Full asset drain via delegatecall 🌟This incident shows how individually “reasonable” designs can combine into a complete privilege bypass chain. Developers should strictly restrict sensitive selectors in meta-transaction systems and avoid unconditional self-call authorization patterns. Full analysis👇
显示更多
🚨 SlowMist TI Alert 🚨 MistEye has received critical threat intelligence regarding an active supply chain attack compromising node-ipc, a foundational Node.js library. The malicious releases have been identified as versions 9.1.6, 9.2.3, and 12.0.1. Threat actors injected an obfuscated credential-stealing payload into the CommonJS bundle. Once loaded, it silently harvests over 90 categories of developer data—including AWS, Azure, GCP, SSH, K8s tokens, and Terraform states—and exfiltrates it to attacker-controlled infrastructure. We have synchronized this IOC with our clients immediately. Detection & Remediation: Please urgently audit your environments for exposure: • Dependencies: Run npm ls node-ipc --all to identify direct or transitive inclusions. • Lockfiles: Search package-lock.json, yarn.lock, or pnpm-lock.yaml for the affected version ranges. • CI/CD: Review pipeline jobs executed after May 14, 2026, that may have pulled loose semver updates (~9.1.x, ^12, etc.). ⚠️ Critical Action: If a compromised version was installed, assume certain compromise. Do not wait for exfiltration confirmation. Downgrade to a known safe version immediately and aggressively rotate all credentials, tokens, and environment secrets present on the affected machine or CI runner. As always, stay vigilant!
显示更多
0
2
41
14
转发到社区
🚨SlowMist TI Alert🚨 💸 @Aurellion_Labs Loss: 455,003 USDC (~$455,003) 🔍 Root Cause: Unprotected initialize(address varg0) in SafeOwnable Facet. Diamond set owner via non-initialize path without updating _initialized version slot (bytes 0-7 of 0xf0c57e...) from 0, allowing re-init by attacker to overwrite owner, call diamondCut to inject malicious facet with pullERC20, and drain approved USDC. 📌 Victim Contract: 0x0adc63e71b035d5c7fdb1b4593999fa1f296f1b2 📌 Vulnerable Facet: 0x3ca79c1cf29b8d19f7c643bb6e6bc9c49762e70f 📌 Attacker EOA: 0x9f49591a3bf95b49cd8d9477b4481ce9da68d5ca Attacker seized Diamond ownership and drained USDC from approved victims including 0x2e933518..., 0xa90714a1..., 0xeced2d37.... Powered by #SlowMist#.AI
显示更多
0
2
39
11
转发到社区