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／ ♪IOSYS監修 オズリライト×バーチャルアーティストIA コラボMV 『Buzz is Justice!』Full版公開！ ＼ 歌：IA（@IA_Official_）シャルロット(@nagaku_yuki) 作編曲：コバヤシユウヤ（@IOSYS_OS） 作詞：Joh=hive（@IOSYS_OS） ギター：三浦公紀 （@Kouki__Miura） 駆け出しミーチューバーのシャルロットがIAと共に「有名になりたい！」という夢に全力で挑む楽曲。IAファンやボカロファンも必聴の、平成ユーロビート×令和トラップの融合サウンド✨ バズりたい彼女の思いがSNSカルチャーやネットミームに！？思わず笑顔になる仕掛けもたくさん！ぜひ映像もお楽しみください(≧∇≦)ノ Youtubeリンク↓ #IA# #iosys# #ボカロ# #ozrewrite# #オズリライト#

we hacked ledger. the @OneKey_Anzen team has successfully reproduced a transaction replacement attack against ledger ethereum app 1.22.1 in our lab. the bug is a race condition between the transaction display logic and the underlying transaction buffer. an attacker can overwrite the transaction waiting to be signed while the user is still reviewing a legitimate one. in simple terms: - you see transaction a on your ledger. - you approve transaction a. - your ledger can end up signing transaction b. - and you never see transaction b. to reproduce this, we built the 1.22.1 ELF ourselves, fixed the speculos reset 502 issue, and got the full attack flow working end to end. ledger fixed this in ethereum app 1.22.3. if you’re still on an older version, update it.

Hi! Recapping some changes we have rolled out over the last couple of weeks that have further reduced the risk associated to potentially destructive actions being performed by Codex during its work. A few weeks ago, we started investigating a small number of reports where GPT-5.6 in Codex took destructive actions outside what the user asked for. The most serious pattern we found was a command meant to clean up temporary work that could instead delete the user files. This should obviously not happen. Here’s what we found: - Codex sometimes creates temporary folders while working and cleans them up afterward. In rare cases, GPT-5.6 got that cleanup wrong. One pattern involved reusing a system environment variable like $HOME for temporary work. A malformed cleanup command could then point at the actual home directory instead of the temporary folder. - There were cases where the model tried to delete or overwrite a temporary path without checking what was already there. We’ve added protections at several layers: - Codex is now explicitly instructed to check deletion targets before acting, create fresh temporary directories, avoid repurposing system environment variables, prefer recoverable actions, and stop when the scope is unclear. - We strengthened the execution checks that identify high-risk deletion commands and escalate them for review. If a command is rejected, the model is directed to take a safer approach. - We made Full access harder to enable accidentally, added clearer warnings, and further restricted especially risky permission combinations. - We updated Auto-review to better identify destructive actions. - We built targeted evaluations that replay the failures we observed. We’re also adding reinforcement-learning tasks and graders focused on these risks, and filtering destructive actions from training data. In those replay evaluations, the changes substantially reduced the behavior while preserving Codex’s ability to complete normal coding work. Two things to do on your end: - Keep the Codex app up to date. We are always improving safety, performance and many other things. - Use one of the sandbox modes: "Ask for approval" or "Approve for me". Only use Full access for environments you trust and can recover. Thanks and happy Codexing out there!

Kami v1.12 is a quiet one. No new templates, no new looks, just a version you can trust more. It now plans a document before laying it out, changes only the part you asked to fix and leaves approved pages alone, tells you honestly what it checked and what it skipped, and never lets a failed build overwrite your last working PDF.

🚨SlowMist TI Alert🚨 💸 @Aurellion_Labs Loss: 455,003 USDC (~$455,003) 🔍 Root Cause: Unprotected initialize(address varg0) in SafeOwnable Facet. Diamond set owner via non-initialize path without updating _initialized version slot (bytes 0-7 of 0xf0c57e...) from 0, allowing re-init by attacker to overwrite owner, call diamondCut to inject malicious facet with pullERC20, and drain approved USDC. 📌 Victim Contract: 0x0adc63e71b035d5c7fdb1b4593999fa1f296f1b2 📌 Vulnerable Facet: 0x3ca79c1cf29b8d19f7c643bb6e6bc9c49762e70f 📌 Attacker EOA: 0x9f49591a3bf95b49cd8d9477b4481ce9da68d5ca Attacker seized Diamond ownership and drained USDC from approved victims including 0x2e933518..., 0xa90714a1..., 0xeced2d37.... Powered by #SlowMist#.AI