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炒美股还在看别人二手解读？ SEC 原始文件才是一手牌。 问题是 10-K、10-Q、8-K、13F 这些东西普通人根本懒得翻，密密麻麻几十页，看两分钟就想关。 EdgarTools 这个项目有点狠，直接把 SEC 文件变成 AI 能查的东西。 你问 Claude： 某家公司最近现金流有没有变差？ 这份 8-K 到底发生了什么事？ 机构 13F 最近加仓了谁？ 高管有没有异常买卖？ 它不是给你编财经小作文，而是去 filings 里扒原始数据。 这东西配 Claude Code 或 Codex 最适合做成自己的美股雷达：每天扫关注列表，有异常文件就推送摘要。 不保证你赚钱，但至少别再只看别人嚼过的二手消息。 🔗

⚡️段永平 Q1 首次新建仓 Circle 今日，知名投资人段永平在美国管理的一个投资账户 H&H International Investment 在其（2026 年 Q1）SEC 13F 文件中披露总计持有 19 只证券，投资组合价值超 200 亿美元。 截至 2026 年 3 月 31 日，段永平的投资组合中，前五大持仓为 -苹果 -伯克希尔哈撒韦 -英伟达 -拼多多 -特斯拉 值得注意的是，段永平在 2026 年 Q1 首次报告建仓 Circle 均价 95.41 美元持仓 200,000 股，截至发布报告时对应市值 1908 万美元，占其投资组合比例 0.1%。

段永平在美国管理的投资账户 H&H International Investment 于 2026 年第一季度提交的 SEC 13F 文件显示： 目前持股 200,000 股 Circle 股票，市值 1908.2 万美元，占组合比例约 0.1%。 $CRCL

🧐段永平 2026 年 Q1 新建仓 Circle，均价 95 美元 知名投资人段永平在美国管理的一个投资账户 H&H International Investment 在其（2026 年第一季度）SEC 13F 文件中披露总计持有 19 只证券，投资组合价值为 20,003,996,234 美元。 截至 2026 年 3 月 31 日，段永平的投资组合中，前五大持仓为苹果、伯克希尔哈撒韦、英伟达、拼多多和特斯拉。值得注意的是，段永平在 2026 年第一季度首次报告建仓 Circle，均价 95.41 美元持仓 200,000 股。

新一代股神 SITUATIONAL AWARENESS 的 Q1 13F 来了 可能很多人要失望了，几乎没有财富密码，最大变化是从“股票 + Call 多头”变成“股票 + 大量 Put 对冲”，62% 都是 PUT, 放在 Q1 价格高位 + 战争的背景下，到也能够理解 最大的三个 Call $SNDK , $BE 和 $CRWV ，清仓了所有光 4 月份这波上涨, 他大概率也做了调整，但没有显示在文件里 这个操作肯定不能照抄，市场变化这么快，但可以学习思路，股神觉得什么样的价格是过热了 完整链接放在评论区

Breaking: Leopold Aschenbrenner just filed his Q1 2026 13F Here's everything you need to know about his recent 13F Top 10 positions: 1. VanEck Semiconductor ETF $SMH [Put] — $2.04B 2. Nvidia $NVDA [Put] — $1.57B 3. Oracle $ORCL [Put] — $1.07B 4. Broadcom $AVGO [Put] — $1.01B 5. Advanced Micro Devices $AMD [Put] — $969M 6. Bloom Energy $BE — $879M 7. SanDisk $SNDK — $724M 8. Micron $MU [Put] — $584M 9. CoreWeave $CRWV — $556M 10. Taiwan Semiconductor $TSM [Put] — $535M New positions: • $SMH, $NVDA, $ORCL, $AVGO, $AMD, $MU, $TSM, $ASML, $INTC, $GLW — all puts • $MU [Call] — $422M • $TSM [Call] — $355M • $SNDK [Call] — $389M Biggest adds: • CleanSpark $CLSK: +648% shares • Riot Platforms $RIOT: +87% shares Biggest trims: • CoreWeave $CRWV [Call]: -83% shares • Bloom Energy $BE: -36% shares Full exits: • Intel $INTC [Call] — was $747M • Lumentum $LITE — was $479M • EQT Corp $EQT — was $133M • Tower Semiconductor $TSEM — was $85M Summary: He kept his AI infrastructure longs and opened $8.45B in new puts against tech and semiconductor

Leopold 13F曝光：卖半导体，梭哈算力基础设施——他看到了什么 Leopold Aschenbrenner，OpenAI前核心研究员，Situational Awareness Fund掌门人，Q1持仓终于曝光。 一句话总结：弃算力芯片，押AI基础设施全产业链——电力（BE）、存储（SNDK）、算力租赁（CRWV、IREN、CORZ）。 他的最大仓位不是intel，不是amd，而是： •Bloom Energy $878.7M——电力 •SanDisk $724.4M——存储 •CoreWeave $556.1M——AI算力租赁 •IREN $401M——GPU云基础设施 •Core Scientific $389.1M——数据中心 半导体呢？AMD只有$20.2M，SMH $10.3M，台积电$7.6M，美光$5.9M，ASML$6.1M——加起来还不够他一个Coreweave仓位的零头。 对比上个季度报告，我能看到几个明显变化： 新增/大幅加仓（Q1新出现）： 1. SNDK $724M——大幅加仓，Q4也有但规模小很多 2. IREN $401M——Q4有，Q1大幅加仓（上个季度只有8.7M shares，这个季度有11.7M shares） 3. CORZ $389M——继续持有（上个季度28.6M shares，这个季度26M，略微减仓） 4. CRWV $556M —— 大幅加仓（上个季度6.09M shares，这个季度7.2M shares） 5. APLD $320M —— 大幅加仓（上个季度11.3M shares，这个季度13.5M shares） 还加仓了RIOT和CLSK Q4有但Q1明显变化： LUMENTUM（LITE）、CIPHER MINING（CIFR）、COHERENT（COHR）、INFOSYS（INFY）——Q4在，Q1消失了，清仓了 这个持仓结构在说一件事：AI算力的红利不在造芯片的人，而在用芯片的人。电力、数据中心、算力租赁——这才是他认为的下一个十年最确定的赛道。卖铲子的赚了第一桶金，现在轮到挖矿的了。 下半年neocloud板块要到验证的时候了，大佬持仓非常看好neocloud，H200 租赁价格都到每小时7刀，B200到每小时5.73，如果芯片都按时部署，那么原定计划的ARR是不是要翻倍？ $IREN 我会越跌越补，48-50大概率再来一次，这个位置要加重仓。 #Leopold# #SituationalAwareness# #IREN# #CoreWeave# #CRWV# #AI基础设施# #13F# #美股#

Berkshire Hathaway underperformed the S&P 500 by more than 30-percentage points over the last year! Berkshire's only annual performance that was worse was in 1999 -- during the Internet mania. Today, though, Berkshire owns Apple and Google, unlike in 1999 when it didn't own any tech stocks. So, what else could explain the company's declining performance? More than a decade ago, researchers at AQR ran a series of regression studies across 30 years of Berkshire's public stock investments to discover which factors drove Buffett's outstanding investment results. They discovered -- to no one's surprise -- that Buffett buys ultra-high quality, large-cap, low-volatility stocks that are extremely cheap. But that's not all they discovered. They also disaggregated Buffett’s portfolio into two distinct sleeves and then ran the same the regression studies on each separately. The public sleeve is the portfolio of publicly traded stocks held inside Berkshire’s insurance subsidiaries — disclosed quarterly in SEC Form 13F filings. This is what most financial press coverage focuses on. The Coca-Cola, the American Express, the Apple, the Bank of America. Over the full sample it averaged about 35% of Berkshire’s total capital. The private sleeve is the portfolio of wholly-owned operating businesses — See’s Candies, Nebraska Furniture Mart, GEICO after the 1995 full acquisition, BNSF after 2010, Berkshire Hathaway Energy, Dairy Queen, NetJets, Precision Castparts, the whole roster of consolidated subsidiaries. Over the full sample the private portion grew from under 20% of Berkshire to more than 78% today. Berkshire was once an insurance company with an equity portfolio. Today it’s an insurance company owned by a conglomerate. And here's why that matters. The public sleeve — the portfolio of stocks Buffett bought fractionally and held — earned an average excess return of 12.0% per year at 16.2% volatility. Sharpe ratio: 0.74. The private sleeve — the portfolio of whole companies Buffett bought outright — earned an average excess return of 9.3% per year at 20.6% volatility. Sharpe ratio: 0.45. The publicly traded pieces of companies Buffett owned delivered materially better returns, especially when compared against the risk taken. The private sleeve’s Sharpe ratio of 0.45 is, remarkably, lower (worse) than the broad market’s 0.49 over the same period. In other words, when Buffett bought pieces of great public companies, he outperformed. When Buffett bought whole private companies, he did not. The private sleeve’s drag on Berkshire’s overall performance is meaningful. That drag was smaller in the early years, when the private portfolio was only 20% of the business. As the private sleeve has grown to 78% of Berkshire’s capital, the drag has grown proportionally. The declining Sharpe ratio of Berkshire over time — which every long-term shareholder has felt, even if they could not name it — comes primarily from the growing share of capital trapped inside whole-company acquisitions that underperform the public-market alternatives Buffett could have bought instead. Learn more about Warren's Mistakes and how to learn these lessons to improve your own investing in my new book.

#アプリボイス# さん発売記念イベントありがとうございました⸝⸝꙳ ここ最近で一番笑った🤣 ありがとうみんな……！ 楽しすぎたよーーーーーー早くまたこういう直接話せる場が欲しいと思った😢 お申込者全員特典のアクスタ等もあるけん、是非…！