需要特别注意下 L0 的 DVN 配置 🤔
Kelp 被盗 116,500 rsETH 事件，初步分析了下：
- 其使用的 LayerZero 跨链是 1/1 DVN 配置，也就是经典的“单签”配置，而 LayerZero 官方文档默认推荐的是 2/2
- 这个“单签单点”可能也是被社工手法干掉，当然这是猜测，具体等调查
- 攻击者在以太坊成功卷走 116,500 rsETH，实际上还尝试了两次继续卷 40,000 rsETH 失败了，攻击者手续费来自 Tornado Cash
- 116,500 rsETH 分散洗走，压力丢给了各质押平台，尤其 Aave，现在巨额坏账
- 那么最终谁来承担这些损失？就看相关受影响平台的进一步信息了…
@SlowMist_Team 我们会持续跟进。
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0x03D8096377Ea7683d840E395d72439F7B6415Abe was exploited.
Power by SlowMist AI 👇
Attack Overview
Attack Type: Oracle Manipulation (AMM Spot Price Manipulation) + Staking Reward Distribution Logic Flaw (Missing rewardDebt update) + EIP-7702 Account EOA Restriction Bypass
Victim Contract: Stake (0x03d8096377ea7683d840e395d72439f7b6415abe)
Attacker Address (EIP-7702): 0xc93a5ab3737081f00788b61da42281955d3df692
Helper Accounts (EIP-7702): 0xfd11c78a2ffc9102080f1accfb2c9cd2ce2aceab, 0x9007983c0b1db337e3c0ff29771027b8e2be550b
Total Profit: Approximately 209,793 USDT (133,490 USDT secured by 0xef670d9c2e24d1788f39ad35c70f4cc51b4e5898 and 76,303 USDT by 0x972bfaae4093baf00bd5b4db2e11d143adc16f97)
Flash Loan Source: Moolah Protocol (0x8f73b65b4caaf64fba2af91cc5d4a2a1318e5d8c), borrowing 1,900,000 USDT
Root Cause Analysis
Primary Vulnerability — Missing rewardDebt Update During Referral Reward Distribution
Contract: Stake (0x03d8096377ea7683d840e395d72439f7b6415abe)
Function: _distributeRefPower(address user, uint256 power)
Secondary Vulnerability — Price Oracle Utilizing AMM Spot Price
Contract: Stake (0x03d8096377ea7683d840e395d72439f7b6415abe)
Functions: getPowerAmount(uint256 amount) → getTURPrice() / getNobelPrice()
Both price sources rely on getReserves() (AMM spot price), which can be manipulated via flash swaps or large-scale swaps within a single transaction. This allows the attacker to artificially inflate the _power value calculated by getPowerAmount(), thereby magnifying the amount of power distributed to referrers via _distributeRefPower.
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