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炒美股还在看别人二手解读？ SEC 原始文件才是一手牌。 问题是 10-K、10-Q、8-K、13F 这些东西普通人根本懒得翻，密密麻麻几十页，看两分钟就想关。 EdgarTools 这个项目有点狠，直接把 SEC 文件变成 AI 能查的东西。 你问 Claude： 某家公司最近现金流有没有变差？ 这份 8-K 到底发生了什么事？ 机构 13F 最近加仓了谁？ 高管有没有异常买卖？ 它不是给你编财经小作文，而是去 filings 里扒原始数据。 这东西配 Claude Code 或 Codex 最适合做成自己的美股雷达：每天扫关注列表，有异常文件就推送摘要。 不保证你赚钱，但至少别再只看别人嚼过的二手消息。 🔗

⚡️段永平 Q1 首次新建仓 Circle 今日，知名投资人段永平在美国管理的一个投资账户 H&H International Investment 在其（2026 年 Q1）SEC 13F 文件中披露总计持有 19 只证券，投资组合价值超 200 亿美元。 截至 2026 年 3 月 31 日，段永平的投资组合中，前五大持仓为 -苹果 -伯克希尔哈撒韦 -英伟达 -拼多多 -特斯拉 值得注意的是，段永平在 2026 年 Q1 首次报告建仓 Circle 均价 95.41 美元持仓 200,000 股，截至发布报告时对应市值 1908 万美元，占其投资组合比例 0.1%。

段永平在美国管理的投资账户 H&H International Investment 于 2026 年第一季度提交的 SEC 13F 文件显示： 目前持股 200,000 股 Circle 股票，市值 1908.2 万美元，占组合比例约 0.1%。 $CRCL

🧐段永平 2026 年 Q1 新建仓 Circle，均价 95 美元 知名投资人段永平在美国管理的一个投资账户 H&H International Investment 在其（2026 年第一季度）SEC 13F 文件中披露总计持有 19 只证券，投资组合价值为 20,003,996,234 美元。 截至 2026 年 3 月 31 日，段永平的投资组合中，前五大持仓为苹果、伯克希尔哈撒韦、英伟达、拼多多和特斯拉。值得注意的是，段永平在 2026 年第一季度首次报告建仓 Circle，均价 95.41 美元持仓 200,000 股。

新一代股神 SITUATIONAL AWARENESS 的 Q1 13F 来了 可能很多人要失望了，几乎没有财富密码，最大变化是从“股票 + Call 多头”变成“股票 + 大量 Put 对冲”，62% 都是 PUT, 放在 Q1 价格高位 + 战争的背景下，到也能够理解 最大的三个 Call $SNDK , $BE 和 $CRWV ，清仓了所有光 4 月份这波上涨, 他大概率也做了调整，但没有显示在文件里 这个操作肯定不能照抄，市场变化这么快，但可以学习思路，股神觉得什么样的价格是过热了 完整链接放在评论区

Breaking: Leopold Aschenbrenner just filed his Q1 2026 13F Here's everything you need to know about his recent 13F Top 10 positions: 1. VanEck Semiconductor ETF $SMH [Put] — $2.04B 2. Nvidia $NVDA [Put] — $1.57B 3. Oracle $ORCL [Put] — $1.07B 4. Broadcom $AVGO [Put] — $1.01B 5. Advanced Micro Devices $AMD [Put] — $969M 6. Bloom Energy $BE — $879M 7. SanDisk $SNDK — $724M 8. Micron $MU [Put] — $584M 9. CoreWeave $CRWV — $556M 10. Taiwan Semiconductor $TSM [Put] — $535M New positions: • $SMH, $NVDA, $ORCL, $AVGO, $AMD, $MU, $TSM, $ASML, $INTC, $GLW — all puts • $MU [Call] — $422M • $TSM [Call] — $355M • $SNDK [Call] — $389M Biggest adds: • CleanSpark $CLSK: +648% shares • Riot Platforms $RIOT: +87% shares Biggest trims: • CoreWeave $CRWV [Call]: -83% shares • Bloom Energy $BE: -36% shares Full exits: • Intel $INTC [Call] — was $747M • Lumentum $LITE — was $479M • EQT Corp $EQT — was $133M • Tower Semiconductor $TSEM — was $85M Summary: He kept his AI infrastructure longs and opened $8.45B in new puts against tech and semiconductor

Leopold 13F曝光：卖半导体，梭哈算力基础设施——他看到了什么 Leopold Aschenbrenner，OpenAI前核心研究员，Situational Awareness Fund掌门人，Q1持仓终于曝光。 一句话总结：弃算力芯片，押AI基础设施全产业链——电力（BE）、存储（SNDK）、算力租赁（CRWV、IREN、CORZ）。 他的最大仓位不是intel，不是amd，而是： •Bloom Energy $878.7M——电力 •SanDisk $724.4M——存储 •CoreWeave $556.1M——AI算力租赁 •IREN $401M——GPU云基础设施 •Core Scientific $389.1M——数据中心 半导体呢？AMD只有$20.2M，SMH $10.3M，台积电$7.6M，美光$5.9M，ASML$6.1M——加起来还不够他一个Coreweave仓位的零头。 对比上个季度报告，我能看到几个明显变化： 新增/大幅加仓（Q1新出现）： 1. SNDK $724M——大幅加仓，Q4也有但规模小很多 2. IREN $401M——Q4有，Q1大幅加仓（上个季度只有8.7M shares，这个季度有11.7M shares） 3. CORZ $389M——继续持有（上个季度28.6M shares，这个季度26M，略微减仓） 4. CRWV $556M —— 大幅加仓（上个季度6.09M shares，这个季度7.2M shares） 5. APLD $320M —— 大幅加仓（上个季度11.3M shares，这个季度13.5M shares） 还加仓了RIOT和CLSK Q4有但Q1明显变化： LUMENTUM（LITE）、CIPHER MINING（CIFR）、COHERENT（COHR）、INFOSYS（INFY）——Q4在，Q1消失了，清仓了 这个持仓结构在说一件事：AI算力的红利不在造芯片的人，而在用芯片的人。电力、数据中心、算力租赁——这才是他认为的下一个十年最确定的赛道。卖铲子的赚了第一桶金，现在轮到挖矿的了。 下半年neocloud板块要到验证的时候了，大佬持仓非常看好neocloud，H200 租赁价格都到每小时7刀，B200到每小时5.73，如果芯片都按时部署，那么原定计划的ARR是不是要翻倍？ $IREN 我会越跌越补，48-50大概率再来一次，这个位置要加重仓。 #Leopold# #SituationalAwareness# #IREN# #CoreWeave# #CRWV# #AI基础设施# #13F# #美股#

Berkshire Hathaway underperformed the S&P 500 by more than 30-percentage points over the last year! Berkshire's only annual performance that was worse was in 1999 -- during the Internet mania. Today, though, Berkshire owns Apple and Google, unlike in 1999 when it didn't own any tech stocks. So, what else could explain the company's declining performance? More than a decade ago, researchers at AQR ran a series of regression studies across 30 years of Berkshire's public stock investments to discover which factors drove Buffett's outstanding investment results. They discovered -- to no one's surprise -- that Buffett buys ultra-high quality, large-cap, low-volatility stocks that are extremely cheap. But that's not all they discovered. They also disaggregated Buffett’s portfolio into two distinct sleeves and then ran the same the regression studies on each separately. The public sleeve is the portfolio of publicly traded stocks held inside Berkshire’s insurance subsidiaries — disclosed quarterly in SEC Form 13F filings. This is what most financial press coverage focuses on. The Coca-Cola, the American Express, the Apple, the Bank of America. Over the full sample it averaged about 35% of Berkshire’s total capital. The private sleeve is the portfolio of wholly-owned operating businesses — See’s Candies, Nebraska Furniture Mart, GEICO after the 1995 full acquisition, BNSF after 2010, Berkshire Hathaway Energy, Dairy Queen, NetJets, Precision Castparts, the whole roster of consolidated subsidiaries. Over the full sample the private portion grew from under 20% of Berkshire to more than 78% today. Berkshire was once an insurance company with an equity portfolio. Today it’s an insurance company owned by a conglomerate. And here's why that matters. The public sleeve — the portfolio of stocks Buffett bought fractionally and held — earned an average excess return of 12.0% per year at 16.2% volatility. Sharpe ratio: 0.74. The private sleeve — the portfolio of whole companies Buffett bought outright — earned an average excess return of 9.3% per year at 20.6% volatility. Sharpe ratio: 0.45. The publicly traded pieces of companies Buffett owned delivered materially better returns, especially when compared against the risk taken. The private sleeve’s Sharpe ratio of 0.45 is, remarkably, lower (worse) than the broad market’s 0.49 over the same period. In other words, when Buffett bought pieces of great public companies, he outperformed. When Buffett bought whole private companies, he did not. The private sleeve’s drag on Berkshire’s overall performance is meaningful. That drag was smaller in the early years, when the private portfolio was only 20% of the business. As the private sleeve has grown to 78% of Berkshire’s capital, the drag has grown proportionally. The declining Sharpe ratio of Berkshire over time — which every long-term shareholder has felt, even if they could not name it — comes primarily from the growing share of capital trapped inside whole-company acquisitions that underperform the public-market alternatives Buffett could have bought instead. Learn more about Warren's Mistakes and how to learn these lessons to improve your own investing in my new book.

Here's the #1# thing most people don't know about Warren Buffett: There is nothing special about Buffett’s stock picking. That doesn’t mean that Buffett wasn’t a great investor. He was! Buffett was, by far, the greatest investor in history, by a huge margin. Over 486 months between October 1976 and March 2017 –— 41 years –— Berkshire Hathaway’s Class A stock earned an average excess return of 18.6% per year above U.S. Tbills. Annualized volatility was 23.5%. Sharpe ratio: 0.79. Berkshire’s Sharpe ratio of (0.79) is roughly 1.6x times the broad U.S. stock market’s Sharpe ratio of 0.49 over the same period. Among all large-cap U.S. stocks and mutual funds with 30-plus-year continuous track records, those are unmatched numbers. A dollar invested in Berkshire on October 31, 1976, was worth more than $3,685 by March 31, 2017. A dollar invested in the S&P 500 with dividends reinvested over the same period was worth approximately $76. Buffett beat a passive index by a multiple of 48. But he didn’t do it with stock picking! Three researchers at AQR Capital Management –— Andrea Frazzini, David Kabiller, and Lasse Heje Pedersen –— dissected Berkshire’s 50 years of investments through 2013. They expanded and republished their findings in 2018 in the Financial Analysts Journal, which is the most highly respected industry financial journal. Their work won the Graham and Dodd Award for the best published paper of the year. The paper is called Buffett’s Alpha. They found, after accounting for cheap leverage (from the insurance float) and exposure to a handful of publicly documented factor premiums, Buffett’s investment skill –— the portion of his returns that cannot be explained by any mechanical strategy –— is 0.3% per year. That's statistically indistinguishable from zero. In other words, the alpha that Berkshire enjoyed for 50 years (as it compounded capital at 24% a year!) wasn’t due to Buffett’s stock picking. So, how did he do it? He did it by gaining access to a huge amount of investment capital that he did not own, for free. Buffett’s track record was built on leverage. That’s a dirty word for most investors, but it's the secret behind Berkshire. The AQR researchers had access to something most Buffett commentators do not: 40 years of Berkshire’s audited financial statements and the full quarterly history of the public 13F stock portfolio. The researchers asked a specific question: If I take Berkshire’s monthly stock returns from October 1976 through March 2017, and I run a linear regression against a set of well-documented risk factors –— market beta, size, value, momentum, and two newer factors called Betting-Against-Beta and Quality-Minus-Junk (detailed below) –— how much of Buffett’s performance can the factors explain? And after the factors have been stripped out, how much excess return remains? The data show clearly there are a few qualities that drove Berkshire’s results. First, Buffett has always preferred large-cap stocks, contrary to the popular image of him as a small-cap value investor. He buys elephants. Second, no surprise, Buffett buys cheap. Berkshire is almost six standard deviations away from neutral on the value axis. So far the picture is ordinary. Every large- cap value manager in America loads positively on size and on value. Buffett’s genius lies in the last two factors. These last two factors are a little complicated, but please stick with me. There’s a new factor, that, like value and size, characterizes Buffett’s strategy. It’s called Betting-Against-Beta (“BAB”). What it means is intentionally investing in stocks with very low volatility. The BAB factor captures the excess return that accrues to investors who own low-beta stocks. Low-beta stocks have historically earned higher risk-adjusted returns than high-beta stocks. Financial theory teaches that higher beta (higher risk) should mean higher return. But it doesn’t. The opposite occurs, in fact. And Buffett was one of the very first people to figure this out. Why does this factor persist? In an efficient market, once that factor is known to investors, then they should bid the price up on low- beta stocks until it no longer provides an edge. The explanation, per the theory of AQR’s Frazzini and Pedersen’s theory, is that because ordinary investors do not use leverage and seek high returns, they create persistent excess demand for more volatile stocks. (Having worked with retail investors for 30 years, I can assure you that is true.) But, an investor with access to cheap leverage –— Warren Buffett, for instance –— can exploit the mispricing by owning the low-beta names and levering them up to produce market-beating returns. And the last factor that matters to Buffett is quality. Buffett buys companies with high returns on invested capital. Quality-Minus-Junk (“QMJ”) is a factor described by Cliff Asness, also at AQR with Frazzini, and Pedersen, in a 2019 paper in Review of Accounting Studies. The QMJ factor captures the return to owning stocks of high-quality companies –— profitable, growing, safe, with high payout ratios –— against stocks lacking those characteristics. QMJ has been positive and statistically significant in every major developed equity market for which it has been measured. Berkshire’s loading is 0.37, with a t-statistic of 4.6. –– meaning it is highly significant to Berkshire’s results. In plain English: Buffett only buys large, high- quality, low-volatility stocks of the highest quality. But, Berkshire’s results were not, in any way, unusual. Any investor buying these same kinds of stocks would have earned those same returns –– about 16% a year over time. So how did Berkshire compound at 23% a year? To figure that out, AQR’s researchers built a Berkshire replica. They constructed a simple, rules-based, publicly investable portfolio that mechanically tilts toward large-cap, cheap, low-beta, high-quality stocks, and levers it 1.6- to- 1 to match Berkshire’s insurance float leverage. The correlation between their replica’s returns and Berkshire’s were virtually identical. The authors’ conclusion is unambiguous. “In summary, we find that Buffett has developed a unique access to leverage that he has invested in safe, high-quality, cheap stocks and that these key characteristics can largely explain his impressive performance.” Berkshire’s cost of insurance float has averaged almost three percentage points below the Treasury bill rate across 50fifty years of data. In roughly two-thirds of all years, Berkshire has been paid to hold other people’s money. That is not an investment strategy. That is a financing miracle. It is also the living, breathing heart of Berkshire Hathaway. It’s what Buffett built, starting in 1967 when he paid $8.6 million for National Indemnity’s $19.4 million of float. And it is the factor every retail investor admiring Berkshire’s returns has never paid any attention to. The 1.6-to-1 leverage that AQR measured over the full period, financed at this negative cost, explains the dollar magnitude of Berkshire’s returns. How do we know? An unleveraged version of the same stock portfolio –— which you can approximate by looking at the 13F holdings alone –— has earned an average excess return of 12% percent per year. It’s Berkshire’s leverage that magnifies this excess return to 18.6 %percent. How does this square with Berkshire’s reported gains? Berkshire’s 18.6% excess return, plus the T-bill rate that averaged roughly 4.7% over 1976–2017, gives you a total nominal return of roughly 23% per year, which is the figure you usually see quoted for Berkshire’s historical performance. The 23% tells you what Berkshire returned. The 18.6% tells you how much of that return was compensation for taking investment risk, as opposed to the baseline yield every lender to the U.S. government was earning anyway. With both of Berkshire’s “edges” –— systematic factor exposures to cheap, high-quality, low-volatility stocks and roughly 1.6-to-1 leverage delivered with insurance float –— you get Berkshire Hathaway’s 23% annual gains over 60 years. It’s the structure that’s genius, not the stock picking. And that's very important because it means the original Berkshire formula can work for any investor. I show you exactly how, in my new book.