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【情報解禁】 ============ テレビ東京 2024年1月期水ドラ25 「推しを召し上がれ～広報ガールのまろやかな日々～」 飯野朝子 役 2024/1/10(水)スタート 毎週水曜25:00～25:30 ============ @tx_oshimeshi #推しを召し上がれ# #推し召し# #生駒里奈# #生駒ちゃん#

🚨SlowMist TI Alert🚨 💸 @LienFinance Loss: ~542k USD 🔍 Root Cause: The `exchangeEquivalentBonds` function in BondMakerCollateralizedEth lacks proper multiset integrity checks. It only counts total exception occurrences instead of verifying each bondID's appearance per group. By repeating a single exception bondID in the output group, attackers consumed the exception count twice, masking a missing input exception. This allowed minting new non-exception BondTokens without burning the corresponding input bonds, which were then sold for USDC from a pre-approved victim address. 📌 Attacker: 0x0d7d9023531ad1a88414e216ee2715f63561808a 📌 Victim: 0xa961684a3a654fb2cca8f8991226c0cefc514d80 📌 Vulnerable Contract: 0xda6fc5625e617bb92f5359921d43321cebc6bef0, 0x843225cf6e663e4454732d6b551a737ac7b47de0 Attackers exploited the flawed exception-counting logic to mint unbacked bond tokens, swapped them for USDC via three pre-authorized endpoints, and drained 542,144.628604 USDC from the victim. Powered by Tx:

🚨 SlowMist TI Alert 🚨 💸 @VerusCoin Loss: ~$7.5M ⚠️ Unlike the prior 0x6990…b321 exploit, which decoupled the validated proof from the executed transfer payload, this attack hash-bound the transfers to the CCE but failed to validate the CCE’s economic backing; both exploit flawed cross-chain import validation. 🔍 Root Cause: `VerusProof.checkExportAndTransfers` verified selected CCE fields—including `hashReserveTransfers` against attacker-supplied serialized transfers and the source/destination IDs—but did not enforce the CCE’s accounting semantics. It failed to parse or validate `totalamounts`, `totalfees`, `totalburned`, CTxOut `nValue`, or whether the prior CCE outpoint carried sufficient value and assets to cover the claimed transfers. As a result, a matching transfer hash was incorrectly treated as authorization to release bridge assets, rather than merely a commitment to the requested transfers. 📌 Attacker EOA: 0xbda71b58cec0b1c20a8f87ccd52fa0679747855c 📌 Victim Bridge: 0x71518580f36feceffe0721f06ba4703218cd7f63 📌 Vulnerable Contract: 0x54e03a1682fd0bb065b669f6296f97028dcfd4ce 📌 Fund Receiver: 0xcfd0a20703cd11e0b9f665e1c3f1ef989c142d54 Impact: The attacker submitted a successor CCE anchored to an accepted Verus state root, containing a hash commitment to eight attacker-defined reserve transfers. Because the bridge did not verify whether the CCE’s economic fields backed those transfers, it executed eight payouts from bridge custody to the attacker-controlled receiver—releasing ETH, DAI, USDC, USDT, and four additional tokens without enforced cross-chain asset backing. Powered by Tx:

🚨 $24.15M USDC drained from an Arbitrum bridge — — 5 compromised keys 5 hot-validator signatures carried 7,142/10,000 power (>2/3 quorum). The contract did exactly what it was told — the keys were the weak point. Two-phase attack, both traced on-chain: 1⃣ Propose (carries the 5 sigs + full 7-validator set, powers sum to 10,000) 2⃣ 200s dispute window → Execute (releases 24.15M USDC, bridged out via CCTP) Sigs are in the propose tx, not the withdrawal tx 👇 Propose: Execute: Stolen funds: 0x627654B2782bfC57580ecD11d40869b350B6ebAC now on ETH chain. 12,467.43703738 ETH

Blockaid detected an exploit at 2026-07-22 21:30 UTC targeting @AFX_XYZ, a protocol on @arbitrum. The exploit was specific to a bridge that AFX operates. Approximately 24.15M USDC has been drained thus far from the protocol. Our team has been working with the incredible folks on the Arbitrum team to respond to the incident, to engage with the affected protocol, and to help them contain the stolen funds. Exploit tx:

Gunners, the North America tour is here! Which show are you comin' out to? Jul 23, Raleigh, NC Jul 26, Saratoga Springs, NY Jul 29, Tinley Park, IL Aug 1, Hershey, PA Aug 5, Toronto, ON Aug 8, Shakopee, MN Aug 12, East Rutherford, NJ Aug 16, St. Louis, MO Aug 19, Kansas City, MO Aug 22, Las Vegas, NV Aug 26, Edmonton, AB Aug 29, Vancouver, BC Sep 2, San Diego, CA Sep 5, Pasadena, CA Sep 9, Arlington, TX Sep 12, Ridgedale, MO Sep 16, San Antonio, TX Sep 19, Atlanta, GA

🚨SlowMist TI Alert🚨 💸 @42dao_official Loss: ~ 912k USD 🔍 Root Cause: Attackers exploited an abnormally low BTCB oracle price from Median Oracle via Spotter `poke` and Dog `bark`. The spotter lacked price deviation checks, max drawdown limits, and minimum price protections, allowing immediate write of the low spot into Vat. The dog module then used this updated spot without any liquidation delay or oracle price validation, enabling instant liquidation of multiple BTCB vaults. 📌 Attacker: 0x9d8dd9f2d734675e2bfcc142d1c7a45609ca213c 📌 Victim: 0x973a722fd8bcd4b81f4c5c1ac687073e44aa9a0c 📌 Vulnerable Contract: 0x849dc2416cbe54995a1d725afe526c0e38829228 (Spotter) & 0x00101ae4467d72e83ef68df447c41de0c71f634e (Dog) Impact: A single-transaction combo exploited the missing price protection and liquidation delay in Maker-style system, allowing an attacker to liquidate multiple BTCB vaults using an abnormally low oracle price and profit from the arbitrage. Powered by Tx: