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🎧 RWACast Ep.1: Pre-IPO Onchain: What You're Actually Holding When You Buy a Pre-IPO Token "Some of them buy real shares. Some hold fund units. And some have nothing at all. They just make you a promise." This week on RWACast, we sat down with Robert, Executive Director at Tiantu Asset Management HK (SFC Type 9, ex-ISI), to unpack how the pre-IPO allocation market really works, and why most onchain buyers can't tell which of the three kinds of pre-IPO tokens they own. If you've bought a pre-IPO token, or you're about to, you shouldn't miss this episode. 🎙 w/ @Kristian_cy Mandarin with English subtitles. 🧵 Episode Timeline: 00:00 Welcome to RWACast with Robert, Tiantu Asset Management HK 00:27 Robert's background: ISI, Evercore, Tiantu 04:17 Where pre-IPO returns come from: access first, price second 08:01 How a star deal flows from the cap table down to the market 13:50 When secondary beats primary: $8B round vs $5.5B employee shares 15:31 Where deals break: structure and hidden fees, rarely valuation 22:20 Economic exposure vs legal ownership, and the TRS nobody notices 28:47 Three kinds of pre-IPO tokens: real shares, fund units, or a promise 32:24 Can a company block a token of its own shares? 37:25 What's the fair price: last round, secondary, broker quote, perp 43:40 Conflict of interest: one platform doing everything, no SEC 47:31 The unsolved problem: distribution 50:04 CFIUS, SpaceX excluding China 59:31 Moving tokenization earlier: Anthropic from under $10B to $1T+ 1:07:56 Hong Kong: regulatory innovation and the sandbox window 1:15:34 Final thoughts: platforms have to be the referee Full episode in the comments 👇
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Regarding the recent drama involving Cye and Britney,also hanks and Wesley exposed details about Britney—I also want to help people know what kind person Britney is by providing some new evidence below. In the video, Britney said she brought in her own players ,hired them at the table to control who wins and who loses . which means She brought in pros she was staking (owning most of their action) to control the outcomes. If you understand Mandarin, Britney was literally talking in the video about her plan to fleece boss. She was telling the person next to her that, “We need to bring our own horses,” because “that way we can control who wins and who loses.”带自己的枪手!带枪手控制输赢!证据确凿!
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Mandarin Speakers Exclusive 🥢 下周在坡的家人们欢迎来Polymarket的华语约饭局,跟我和@XtineFang 一起吃香香饭! (注册了请私信!坡上见)
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Watters: Mamdani speaking that language of the revolution, Mandarin Chinese.
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I finally got my mandarin certificate 和我非常高兴!!!!
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Had a great convo with Lisa from 天下雜誌. Taiwan is like a second home. Many of my childhood friends were Taiwanese. That's why my Mandarin carries a Taiwanese accent. 😄 We talked about the early Binance days, family, and what I’m focused on now.
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Nayeon greeting in Mandarin at the GROVE event in Shanghai, China.
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🚨 On July 1, Beijing's New "Ethnic Unity" Law Goes Live — and Article 63 Reaches Into Your Living Room. July 1 is not a routine compliance date. That morning, the People's Republic of China activates the Law on Promoting Ethnic Unity and Progress, passed by the 14th National People's Congress (NPC) on March 12 and signed the same day by Xi Jinping. Sixty-five articles, seven chapters, one preamble — and one provision foreign capitals are still under-reading. Article 63 is the extraterritorial clause. Verbatim, it asserts jurisdiction over "organizations and individuals outside the [mainland] territory of the PRC that commit acts aimed at the PRC that undermine ethnic unity and progress or create ethnic division." The operative categories are deliberately elastic, the same structural choice that gave Hong Kong's National Security Law its global reach. The difference: Hong Kong's statute nominally orbits one territory. This one is drafted without borders. Writing in Japan's PRESIDENT magazine on June 21, commentator Tsukasa Shirakawa — an LDP Chiyoda Ward (Tokyo) assembly member — described the statute as the completed form of Xi Jinping's "external-suppression infrastructure," with Japanese companies and Japanese citizens' speech in the crosshairs. His three flags: forced Mandarin standardization that squeezes Uyghur, Tibetan, and Mongolian linguistic survival; the criminalization of cultural dissent as "separatism"; and Article 63's global reach. The reach is not theoretical. Safeguard Defenders has documented at least 102 PRC overseas "police service stations" across 53 countries — a transnational policing lattice already operating. Article 63 hands that lattice a domestic legal pretext. The audience matters. Under Beijing's grammar, a Japanese executive endorsing Taiwan, a German academic publishing on Xinjiang, an American congressional staffer briefed on Tibet — all sit inside the statute's surface area. None has to land at Beijing Capital Airport to be charged on paper. The ones who do land — diaspora Uyghurs, Tibetans, Hong Kongers, dual nationals — face confiscation and detention risk under adjacent statutes that Article 63 now scaffolds. The headline isn't the ethnic policy. The headline is jurisdiction. Beijing is claiming the right to govern global speech about China itself. ACI — Aric Chen | Insights
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Students from the UAE built Líng Huà, an Arabic-first Mandarin learning platform powered by Huawei Cloud AI. It removes the need to translate through English, using speech recognition, AI scoring, and translation to help learners develop Mandarin skills intuitively.
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jadi mahasiswa bahasa mandarin tiap hari mual liat hanzi
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