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UPDATE: The database issue has been resolved and SSL is now fully activated. ✅ You can now proceed with your application. We apologize for the inconvenience and appreciate your patience! 💙 🤖 Dear CyberThrone Community, If you haven't secured a mint spot yet, we have good news! 💙 Our Wallet Submission Platform is now available, giving everyone another opportunity to join the CyberThrone mint. 🔹 Complete a few simple tasks 🔹 Submit your wallet 🔹 We review your on-chain activity Submitting a wallet does not guarantee a whitelist spot. We are looking for genuine holders and will check for bot/scripted minting and patterns of quickly flipping free or discounted mints. 🔐 Using a hot + cold wallet? You can submit both, and we will review them together. Our goal is simple: give the remaining spots to those who genuinely want to support and be part of CyberThrone. We support those who support us. 💙 CyberThrone Team

🚨 On September 6, 2026, @Liquid_BTC was affected by a cache key collision vulnerability in rangeproof verification. An attacker minted ~3,998.5 L-BTC with no corresponding peg-in. Within minutes, the unbacked L-BTC was pegged out into real BTC on the Bitcoin mainnet. About 3,400 BTC was later returned to the federation peg wallet, while ~598.5 BTC remains under the attacker’s control. The SlowMist Security Team traced the fund flows on the #Bitcoin# side using @MistTrack_io and fully analyzed the incident. 🧩 Attack flow: 1️⃣ Two setup transactions first landed valid rangeproofs and commitments, while embedding a crafted payload in the locking script to seed node caches. 2️⃣ A follow-up minting output reused a colliding cache key — the same raw concatenation of proof, commitment, asset commitment, and scriptPubKey, but with different field boundaries. 3️⃣ On a cache hit, nodes skipped secp256k1_rangeproof_verify and min-value checks, accepted an unbacked commitment, and minted ~3,998.5 L-BTC. The fake UTXOs were consolidated and pegged out within minutes. ⚙️ Root Cause: The Elements rangeproof cache key concatenated variable-length fields without length prefixes. Distinct argument tuples could hash to the same key, so a positive cache hit meant skipping cryptographic verification. 🛡️ SlowMist Insight: A positive-result cache in a consensus verification path is itself a cryptographic primitive. Every field the verifier reads — and every field boundary — must be unambiguously bound into the key. Treat cache-key integrity as a mandatory item in consensus-layer audits. Full analysis👇

🚨SlowMist TI Alert🚨 💸 @BeatXswap Loss: 2,984,557 BTX (~$77,512) 🔍 Root Cause: The `LiquidityVestingConvert` contract calculates BTX quotes via `_calculateQuote()`, which reads `IUniswapV3Pool.slot0()` spot price as the sole oracle. No TWAP protection, no sanity check, no deviation limit. An attacker borrowed 6,000,000 BTX via flash loan, dumped it into the V3 pool to crash `sqrtPriceX96`, then called `deposit()` twice (10,000 + 2,000 USDT), triggering `POSITION_MANAGER.mint()` at the manipulated spot price and draining BTX from LP positions. 📌 Attacker: 0x67B2f08683A735cfE6f6E57fA86909b62218C2a1 📌 Victim: 0x1e647FAADb05f2124BFCcFC003EDc06D1A90bf5D 0x9a7A92240FBAc4030b65A6E61239928d6Bcc716F 📌 Vulnerable Contract: 0x1e647FAADb05f2124BFCcFC003EDc06D1A90bf5D Powered by Tx:

大家好，我是一名建筑环境与能源应用工程专业的大学生，我在 Robinhood Chain 上开发了一个第一款公平发射与热力挖矿协议-Heat Protocol（官方资产免费MINT）。 受@Blonskr和@fruitflydev启发我创造了历史上第一款可真实运行的热力矿机 ，一个散热器片就是一个NFT，通过管道连接所有散热器片就组成了一个可以真实运行的链上热力矿机，但是如果蝇一样连接方案有几百种甚至几千种，不同的连接方案在现实生活中就会导致房间内的温度不同，同样对应链上就是算力不同！ 现在我们创建了协议的官方散热器片Heat Protocol。 MINT网站： 总量： 2500万 mint单价: 免费 单推特单钱包限制：10000 白名单： 6万 注：（之前网站崩溃时mint的自动成为白名单，如果有蓝V KOL想要白可以私信我做推文任务。） 我们的优势： 1.设计创新，第一次引入热力矿机概念，潜力无限。 2.免费MINT，mint完成或者mint过程中我可能随时结束mint然后发射代币开启挖矿，我自己掏腰包到PONS市场买入约3亿筹码供大家挖矿。 3.代币税费每天回购代币加入矿池，源源不断的增加矿池代币容量。 4.代币销毁制度：社区创建代币会销毁50000官方代币，不断缩减总量增加市值。 开源网站： （后续有更新） @Blonskr @ponsdotfamily @RobinhoodApp @cz_binance @youyou5202

Some of you told me you missed the chance 🥺 So I’m giving you 5 more hours 🩷 Your last chance to mint. Only 25 NFT boxes left 👇🏻 Ends Sep 11, 2 AM MYT / Sep 10, 6 PM UTC.

Only 2000 TMF Passes will ever exist. Here's some info (since sharing is caring), with more to come: 🪑 Each pass allows you to mint 2 seats. 🪑 Passes are soulbound (non-tradable). 🪑 The website WILL have a UGC application for TMF Passes. Start brainstorming! Mint Price: TBA

🚨SlowMist TI Alert🚨 💸 @EnsoBuild Loss: ~5.6 ETH 🔍 Root Cause: An oracle price calculation error occurred in the Enso Finance / DPI Strategy Vault. In `Controller.deposit()`, the EnsoOracle's `estimateStrategy()` is called before and after the user tokens are transferred, and shares are minted on the difference: `mint = amountAdded * totalSupply / valueBefore`. The valuation chain — EnsoOracle → ItemEstimator → `ProtocolOracle.consult()` — prices tokens via UniV3 `pool.observe()`, but the registry's `fee` field is reused as `secondsAgo`, producing a near-spot TWAP window. Due to the absence of TWAP consistency checks or price range validation—combined with the fact that the liquidity in the Uniswap v3 pool used for price calculation was inherently imbalanced—an attacker was able to swap 0.683 WETH for 268.42 FARM tokens on Uniswap v2 in a single transaction, while the imbalanced v3 pool incorrectly valued that amount at 6.3 WETH (~ 9.2x). Subsequently, an excessive number of shares were minted at an incorrect price and redeemed for profit. 📌 Attacker: `0x3196398321D77a2511d369DCB6eCa9d2aD87b73A` 📌 Victim (Strategy): `0x890ed1ee6d435a35d11051d9ed97ff457ce53b5942` 📌 Vulnerable contract: Controller impl: `0xd8D22509C1fe47516D8F82A28CFd728111F57Ef1` Oracle: `0xAb7505eB360cE0D63e8E88f7853677EcD5537DC0` Powered by Tx:

感谢four @fourdotmemezh @four_meme_Fora 非常公平地处理了BNC4的mint请求，完全没有老鼠仓，我作证（因为我是第一个转账开票的，第一个发给我了） 3wu-23wu Easy Money. 永远爱